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1. LATIN AMERICA: A CASE OF CONTRADICTORY DEVELOPMENT 
The first questions which this chapter sets out to answer concern the 
potential complementarity of Latin America and Europe, viewed from the 
standpoint of the former. What are the possibilities and the needs of the 
Latin American countries in their relations with Europe? What are some 
of the basic criteria which should define the strategy of these relations 
during the coming years? To help answer these questions we shall begin 
with a brief analysis of some of the main possibilities and problems of 
Latin American development' and a description of the present stage of 
internal development of the countries of the region. An account will be 
given of some of the heterogeneous and even apparently contradictory 
aspects of this development, which displays important advances side by 
side with flagrant backwardness and the persistence of some serious 
problems. An attempt will be made to explain the implications of this in 
defining the type of relations with Europe which would best meet the 
needs of Latin America in the fields of trade, private investment, tech-
nology and finance. 
A. The broad stages of Latin American development 
Despite the disadvantages of simplification, it is helpful to distinguish 
three broad stages in Latin American development during the course of the 
present century. Such an overall view enables the present analysis, which 
deals with part of the second and the whole of the third of these stages, to 
be related to its historical background. As will be shown further on, the 
beginning and end of each of these stages can be only approximately 
defined. Moreover, the various Latin American countries passed through 
these stages in different ways and are even now at different points in the 
development process. 
The first stage ends approximately with the crisis of 1930. Up to 
that time the bulk of Latin American production was made up of primary 
commodities, services and, in very rudimentary form, some manufactured 
goods —mainly non-durables with a few intermediate goods— based on 
The necessary background on the internal development and external sector 
of Latin America, which may not be familiar to some European readers, is taken 
from recent CEPAL studies, especially the reports entitled The economic and social 
development and external relations of Latin America (document E/CEPALI 
1024/Rev.l, prepared for the seventeenth session of the Commission), Long-term 
trends and projections of Latin American economic development (E/CEPAL/1027), 
and The economic and social development and external relations of Latin America 
(document F/CEPAL/1061, prepared for the eighteenth session of the Commission). 
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primary commodities. The degree of protection was low and the coef-
ficient of foreign trade in relation to the GDP was high. Only primary 
commodities were exported, and many consumer goods were imported, 
chiefly durables, capital goods for internal use and manufactured interme-
diate goods. Direct foreign investment in Latin America was chiefly 
directed to primary activities, public services, trade and finance. Many of 
the Latin American countries had access to private foreign markets for 
medium- and long-term capital, where they obtained a large part of their 
financial backing from abroad. 
The world crisis of 1930 cut short this stage and ushered in the 
second. It compelled the introduction of exchange and financial regula-
tions and protection, and what was at first little more than a policy 
designed to adjust the use of foreign currency to the available resources 
was gradually transformed into a protection policy more specifically aimed 
at promoting industrial development. Protection was at a very high level 
and, due to its successive modifications, lacked the rationality needed to 
link it with clear criteria aimed at industrialization. The State gave impetus 
to the industrialization process not only through protection and the 
transfer of revenue from the primary sectors to industry, but also through 
direct action by means of development agencies, State enterprises and 
various important supporting measures. A process of import substitution 
was carried out on the basis of the closing of each national market with a 
severity and intensity which varied from one country to another. Industry 
developed vigorously, mainly in the fields of non-durable and durable 
consumer goods. The world war and the performance of the international 
economy during the post-war period also helped to promote industrializa-
tion. Progress began to be made in the production of some intermediate 
goods, but the production of basic capital and intermediate goods lagged 
noticeably behind the development of light industry. 
Exports continued to consist solely of primary commodities. The 
importation of consumer goods was gradually diminishing, and was con-
fined to essential intermediate and capital goods with a high income-
elasticity of demand. There was a constant trend towards external 
strangulation, through the slow growth of exports and the upsurge of 
import needs. The growth rate of exports and imports was much slower 
than that of the product, so that the trade coefficient systematically 
declined to quite low levels. 
A clear trend towards nationalization of direct foreign investments 
made its appearance, mainly in the field of public services and some 
mining industries. New direct investments were small during the war and 
the post-war period, in the latter case because many of the developed 
countries were in the process of reconstruction and were absorbing their 
own investments instead of exporting them. In the second half of the 
1950s, however, direct foreign investment began to increase, and after 
some initial resistance it tended to adapt itself to the import-substitution 
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model, confining itself mainly to industrial production for the domestic 
markets. There was an increase in the relative importance of external 
financing from official sources, coupled with a corresponding decline in 
recourse to the private medium- and long-term markets to which many 
Latin American countries had had access before the world war and the 
crisis. 
Technological initiative in the Latin American countries was very 
slight and haphazard; there was no explicit relationship between scientific 
and technological initiative and industrialization. 
As import substitution lost impetus and the countries had to tackle 
the production of goods of greater technical complexity, with more 
exacting requirements in respect of fixed capital or larger markets because 
of the importance of economies of scale, many Latin American countries 
began to enter a third stage. This began in the 1960s, when the trend 
towards the closing of the economies to outside trade was reversed and 
there began, through integration processes, a tentative opening up in the 
regional sphere which later spread to trade with the rest of the world. 
An effort was made to introduce non-traditional exports, including 
manufactures. Protection was reduced and rationalized, and more realistic 
exchange policies were adopted. Industry laid more stress on efficiency 
and competitiveness. At the same time most of the countries continued to 
develop import substitution, though now with a more carefully defined 
degree of protection. Thus exports and substitution became two elements 
of a single industrialization policy. 
Foreign private investment began to adapt itself, though with consi-
derable resistance and delay, to the new policy of exporting manufactures 
first within the regional sphere and more recently to the rest of the world. 
Many of the Latin American countries began to lose effective access to the 
official concessionary and even non-concessionary sources of finance and 
some of them, especially the largest, resorted to private sources of finan-
cing, above all the private banks, as access to the medium- and long-term 
capital markets was still very rare. 
Efforts began to be made in the technological field, which was still 
at an early stage but already significant and growing, especially in the 
larger countries of the region, and these efforts were increasingly related to 
the policies of exporting manufactures. 
This third stage began in response to long-term structural develop-
ment needs in the Latin American countries; during its course, however, 
policy was also influenced by the international economic crisis which 
began in 1973. As mentioned earlier, these stages did not follow a uniform 
pattern in all the Latin American countries, being more in evidence in the 
larger and some of the medium-sized countries. Some of the medium-sized 
and smaller countries exhausted their possibilities of substitution on the 
basis of their domestic markets before they had reached high coefficients 
of domestic supply even in traditional industries. More recently the 
medium-sized and relatively less developed Andean countries instituted a 
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sub-regional integration process in order to advance further in indus-
trialization and substitution by overcoming the limited size of their 
domestic markets. As far back as the 1950s the Central American 
countries had initiated an integration programme in order to make 
progress in industrialization and import substitution, which was not 
feasible for such small domestic markets on an individual basis. The 
progress made was undeniable, and it had a favourable impact on 
industrialization, but it proved impossible to attain more advanced stages 
of production of capital and basic intermediate goods, partly because even 
the conii billed market of the five countries was still too sma11.2 Some of 
the countrk.s which made a later start on some of the stages of import 
substitution followed patterns of greater efficiency and less protection 
than those employed by the larger countries in earlier years. 
ll, Outstanding features of Latin American internal development 
Within the framework of the stages described in very summary and general 
terms in the foregoing pages, this section highlights some features of Latin 
American internal development which have a special bearing on 
the region's relations with Europe. Section C of this chapter will give a 
similar account of certain features of Latin America's external relations 
and of the position occupied by the countries of the region in the world 
economy. As will be seen further on, Latin American development is 
characterized in various fundamental aspects by marked contrasts between 
the major advances made in some fields and the lags, almost total lack of 
progress, and even regression in others. 
Reference will be made to the events of the past 25 years and more 
particularly to the period following the mid-1960s, which corresponds to 
the third of the stages mentioned above. 
1. Transformation of the production structure 
During the period 1950 to 1975 the gross domestic product of Latin 
America increased at an annual rate of 5.5 per cent, exceeding by almost a 
whole point the rate of the developed market economy countries. In per 
capita terms, however, the Latin American growth rate was lower than 
that of the developed countries, since its annual population growth rate 
was around 3 per cent. The growth rate of the overall product accelerated 
up to and including 1974, since from 5 per cent per year in the 1950s it 
rose to around 5.5 per cent hi the 1960s and 6.3 per cent in the first half 
of the 1970s, but from 1975 onwards the effect of the world recession was 
seen in growth rates lower than the overall average for the preceding 
period. 
2 CEPA', The economic and social development and external relations of 
Latin America 1E/CEPAL/1024/Rev. 1), 1977, pp. 264 to 273. 
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Evolution varied appreciably from one country to another, but the 
acceleration in the growth rate was fairly general.3 This acceleration of the 
product was made possible by an appreciable increase in the growth rate of 
investment, which rose from an average of 5.7 per cent per year between 
1950 and 1965 to 8.3 per cent between 1965 and 1973. This average 
conceals very different situations in the individual countries, but the 
favourable results become clearer if the situation at the beginning of the 
1950s is compared with more recent developments in terms of invest-
ment-product coefficients. Thus, this indicator rose from 19.8 per cent in 
1950-1952 to 23.7 per cent for 1974-1975, with values exceeding 20 per 
cent in 14 of the 19 Latin American republics under study (excluding 
Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean countries). 
With this expansion in investment there has been a parallel dyna-
mism in national saving, whose coefficient in relation to the product rose 
from 18.5 per cent in 1950-1952 to 21.3 per cent in 1974-1975. 
The coefficient of domestic saving in relation to total saving has 
remained around 90 per cent (it dropped from 93 per cent to 91 per cent 
between 1950-1952 and 1974-1975), this indicator being generally higher 
for those countries which recorded higher growth rates of total invest-
ment. In this connexion, it should be noted that the fluctuations in 
external indebtedness are very wide and are linked with recurring balance-
of-payments deficits. 
2. Industrialization 
The aforementioned developments were associated with an intensive in-
dustrialization process whereby the weight of manufacturing in the total 
product increased from 18 per cent in 1950 to 24 per cent in 1975. The 
countries which were of greatest economic importance at the beginning of 
the period (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) recorded around 26.6 per cent 
of manufactures in their total gross product in 1975, while the medium-
sized and small countries achieved only an average of 17.7 per cent in the 
same year.' 
As already noted, the trend of industrialization was strongly towards 
import substitution for each domestic market until the mid-1960s, 
whereas from then on import substitution was combined with the export 
of manufactures to the regional and world markets. The more advanced 
countries came to produce a great variety of goods, including many 
engineering products of some technological complexity, and there was an 
improvement in quality and a reduction in costs which in many cases 
rivalled international levels. The share of the engineering industries in total 
manufacturing output has now passed 25 per cent and has grown very 
rapidly, since it has risen 4 points during four of the years of the present 
decade. 
3 Ibid.. pp. 33, et seq. 
4Ibid., pp. 158 and 159 
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The differences between countries are reflected also in the different 
progress achieved in specific sectors. 
The great progress made in industrialization has placed a group of 
Latin American countries in a new stage of development which can be 
described as that of semi-industrialized economies. This progress is 
counterbalanced, however, by serious deficiencies and limitations in the 
industrialization itself, three problems being outstanding in this respect. 
Firstly, this industrial development was linked with a very unequal income 
distributions and its greatest dynamism stemmed from the demand of 
medium- and high-income groups which were numerically small and had a 
very diver. 	consumption structure, strongly influenced by the 
consumption patterns of the developed countries. This helped to create 
small-scale industries, while vast sectors of the population remained on the 
sidelines of this process, even though in recent years the middle strata in 
the larger countries have come to form "critical masses" of considerable 
size. Further comments will be made on these aspects later on. 
Secondly, the developed part of industry grew up in conditions of 
heavy protection and low efficiency. This defect was gradually corrected, 
especially from the 1960s on, when the third of the stages mentioned 
earlier began and protection was reduced and more emphasis laid on the 
export of manufactures. Progress in this field is undeniable; in some cases 
price and quality have already reached international levels. However, in 
many others there still remains a considerable degree of protection which 
in turn calls for a high degree of promotion at the export level, as will be 
seen further on. 
The third problem relates to the very uneven progress made in the 
development of the manufacturing sectors. In certain light industries 
producing non-durable and durable consumer goods substitution advanced 
too far, attempting to produce everything without specialization, on a 
small scale and with little competition, while at the same time the 
industries producing basic capital and intermediate goods were systematic-
ally retarded, so that even in the larger countries a wide margin still exists 
for substitution in these sectors. On the other hand, even within the 
capital goods industry there are notable differences: some items, such as 
machine tools for general use, are being efficiently produced and exported, 
while the production of other capital goods is only just beginning. General-
ly speaking, in the capital goods field there was delay in the production of 
those goods which correspond specifically to individual industries, 
constitute the nucleus of the production equipment of particular branches 
of industry, and thus represent the technology of the sector in question. 
In contrast, more progress was made in the production of capital goods for 
general use which are equally applicable to many industries. Preference has 
been given to a type of intersectoral specialization, great progress being 
s CEPAL, Long-term trends and projections of Latin American economic 
development (E/CEPAL/1027), 1977, pp. 8 and 9. 
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made in light industry while the basic industries lagged behind. It has not 
been possible to achieve the pattern of industrial development character-
istic of mature economies, where specialization occurs within each sector 
and this is reconciled with a diversified industrial structure. Technological 
progress in the manufacture of any product —textile, food, consumer 
durable, chemical, etc.— generally materializes in the creation of new 
specific equipment incorporating this advance; it is therefore no accident 
that Latin America is backward in the production of these capital goods, if 
account is taken of its poor capacity for creation or even creative adapta-
tion of technology, together with the lack of a sufficiently defined 
scientific and technical policy and the scantiness of the resources assigned 
to these purposes.6 
The seriousness of this last problem is emphasized by the fact that 
there is backwardness precisely in those industries which play a vital part 
in the process of technological innovation. Far from specializing in one 
activity from beginning to end, vertically, in order to produce not only 
finished goods but also some of the chief intermediate goods, and espe-
cially equipment —a situation which may apply to countries which are well 
up in the technology of the sector in question and are therefore not 
harmed by having to import other goods— the Latin American countries 
have in fact adopted a kind of horizontal specialization in which innova-
tion is left entirely to the outside world. This is important, inasmuch as 
competition in the world market takes the form not only of lower costs 
and better quality but also, and especially, the development of new types 
of goods or the improvement of known ones. The appearance of new 
goods or changes in existing goods are precisely among the main causes of 
dynamism in demand. Thus the lack of capacity for innovation becomes 
an important negative factor in Latin American competitiveness abroad 
and prevents the region from sharing in the market of those goods which 
are most dynamic in terms of world demand. 
3. Agriculture and mining 
A number of points are worthy of note in relation to agriculture and 
mining. 
In the first place, the region is endowed with abundant and varied 
resources. Their exploitation, however, involves investment, technology, 
and the solution of institutional problems. As will be appreciated further 
on, natural resources continue to be the basis of 85 per cent of the total 
exports of the region. 
Over the last quarter of a century the exploitation of natural 
resources did not develop at the rate required by domestic needs and 
6Juan Ayza, Gerard Fichet and Norberto Gonzdlez, America Latina: Integra-
tion economica y sustitucion de importaciones, Fondo de Cultura EconOmica, 
Mexico City, 1975, p. 11. 
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international trade. In agriculture, the chief delaying factors were the 
structure of land ownership, the low and fluctuating level of internal and 
external prices, the failure to keep pace with the high levels of investment 
and technology needed for greater progress, and the policies of the 
developed countries, which not only affected international prices but also 
hindered access to those countries' markets. Poverty and bad distribution 
of property are still the main features of Latin American agriculture. 
Agrarian reform made little progress, and that only in a slow and uneven 
manner, and both it and the modernization of agriculture improved the lot 
of only a fraction of the poorer sectors: others emigrated to the cities or 
found complementary sources of income, whereas many made no progress 
at all. All in all there was no relief of social tensions, for there were still 
large numbers of under privileged people and furthermore the difference 
between their social and economic situation and that of the sectors which 
gained benefits became even more marked. 
At the same time, there came into being a form of modern commer-
cial agriculture, above all in the medium-sized and large farming estates, 
which showed sensitivity to price improvements, made capital investments 
and introduced improved technologies, and took advantage of State action 
in respect of infrastructure and extension. 
In mining, the region gained ground in the external sector in a few 
goods such as iron ore, but lost ground in various others. 
Simultaneously major changes took place in national policy. The 
developed countries tended rather to diversify their sources of supply, and 
foreign capital invested in these sectors was displaced in relative terms to 
other regions of the world. For their part, many of the Latin American 
countries carried out a series of nationalization measures. 
In recent years domestic demand began to be a major factor of 
growth in the mining sector. Industrial development requires an increasing 
proportion of mineral resources, and in addition there is a clear tendency 
in the countries to try to export these resources with a greater degree of 
processing than in the past. The exploitation and processing of mining 
resources, however, make great demands in respect of capital and tech-
nology. 
4. Energy 
As regards energy, the consumption growth rate in Latin America in the 
period 1950-1975 was 7 per cent per year, which was substantially higher 
than that of the developed countries (4.5 per cent per year). The elasticity 
of modern energy consumption in relation to the product has tended to 
decrease in Latin America during the last few years, in conformity with 
the experience of the more developed countries.' 
7CEPAL, The economic and social development and external relations of 
Latin America, (E/CEPAL/1024/Rev. 1), pp. 158 to 163. 
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The drastic increase in oil prices brought energy problems and 
policies, including the question of increasing production and limiting 
consumption growth rates, into the forefront of attention in the countries 
of the region. In the Latin American region as a whole oil is far and away 
the main source of energy. In recent years it provided around 80 per cent 
of modern energy needs, a figure which is the highest in the world. 
As far as oil is concerned, the countries of the region fall into four 
groups. The first is that of the countries which have been oil exporters or 
at least have not had supply problems: Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Trinidad and Tobago. To these may be added Mexico, which will soon 
begin to export. The second group consists of the countries which are 
almost self-sufficient: Argentina, Colombia and Peru. The third group 
comprises the countries which, although they do produce oil, only manage 
to supply a limited part of their own needs: Chile and Brazil. The 
remaining countries do not produce oil or produce only a very small 
proportion of their own demand (e.g., Cuba, which produces only 3 per 
cent of its consumption). 
Just as oil production is concentrated in a few countries, so are the 
reserves of oil and natural gas: 90 per cent of these are found in five 
countries, Venezuela having the largest share. Proven reserves at the 
beginning of 1976 represented 22 times the 1975 production for oil and 
64 times for natural gas. If a more flexible concept of reserves such as that 
of "expanded proven reserves" is used, this volume could be increased 
fourfold. The proportion of reserves in relation to consumption is still 
more favourable in the case of coal. 
5. Technological development 
Some of the countries of the region are reaching a level of technological 
development which, although still limited, is already significant and is 
having practical effects on their industrialization and exports. The three 
countries which have most clearly attained this level are Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. Some others, such as Colombia and Venezuela, are following 
the same trend, although they are still far behind the first three. 
This technological development has taken place parallel to a process 
marked by important contrasts. On the one hand there has been an 
increase in economic concentration, in the participation of foreign capital 
and in the assimilation of patterns of technology and demand deriving 
from societies which have reached a higher degree of development. 
Moreover, in contrast to the developed countries, whose reciprocal rela-
tions are characterized by technological interdependence, the more 
advanced countries of Latin America have relied on imitation and in many 
cases still continue in a state of dependence: they have adopted the 
advances of the developed countries with several years' delay and have 
received the designs of products and production processes from abroad, 
the transnational corporations being fundamental instruments in this. Two 
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further important facts should also be noted: first, the serious imperfec-
tions of the technology markets, where technological know-how is the 
property of just a few firms in each case, and secondly the limited 
bargaining power of the Latin American States and national firms. This has 
resulted in excessively high payments for technology and the acceptance 
of restrictive clauses such as the prohibition of exports, grant-back provi-
sions covering adaptations of technological know-how by the recipient 
enterprise, restrictive practices regarding supply of parts, inputs, dies and 
other elements, and the fixing of differential royalties between enterprises 
for what is essentially the same technological "package", etc.8 There have 
also been cases in which know-how was not really transferred to the 
purchaser, thereby keeping him in a state of dependence on the supplier 
and impeding the genuine absorption and diffusion of the new technology 
in these countries. 
The increase in the participation of foreign capital in manufacturing, 
the growing concentration in the main productive sectors, and the dete-
rioration or at least the lack of progress in patterns of income distribution, 
resulting in the continued marginalization of large sectors of the popula-
tion from the consumption and labour markets, are all indications of the 
way in which technological modernization has developed in these 
countries. 
Despite these problems and limitations, clear signs have appeared 
during recent years in the three countries mentioned of national advances 
which, despite their still limited scale, are growing rapidly and already 
showing concrete results. The amounts devoted to scientific and techno-
logical development in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are now quite sub-
stantial.9  Industrial advance has been accompanied by a greater capacity 
for the absorption, adaptation and to some degree creation of technology, 
and the manufactures exported by these countries contain numerous 
innovations in design, as do the production processes. 10 The favourable 
conditions displayed by these three countries in exporting their manu-
factures to other Latin American countries and more recently outside the 
region are undoubtedly connected with these advances. There have also 
been cases of the export of turnkey plants and of the sale of technology 
8/bid., pp. 70, et seq. 
9See CONACYT, Politica nacional de ciencia y tecnologia, estrategia, linea-
mientos y metal, Mexico City, 1976; Nuno Fidelino de Figuereido: The transfer of 
technology in the industrial development of Brazil, CEPAL (E/CN.12/937), February 
1974; Jorge Katz, Importacion de tecnologia, aprendizaje e industrializacion depen-
diente, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura EconOmica, 1976. 
t0See C. Diaz Alejandro, Some characteristics of recent export expansion in 
Latin America, Economic Growth Centre, Yale, 1973, p. 183; R. Jenkins, Interna-
tionalization of capital, multinational corporations and industrial exports in Latin 
America, Mexico City, mimeo, 1976; CEPAL, La exportacion de manufacturas en 
Mexico y la politica de promocion, Mexico City, mimeo, August 1976. 
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not incorporated in goods. Cases are also beginning to appear of firms in 
these countries establishing subsidiaries in other developing countries, 
especially within Latin America. 
There have also been noticeable advances in the scientific infrastruc-
ture, the supply of professionals and their contacts with experts of the 
developed countries. In these respects, a "critical mass" of some impor-
tance is being attained. The very fact of the "brain drain", influenced also, 
of course, by other factors such as instability, means an increasing supply 
of scientists and professionals for some countries. Moreover, some signi-
ficant technological externalities are being generated in the case of these 
three countries. 
6. Population 
The natural growth rate of the population of Latin America as a whole for 
the period 1970 to 1975 was 2.8 per cent per year. This was one of the 
highest rates in the world: three times higher than that of the developed 
areas and even somewhat above that of Africa. Brazil and Mexico together 
account for more than half of the population, followed by Colombia and 
Argentina which together comprise about one-sixth." 
Average life expectancy at birth for the period 1970 to 1975 was 
61.4 years for Latin America: closer to that of the developed regions 
(71.1) than to Africa (41.0) and South Asia (48.5). The overall fertility 
rate for Latin America in the same period was 5.3; in this respect it comes 
nearer to other developing regions such as Africa (6.3) and South Asia 
(6.0) than to the developed regions (2.3). Improvement in health condi-
tions has been very rapid in Latin America, but the decline in fertility, 
except in a few countries, has only relatively recently begun to take place: 
a fact which explains the high population growth rates in the region. 
The process of urbanization has been intense in the period 
1950-1975, during which time the proportion of the population living in 
areas of 20 000 or more inhabitants practically doubled. 
For Latin America as a whole, the urban population has grown by an 
annual 5.1 per cent during the period 1950-1975. In the last of these years 
61.1 per cent of the population were living in cities. 
The economically active population 12 increased at an average annual 
rate of 2.5 per cent between 1950 and 1975. This rate was lower than the 
growth rate for the population as a whole because of the high fertility 
rates and the decrease in the mortality rate. The former increases the 
number of persons in the non-active age groups and the effect of the 
second is similar, since the decrease was mainly due to the drop in infant 
II
CEPAL Long-term trends and projections of Latin American economic 
development (E/CEPAL/1027), pp. 92, et seq. 
12The economically active population includes both employed and unem-
ployed persons, including those seeking work for the first time. 
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mortality. According to the projections, the economically active popula-
tion will increase at an average rate of 3 per cent between 1975 and 2000, 
i.e., over that period it will increase by more than 100 per cent. The 
evolution of this indicator varies considerably from one country to 
another. Thus, while in the Dominican Republic the rate will be 3.7 per 
cent and in Mexico and Nicaragua 3.6 per cent, the average annual increase 
in Argentina and Uruguay will be only 1.1 per cent. The growth rate for 
Brazil will be the same as the average for the region.13  
The urbanization process will also continue. By the end of the 
century three out of every four inhabitants in Latin America will be city 
dwellers. The economically active urban population will increase at an 
annual rate of 4 per cent, so that the number of young people who will 
join the urban labour market will increase by nearly 170 per cent. 
The natural growth rate of the population began to decline slowly 
from the beginning of the 1960s and this trend will continue, but even so, 
according to the middle projection hypothesis of CELADE, the average 
population growth rate for the period 1975-2000 will be 2.6 per cent per 
year. By the end of the century the population of Latin America could 
reach 600 million: double that of the United States and Canada together 
and more than that of Europe. The relative weight of the different 
countries will change substantially, with special importance being assumed 
by the great masses of population which will accrue to Brazil and Mexico. 
7. Employment 
Emphasis must be laid on the significance of this last fact, which will 
impose big demands for labour absorption on the economy, and in 
particular on urban industry and productive services, to say nothing of the 
need to absorb the population currently unemployed or under-employed, 
to which reference will be made further on. 
As regards agriculture, there has been a continuing fall in the 
proportion of the active population employed in this sector." This 
situation is connected with the intensive urbanization process mentioned 
above. Manufacturing should have played an active role in the absorption 
of labour in order to give productive employment to a major part both of 
the natural population increase and of those leaving agriculture, but in 
reality, despite the growth rates in production indicated earlier and the 
fact that the industrial growth rate even exceeded the general average, 
industry made only a very limited contribution from 1950 onwards: the 
rate of increase in industrial employment was practically equal to that of 
13Source: CELADE, Demographic Bulletin, various numbers. 
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In six Latin American countries representing three-quarters of the region's 
active population, 35 per cent of this population is engaged in agricultural activities 
and the rest in industry and services. 
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the population, which meant that while industry more or less maintained 
its share in total employment, it showed itself unable to contribute to the 
solution of problems of unemployment and underemployment. The labour 
force which moved out of agricultural activities thus established itself in 
the services sector, which expanded far beyond the limits consonant with a 
sound and productive increase in these activities. 
Account must also be taken of the increase in labour productivity in 
industry, which meant an improvement in the standard of living of those 
employed in it, but helped to limit the role of industry in absorbing more 
labour. 
8. Structural unemployment 
At present about 5.8 per cent of the economically active population are 
openly unemployed. But the problem of unemployment is much more 
serious than this figure would seem to indicate. A high proportion of the 
active population is only partially employed or carries out activities of 
very low productivity which frequently signify disguised unemployment. 
If an estimate is made of this type of disguised unemployment and this is 
added to the open unemployment already mentioned, the result is a level 
of virtual total unemployment close to 28 per cent of the economically 
active population.15 A fifth of this amount relates to open unemploy-
ment, two-fifths to underemployment in agricultural activities and two-
fifths to underemployment in urban activities. 
Projecting the problem into the future, different calculations made 
independently16 coincide in estimating that —on the basis of reasonable 
assumptions on production structure, technology, etc.— Latin America 
would need to reach an annual growth rate of not less than 8 per cent 
—much higher than that which it appears to be approaching now— in order 
to begin to solve the problem of unemployment and underemployment 
within the next 10 or 15 years. If such a rate were achieved, rural-urban 
migration could be slowed and agriculture would gradually absorb its own 
underutilized labour force, while industry, and to a lesser degree the 
productive services, would give employment to the increase in the active 
labour force and would begin to absorb the surplus urban manpower. In 
this way, even though the solution of the underemployment problem 
would take a considerable time, there would at least be a trend in that 
direction. 
15PREALC (ILO), The employment problem in Latin America: facts, 
outlooks and policies, Santiago, November 1975. 
16 	• Raul Prebisch, Change and Development, and CEPAL, Long-term trends and 
projections of Latin American economic development (E/CEPAL/1027), p. 129 
et. seq. 
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9. Skilled manpower 
The other important feature in the employment field is the sharp increase 
and high proportion of persons in the medium and high-level occupational 
strata in urban manufacturing and service activities. These strata include 
professionals and semi-professionals, management personnel, employers, 
self-employed workers and owners of commercial establishments, represen-
ting highly qualified management and technical personnel. Around 1970 
these people represented about a fifth of the labour force in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela, and the proportion was rising 
rapidly. To this category must also be added skilled employees and 
workers who have reached an appreciable standard of knowledge and 
income. This means that a high proportion of the population in Latin 
America is now qualified to carry out tasks which go far beyond the levels 
of elementary knowledge required to discharge low-grade functions in 
agriculture or industry. This phenomenon reflects the degree of develop-
ment reached in industry and the growth of intermediate income strata, to 
which reference will be made further on. 
10. Income distribution and market size 
Subject to all the reservations that the inadequate data impose, it may be 
estimated that the poorer 50 per cent of the Latin American population, 
which in 1970 shared in less than 14 per cent of the total income; had in 
that year an annual average per capita personal income of about 
150 dollars. It is estimated that about 45 per cent of the population of 
Latin America lives in conditions of extreme poverty. 
The great majority of this group of more than 150 million people 
have very little capacity for purchasing manufactures. Their exceedingly 
low income level barely enables them to buy the most essential goods, 
generally of a primary nature. Some of these people who live in the towns, 
however, probably demand certain manufactures through imitation, albeit 
at the expense of consumer goods which might be considered more 
necessary, such as foodstuffs. 
The next 40 per cent of the population, taken in ascending order of 
income, had in that year a personal per capita income similar to the 
general average, although naturally with considerable differences within 
this large group. As their per capita income, at least in the 1960s, increased 
more rapidly than the general average, the standard of living of this group 
fully benefited from the growth rates attained by the gross per capita 
product. At the present time, with a total Latin American population of 
about 320 million, it can be estimated that these intermediate strata 
constitute a mass of not less than 130 million people, with a purchasing 
power which makes them consumers of manufactured goods. 
Mention must also be made of the 5 per cent of the population at 
the highest income level, with a personal per capita income of about 3 200 
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dollars per year in 1970. This level of income enables this group, which 
consists of a little more than 15 million people, to practise a form of 
consumption which is very diversified and exacting as regards the quality 
and renewal of goods. As this group is also subdivided into small national 
groups, its consumption habits lead to very great diversification of the 
production structure, with a high import content. 
There are thus three principal facts to emphasize in this context. 
First, there is the immense number of Latin Americans (corresponding in 
great measure to the unemployed or underemployed) who constitute a 
great reserve of domestic demand but who are practically outside the 
consumer market and must therefore be incorporated into it. Secondly, 
there is a "critical mass" of people in the intermediate-income strata who 
already constitute an effective market for Latin American industry and 
whose large members —although split up into national markets which in 
some cases are only small— explain the eagerness of private foreign 
investors and the transnational corporations to enter these markets to 
produce for these groups. Thirdly, there are small national groups with 
very high, diversified and exacting consumption patterns, closely imitative 
of those of more developed countries; these groups, by force of demon-
stration, induce an increase in the consumption of the intermediate strata, 
which leads to the creation of industries and services producing sophisti-
cated goods on a small scale and generates a constant pressure on the 
balance of payments through a tendency to import luxury goods. 
C. The external sector of Latin America 
The internal aspects described in the preceding section are reflected in the 
behaviour of the external sector and in the relations of Latin America with 
foreign countries, especially with Europe. This section will make an overall 
review of this external sector and the relations of the region with the rest 
of the world, their possibilities and problems. This analysis will serve as a 
framework for the study of Latin America's relations with Europe which 
will be made in succeeding chapters. 
1. Latin America's external economic policy 
As was seen above, until the middle of the 1960s the degree of protection 
for industry was very high and was used with little discrimination in many 
of the Latin American countries. In addition to nominal tariffs which 
sometimes exceeded 200 or 300 per cent, non-tariff prohibitions or 
barriers were also in force. 
Of course the situation with regard to protection was not uniform 
for all countries. The barriers were higher for countries like Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and were lower for Colombia, Mexico and Peru, 
etc. The lack of tariff rationalization, however, meant that the effective 
protection bore no relation to development needs and in some cases even 
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worked against them. Sometimes the exchange rate overvalued the 
national currency, encouraging imports and discouraging exports. No use 
was made of systematic policies to promote non-traditional exports, at 
least at a level sufficient to produce a genuine impact on trade diversifica-
tion. 
From the 1950s in the case of Central America, the beginning of the 
1960s for LAFTA and the early 1970s for the Andean Group countries, 
policies began to be applied aimed at reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to intrazonal trade within these integration schemes. The removal of 
internal barriers was extensive and thorough in the case of the Central 
American Common Market, but only very partial in the case of LAFTA, 
where after some time the process was practically abandoned. In the case 
of the Andean Group the elimination of internal barriers is advancing at a 
good pace, though it has not yet been completed. 
From about the middle of the 1960s a change began to appear in 
Latin America's trade policies with respect to the rest of the world. 
Although the trend was not continuous or uniform as between countries, 
there was a reduction in non-tariff and tariff barriers and an attempt was 
made to apply them with a greater degree of rationality; many studies on 
effective proctection were carried out at this time in several Latin 
American countries. Argentina reduced its tariffs from an average of 
151 per cent in 1960 to a recent level of about 40 per cent of nominal and 
effective protection, with a maximum of 80 per cent. Brazil reduced its 
tariffs from 54 per cent to 39 per cent as an average between 1966 and 
1967, but in later years they were increased again and amounted to 49 per 
cent in 1973. The five Andean Group countries agreed on a reduction 
from an average 40 per cent in 1971 to 28 per cent in 1976, with a 
maximum 60 per cent. The time-limits for the application of this reduc-
tion have been extended, however, and there are important exceptions.17 
Exchange policies also underwent considerable changes. Exchange 
rates came nearer to parity and systems of frequent small devaluations 
("crawling peg") were introduced to prevent inflation from invalidating 
the exchange rates and thus introducing a strong element of instability 
into the real prices obtained by exporters. The exchange reform applied in 
different ways by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, etc., was 
possibly the policy change which had the greatest impact on non-
traditional exports. 
Moreover, from 1965 onwards export promotion systems were 
introduced which contained fiscal, financial and institutional elements and 
17Sources: Argentina: Santiago Macario, "Protectionism and industrialization 
in Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. IX, No 1, 1964. Brazil: 
IPEA, Relatorio de pesquisa No 22, A politica brasileira de comercio exterior y seus 
efeitos: 196711973, Rio de Janeiro, 1974. Andean Group: Board of the Cartagena 
Agreement, Antecedentes sobre el arancel externo coman, J/PE/86/Rev.1, September 
1977. 
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used a considerable variety of instruments, including "draw-back", 
internal-tax exemption, export credits, exchange facilities, favourable 
terms for imports, etc. Throughout this period promotion institutions and 
instruments alike were frequently and markedly improved in order to 
increase their effectiveness and reduce their cost to the government. 
Specific aspects were modified, but a policy of strong support for non-
traditional exports was maintained throughout. 
It should be noted that the drastic reductions in protection which 
have been and are still being made constitute very important advantages 
granted by Latin America, especially for the developed countries from 
which the region buys the greater part of its imports. Since these reduc-
tions were made mainly with a view to improving the efficiency of 
industry and reducing trade barriers, they were effected outside the 
Kennedy and Tokyo (GATT) rounds. This has given rise to the curious 
situation that in spite of them Latin America is accused of not recipro-
cating the relatively minor advantages which it is demanding from the 
developed countries in the multilateral trade negotiations at Geneva. 
Despite the marked progress made in its reform, external trade 
policy is still at a transitional stage in the Latin American countries. Some 
problems therefore still persist and foreign trade has not in every case 
attained a new and regular pattern of behaviour. Certain aspects may be 
noted by way of example. 
In some sectors the level of protection is still high, making necessary 
an equally high level of export promotion in compensation. 
In others, the desire to attain greater efficiency and competitiveness 
has resulted in over-hasty and excessively drastic reductions in protection 
which have endangered the industrial progress already made. 
From a conceptual standpoint there are two aspects of export 
promotion (i.e., export incentives). In the first place, there is the compen-
sation for the obstacles placed in the way of the new exports by the 
national economic policy itself: this includes compensation for import 
duties on inputs and capital goods used in the production of the exported 
article, and for the still persistent overvaluation of the national currency 
through the fixing of unrealistic exchange rates. This procedure is accepted 
as legitimate by the developed countries. Additionally, internal taxes 
which the exported goods would pay if they were destined for the 
domestic market may be rebated: this compensation is accepted by many 
developed countries but opposed by others. 
In the second place, it may be necessary for promotion to go beyond 
these measures in order to offset the initial disadvantages experienced by a 
new export during the process of organizing its external distribution, 
making the product known in foreign markets, and getting to know those 
markets. This type of promotion should be acceptable within reasonable 
limits of level and time when applied to incipient export activities, in the 
same way as protection is accepted within similar limits for incipient 
industries. 
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A further type of promotion, not discussed here, is needed to offset 
the restrictions on access to their markets applied by developed countries, 
which have a serious effect on some of the new Latin American exports.18  
In a recent CEPAL study19 it is stated that, in the past 10 years' 
experience of the Latin American countries which have made most prog-
ress in the export of manufactures, the export incentives provided by the 
promotion systems in force have consisted mainly of compensation for the 
customs duties and internal taxes placed on exported goods. Any further 
compensation is generally lower than the tariffs in force in the same Latin 
American countries for imports of goods similar to those exported. Of 
course the situation varies from one country and sector to another. 
2. The total foreign trade of the region 
It was stated earlier that during the 1960s one stage of Latin American 
development ended and another began. The main features of that which 
ended were import substitution in each national market, high and virtually 
indiscriminate protection, and little emphasis on the promotion of non-
traditional exports. In the new stage, import substitution was combined 
with the export of manufactures, there was a tendency to reduce and 
rationalyze protection, and high priority was given to promotion policies 
for non-traditional exports. The performance of trade reflects these policy 
changes if the year 1965 is regarded as the boundary between the two 
stages: a choice which, although arbitrary to some extent, corresponds 
roughly to the period when the changes began. 
As regards imports, their rate of growth during the period 
1950-1964 was 0.4 per cent for each 1 per cent of the growth of the 
product.2° Between 1965 and 1975, in contrast, imports increased at an 
average rate 1.4 times that of the product, the relation being 2.1 for Brazil, 
1.3 for Mexico and 2.0 for Ecuador. 
In order to assess the significance of these facts it is useful to know 
what would happen in Latin America as a whole if, in the case of each and 
every one of the different types of goods, the import coefficient with 
respect to overall supply of these goods remained constant in the medium 
term. This situation would correspond to what might be called "neutral" 
import substitution in each of the sectors of economic activity, since for 
each one of them domestic production and imports would exactly follow 
the growth rate of demand, without either of them advancing or retreating 
in relative terms. A calculation made on the basis of this hypothetical 
assumption indicates that with this "neutral" substitution imports would 
18 See Chapter II, Part B. 
19CEPAL, The economic and social development and external relations of 
Latin America, (E/CEPAL/1024/Rev.1), pp. 198 and 199. 
20Ibid., p. 185. 
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grow at a rate 1.3 to 1.4 times that of the product.2' Moreover, this 
difference between the growth rate of imports and that of the product 
becomes even greater as the growth rate of the latter rises, that is, as the 
elasticity coefficient increases. This is due to the fact that, with the growth 
of the per capita product and even more with its acceleration, there is a 
more rapid increase in demand for goods with a high direct or indirect 
import content, and a slower increase in demand for goods with a larger 
proportion of domestic production. 
Using the terms of comparison defined in the preceding paragraph, 
an estimate can be made of the coefficients of elasticity of imports in 
relation to the product during the periods 1950-1964 and 1965 onwards 
which were mentioned earlier. The coefficient in the first of these periods 
was less than one-third of the elasticity which would correspond to a 
"neutral" substitution in each and every sector of the economy. This can 
be interpreted as meaning that during this period import substitution was 
not only very strong, but was also possibly accompanied by actual com-
pression of imports, i.e., by the reduction and suppression of purchases 
abroad, without an equivalent accompanying increase in the national 
production of the same goods; indeed, the experience of what occurred in 
many Latin American countries during this period does suggest that substi-
tution was accompanied by such compression. As regards the period from 
1965 onwards, the elasticity of imports in relation to the product which 
actually took place is practically the same as that corresponding to 
"neutral" substitution. Does this mean that the coefficient of imported 
supply remained constant in each and every one of the productive sectors 
of Latin America? Experience indicates that it did not. In some sectors of 
economic activity the coefficient of imported supply continued to decline, 
that is to say, import substitution went ahead. In other sectors, the 
coefficient of imported supply increased as a result of the greater opening 
up of the economy (through reduction and rationalization of protection), 
which eliminated the compression of certain imports and caused national 
production to grow at a lower rate than the demand. Thus, the substi-
tution which occurred in some sectors was more or less offset by the 
liberation of imports in others.22 
At all events, protection is still high in many Latin American 
countries and this is reflected in the performance of their trade. If these 
countries had a degree of protection and competitiveness in their industrial 
sector similar to that of the OECD countries, the present size of their 
domestic markets would compel them to carry on more intensive external 
trade, i.e., they would have higher import coefficients in relation to 
21Juan Ayza, G. Fichet and N. Gonzalez, America Latina: integration econo-
mica y sustitucion de importaciones, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Econornica, 
1975, pp. 66 et seq. 
22Ibid. 
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demand than they have at present.23 For example, in 1972 the size of 
Brazil's market for transport equipment was close to that of Italy in 1969, 
but its coefficient of imported supply in relation to demand was 11 per 
cent compared with 25 per cent for the European country. In that same 
year the size of the market for chemical products in Argentina and Spain 
was very similar, but the former's import coefficient was 9 per cent and 
the latter's 17 per cent. In Mexico, domestic demand for non-electrical 
machinery was similar to that of the Netherlands in 1969, but while 
Mexico's import coefficient was 52 per cent, that of the Netherlands was 
68 per cent. A similar situation is found in most of the sectors, with 
import coef ,cients lower in the Latin American countries than in those of 
the OECD because of the higher level of protection. 
About the middle of the 1960s there was also a change in the 
performance of regional exports. During the period 1950-1965 their pur-
chasing power grew by only 2 per cent per year, because although they 
increased in volume by 4.3 per cent per year, there was a downturn in 
their relative prices. From 1965 onwards, however, their purchasing power 
grew more rapidly. Between 1965 and 1973 it rose by 6.6 per cent per 
year through an accelerated increase in volume (5.0 per cent per year) in 
comparison with the preceding period, accompanied by an improvement in 
prices; indeed, 1973 was the year in which the terms of trade were the best 
for many years for Latin America, as a result of price rises for the majority 
of the basic products exported by these countries, despite the fact that the 
relative price index was still markedly below that recorded for the period 
1950-1954. In the following three years, however, from a general export 
standpoint, relative prices deteriorated for nearly all the non-oil-exporting 
countries, and the falls in 1974 and 1975 were not offset by the im-
provement in 1976, which was partly due to a lower rate of inflation in 
industrial imports and also to the substantial increases in coffee prices. 
Of course these global movements conceal different situations for 
individual basic commodities and countries. As regards the oil-exporting 
countries, their prices, which had deteriorated previously, began to im-
prove and reached their peak in comparison with imports in 1974. 
These stages are reflected in the structure of exports, as may be seen 
from table 1. 
This table clearly shows that between 1955 and 1965 the proportion 
of raw materials and of fuels in the export total varied very little, and that 
of manufactures increased only very slightly from 1960 onwards. In 1965 
66.0 per cent of exports still consisted of raw materials and 28.6 per cent 
of fuels, while manufactures accounted for only 5.4 per cent of the total. 
From that year onward, however —i.e., in the second of the stages indi-
cated— there was an important change in the situation. In 1965-1975 the 
relative proportion of raw materials fell from 66.0 per cent to 47.0 per 




PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, ON THE 
BASIS OF CURRENT PRICES 
Average annual 
growth rate 
1965 1960 1965 1970 1975 1955-1975 
(percentages) 
Raw materials 66.8 64.7 66.0 64.8 47.0 6.6 
Fuels 30.1 32.0 28.6 24.0 39.4 9.9 
Manufactures 3.1 3.3 5.4 9.1 13.6 16.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8.6 
Source: UNCTAD, Yearbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, and 
United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
in petroleum prices), and that of manufactures increased from 5.4 per cent 
to 13.6 per cent. 
In other words, exports of manufactures grew very rapidly: rising 
from a relatively unimportant level in the first half of the 1960s they have 
now come to represent somewhat more than one-eighth of the total value 
of all the exports of the region. Since they started at such a low level, the 
very rapid annual growth rates which occurred during this stage did not 
have a more pronounced effect on the growth of total exports, but if they 
maintain a similar dynamism in the future their influence will soon be 
marked and will come to be decisive in the growth of total exports, up to 
the point where they will represent a significant part of the whole. 
The situation naturally differs from one country to another, and 
there is a similar difference in respect of sales to the rest of the world 
compared with intra-zonal sales. In the case of the largest countries the 
proportion of manufactures in total exports to all destinations is quite 
high: Brazil (24.5 per cent), Argentina (24.2 per cent), Mexico (36.5 per 
cent) and Colombia (23.1 per cent) in 1975. 24 The smaller countries, and 
especially the less developed ones, generally have a lower proportion of 
manufactures in their exports: Bolivia (0.6 per cent), Chile (8.1 per cent), 
Honduras (11.4 per cent), Peru (3.8 per cent), the Dominican Republic 
(1.8 per cent) and Venezuela (1.0 per cent). 
These manufactures comprise goods of various classes. In the first 
place, there are those coming from labour and natural resource-intensive 
traditional sectors (leather articles including footwear, textiles, processed 
foods, and articles made of wood). Secondly, there are manufactured min-
eral goods, with a high density of natural resources and capital, and a 
growing industrial added value. Thirdly, there are the chemical and metal-
working industries, which are acquiring increasing weight in export sales, 
24 CEPAL, official data. 
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both to the Latin American market and also outside the region (the elec-
tronic and motor-vehicle industries, consumer durables and capital goods). 
These exports differ greatly from country to country in their sec-
toral composition. In the exports of manufactures from Argentina and 
Brazil the metal-working industries (CUCI 7) accounted for high per-
centages (55.3 per cent and 40.9 per cent, respectively) in 1975, chief 
among the exports being non-electrical machinery, transport equipment 
and basic metal products. In Mexico, metal products and machinery repre-
sented 26.7 per cent of total exports in 1974, the most important items 
being non- electrical machinery and, to a lesser degree, chemical products. 
In Colombia the proportion of metal products and machinery is much 
lower, the chief exports of this country being intermediate industrial prod-
ucts, especially chemicals. In the exports of manufactures of the medium-
sized countries (Peru, Chile and Uruguay), intermediate industrial goods 
such as wood pulp, paper and traditional chemical products predominate, 
while in the smaller countries traditional manufactures reach very high 
proportions in comparison with other manufactured exports. 
The metal-working industries employ more highly skilled and 
better-paid labour; their products have a high unit value and demand for 
them has a higher income elasticity. These goods are very suitable for 
export and also have promising sales prospects in external markets (as 
recent experience shows), taking into account the present stage of Latin 
American development. 
In intra-regional trade exports of manufactures, which represented 
only 12.6 per cent of the total in 1960, grew at a very high rate, reaching 
38.3 per cent of the total in 1975; the three countries most advanced in 
industry —Argentina, Brazil and Mexico— are those which have derived 
most benefit from this trend, although in the other countries too the 
volume of manufactures in their exports to the region is proportionately 
higher than it is to the rest of the world. 
It must be emphasized, however, that there is little difference 
between intra-regional and extra-regional protection, except in cases of 
internal trade within Central America and the Andean Group, although it 
is true that there are other elements which favour such trade. 
Despite these advances, agricultural and mining products and fuels 
still form the greater part of Latin American exports. The high proportion 
of these goods in external sales, together with their loss of importance in 
world trade, explain in part the declining participation of Latin America in 
world trade during the past 25 years. Thus, taking world trade as a whole 
(including all goods and all countries), primary products practically kept 
pace with the evolution of total trade in the first half of the century but in 
the period after the Second World War the situation changed profoundly. 
Manufactures increased very rapidly —by an average of 12.7 per cent per 
year— and increased their relative weight from 43.7 per cent of the total in 
1950 to 60.4 per cent in 1975, while fuels increased from 9.9 per cent to 
18.6 per cent, chiefly because of price rises. In contrast, the share of raw 
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materials and foodstuffs dropped from 46.4 per cent to 19.0 per cent. 
These trends were persistent throughout the past 25 years. 
The deficiencies in the Latin American production structure have 
produced an unbalanced external trade structure, which has had negative 
effects on the expansion of exports and the equilibrium of the trade 
balance. This imbalance is due to a relatively high weight of primary 
commodities and a low weight of manufactures in exports, and the reverse 
situation in imports. In order to appreciate this fact it is helpful to 
compare the case of Latin America with that of some developed countries, 
drawing a distinction between primary goods, traditional industries and 
industries with more advanced technology. This comparison is made in 
table 2. 
Table 2 
RELATIONS BETWEEN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN SOME 
STRATEGIC SECTORS 
Volume of exports in comparison with imports 











Primary commodities 1.3 0.7 0.2 2.4 
Foodstuffs 1.7 0.7 0.1 2.9 
Agricultural raw materials 1.2 0.9 0.2 1.5 
Minerals 0.6 0.5 0.2 1.9 
Fuels 0.2 0.2 0.01 1.5 
Manufactures 1.1 1.5 4.6 0.2 
Non-electrical machinery 2.4 1.8 2.9 0.1 
Electrical machinery 1.2 1.5 7.1 0.2 
Transport equipment 1.0 2.2 17.4 0.2 
Chemical products 2.2 1.5 1.7 0.2 
Other manufactures 0.6 1.2 4.1 0.3 
Source: Prepared on the basis of data from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
a20 republics, excluding Cuba, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Panama. 
As regards technologically advanced manufactures, it can be seen 
from this table that the mature developed economies export and import 
goods in all sectors, and the volume of their exports is equal to or greater 
than that of their imports. For example, in the case of non-electrical 
machinery the exports of the United States are 2.4 times as great as its 
imports and those of the EEC are 1.8 times as great as the amount im- 
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ported by the Community. This reflects the fact that in these indus-
trialized economies there is specialization in each of the manufacturing 
sectors, so that in the sectors of greatest technological importance and 
dynamism in world trade, the exports of each country or area are equal to 
or greater than their imports for the same type of goods. In Latin America, 
in contrast, exports of non-electrical machinery are scarcely one-tenth of 
the region's imports. This same contrast between Latin America and the 
developed economies is shown for other sectors in table 2. 
In the case of traditional industries the situation is very different. In 
these activities, for which less advanced technology is required and world 
demand grows more slowly, Latin American exports exceed the region's 
imports in volume, whereas in the developed economies exports and imports 
are equal. 
In the case of primary commodities, the availability of natural 
resources is a major determinant of production potential in each country 
or region. Latin America, which is relatively thinly populated and has vast 
natural resources, is favourably situated to produce and export. Some of 
these goods are still exported in primary form without processing. Among 
the developed countries, however, there are great differences as regards 
these same resources. The United States, which is highly developed in the 
advanced industries mentioned above, is also endowed with both 
agricultural and mineral natural resources and is therefore a major exporter 
of certain goods, while it produces a high proportion of its domestic 
demand for others. In respect of other primary goods, such as fuels, its 
dependence on imports is critical. In contrast with the United States, 
Japan has very few natural resources, so that its dependence on other 
countries for its supply of agricultural and mineral products and fuels is 
very great and its exports of these products are only a small fraction of its 
imports (see table 2). The European Economic Community comes 
between the United States and Japan in this respect: its exports of agri-
cultural products are not very different in volume from its imports, partly 
because of the protection and import substitution brought about by its 
Common Agricultural Policy; in the case of minerals its exports of refined 
products are appreciable, although less than its imports, while in fuels its 
comparative lack of natural resources makes it severely dependent on the 
outside world. These averages for the EEC, however, naturally fail to 
reflect the sometimes considerable differences which exist between coun-
tries and specific goods. 
In Latin America the relationship between exports and imports is 
more prejudicial to those sectors whose international trade grows more 
rapidly, which at the same time contain a higher proportion of better-
qualified, better-organized and therefore better-paid labour, and whose 
profit margins are generally higher because of their speedier pace of tech-
nological innovation. In contrast the relationship between exports and 
imports is more favourable to the sectors of the region where demand 
grows slowly, where there is little technological innovation, and where 
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there is a high content of unskilled, badly-organized, and therefore rela-
tively badly-paid labour. This kind of asymmetrical structure of trade does 
not seem to be much in keeping with the considerable development in 
Latin America of the managerial and professional strata and skilled 
workers, referred to earlier. The vigorous industrial development and the 
important advances which have taken place in the improvement of man-
power skills have not yet been reflected in a parallel change in the struc-
ture of Latin American external trade. 
3. The balance of payments and external finance 
In this connexion it is necessary to distinguish between oil-exporting 
countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela) and 
non-oil-exporting countries. Outstanding among the former is Venezuela, 
which has had extremely high surpluses, although the very rapid growth of 
imports is leading once again to a trade deficit. Mexico, too, will soon 
qualify for inclusion in this first group. 
For the non-oil-exporting countries of the region, the average 
balance-of-payments current account deficit rose from a little over 1 500 
million dollars per year in the period 1965-1970 (less than 15 per cent of 
the exports of goods and services) to a little over 4 000 million dollars per 
year in the period 1971-1973 (22 per cent of exports), while in 
1974-1976, it jumped to almost 14 000 million (45 per cent of exports). 
According to preliminary calculations this deficit was reduced in 1977, 
although it still remained high both in absolute and relative terms. 
This means that external strangulation has reappeared as a major 
limiting element of Latin American growth, and the prospects are that 
—unless the improvement first glimpsed in 1977 materializes— this stran-
gulation will continue, especially in view of the uncertainty about the 
future evolution of the world economy and the relatively lower growth 
rate expected in the developed economies, at least for several years to 
come. World-wide inflation and the severe fluctuations in the prices of 
basic commodities are major factors in this situation of uncertainty: 
The deficits incurred by the Latin American countries in recent 
years as a complement to their internal measures reflected their attempts 
to defend their growth rates —as far as was reasonable— against sharper 
falls; these deficits also played a part in avoiding a sharper decline in the 
growth rate of imports, which are composed for the most part of capital 
and intermediate goods acquired from developed countries. In this way 
Latin America helped to maintain the trade and economy of the world at a 
higher level than would otherwise have been the case. 
In some countries such as Brazil and Mexico there have been recent 
public discussions on the influence which can be attributed to foreign 
investment operations, and especially the activities of the transnational 
corporations, as contributory causes of this deficit. 
The deficit countries also changed their sources of external finance. 
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Before the Second World War, as noted earlier, many Latin American 
countries had access to medium- and long-term private capital markets. 
After the world war, as the reconstruction of the European countries 
proceeded and the reserves accumulated by Latin America during the 
conflict were used up, the flows of external finance were renewed. From 
the late 1950s until the early 1970s, however, public international and 
national sources of finance predominated. In recent years, since the 
increase in oil prices, these public sources lost importance as a source of 
funds for Latin America. There was a decline in the proportion of interna-
tional financial flows controlled by these sources, and moreover the 
criteria they applied in the distribution of their funds gave precedence to 
the countries with the lowest income levels, leaving the greater part of 
Latin America on the sidelines, except for countries like El Salvador, Haiti 
and Honduras. There was a sharp increase, on the other hand, in the 
proportion of external finance for Latin America deriving from private 
sources, especially private banks. Some countries in the region, especially 
the larger ones, tried to gain access to the medium- and long-term private 
markets through the floating of bonds, but although positive results were 
achieved in this way, only a small proportion of what is needed comes 
from this source as yet, showing the existence of problems of access. 
Exclusion from public concessionary finance affected not only the 
larger countries but also many medium-sized and small countries, and in 
addition there was a widespread reduction of access to non-concessionary 
public funds. The simplified criteria employed by the public agencies 
recognize only the relatively less developed countries (which are very few 
in Latin America: Haiti, Honduras and El Salvador, according to the 
criteria applied in various cases), and they tend to apply uniform treat-
ment to all the rest, whether they be large, medium-sized or small coun-
tries. It should be noted that many of the medium-sized and small 
countries of the region have acute balance-of-payments problems, rela-
tively primitive production and export structures, little or no access to the 
capital markets, and severe domestic problems of mass unemployment and 
poverty. 
The guaranteed public debt of the non-oil-exporting countries of the 
region rose from 8 700 million dollars in 1965 to 49 000 million in 1976, 
and non-guaranteed credits from private banks reached 31 000 million in 
1976. These figures do not include indebtedness to the International 
Monetary Fund or non-guaranteed supplier credits. 
Of the total indebtedness of 81 000 million dollars in 1976 
(including IMF credits), guaranteed and non-guaranteed credits from 
private banking sources came to somewhat more than two-thirds: i.e., 
twice as much as the already relatively important proportion of one-third 
or more which they represented ten years earlier. Quite apart from its 
effects as regards time-limits and servicing of the debt, this can have other 
consequences which are still difficult to appreciate fully. 
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Thus, the amount of the debt has increased sharply in both absolute 
and relative terms. Additionally, there has been an increase in the ratio of 
servicing charges to exports. The debt problem is therefore one of those 
which requires most attention in Latin America. What is more, the fact 
that the ratio of debt servicing charges to exports has not attained exces-
sively high levels is due in part to the rapid growth in the field of exports, 
so that in the future evolution of the problem the interdependence 
between finance and trade will have to be taken into account. 
There was a parallel change in the time-limits and costs of the debt. 
Credits to developing countries for periods of over 7 years announced in 
the European currency market dropped from 50 per cent of the total 
borrowed in 1974 to 5 per cent in 1976, while credits of over 10 years 
granted by this same market disappeared completely. The surcharge on the 
basic reference rates rose from 1.25 per cent in 1973 to 1.78 per cent at 
the beginning of 1976. 
Among the non-oil-exporting countries the situation as regards 
deficit and financing varies from one to another. Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, through their very size, represent a very high proportion of the 
total deficit; but the problem is also serious for many medium-sized and 
small countries when related to the volume of their exports. The larger and 
some of the medium-sized countries have easier access to private capital 
markets —although in no case is this access satisfactory— and these same 
countries also obtain better terms from the international banking system. 
H. LATIN AMERICAN TRADE WITH EUROPE 
A. Global trends 
1. Evolution of Latin America's share in world trade 
Since the Second World War the developed market-economy countries and 
the European countries with centrally planned economies have grown 
vigorously not only as regards their production but also their trade, finan-
cial and investment relations. Thus, the developed countries increased their 
share in world exports from 60.2 per cent to 64.5 per cent between 1950 
and 1977 (table 3). This increment, which is part of a process of changes 
in the shares of different areas in world trade, has been achieved through 
an intensification of trade between the various groups and also within each 
individual group (EEC, EFTA, United States, Canada, Japan and the 
European socialist countries). Factors that have contributed strongly to 
this have been the integration processes, the reduction or elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers for manufactured products, and the opera-
tions of transnational corporations. The developing countries, for their 
part, have greatly diminished their share of world trade, in both exports 
and imports, with the proportion of their exports in the world total 
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dropping from 31.7 to 25.8 per cent during the same period and that of 
their imports falling from 27.1 to 22.7 per cent (table 3). These tendencies 
are also reflected by the changes in the structure of world trade, where 
manufactures now represent nearly two-thirds of total trade compared 
with less than half in 1950, while food and raw materials have lost impor-
tance over this period (see annex, table II). 
Within this group, however, there are marked differences between 
the various developing regions. The oil-exporting countries improved their 
position doubling their share in world exports between those years from 
7.3 to 13.2 per cent, while the share of the non-oil-exporting countries fell 
from 24.4 to 12.2 per cent. A similar trend is noted in the case of imports, 
although to a slightly lesser degree, as can be seen from the table. Within 
this group, Latin America is the region that has lost most ground: its share 
dropped from 10.4 to 4.4 per cent in the case of exports and from 9.0 to 
4.9 per cent in the case of imports between 1950 and 1977 although the 
evolution of trade with different areas in not homogeneous. The rest of the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries (with the exception of Africa 
during the last two years) all show higher rates of increase in trade than 
Latin America, albeit lower than those recorded by the developed regions 
(table 3). Within Latin America itself there are also marked differences in 
the growth of exports at current prices. Particularly noteworthy are the 
countries of the Caribbean (with an annual growth rate of 12.0 per cent) 
Brazil (9.4 per cent) and the Central American Common Market (9.3 per 
cent), while Argentina's exports grew only slowly (6.0 per cent) between 
those years.25  
2. Structure of Latin America's trade with major areas 
Latin America's trade with developed market-economy countries is 
characterized by a notable disequilibrium in its structure, as can be seen 
from a comparison between the exports and imports of each group of 
goods. This has already been referred to in the section on Latin America's 
total external trade, which showed what happens in the case of some 
strategic goods such as those produced by the metal manufactures and 
machinery industries and the chemical industry. This chapter deals more 
specifically with trade with the developed market-economy countries and 
the centrally-planned economies, distinguishing the main types of basic 
commodities and manufactures as a whole. As regards the first of these 
two groups of countries, in 1977 trade in fuels reflected a favourable 
balance for the region of 13 000 million dollars, representing the most 
important group. The importance of this group is, however, severely 
limited by the fact that almost all the exports come from one country: 
Venezuela. The group ranking second in importance is composed of 
agricultural commodities, which also show a positive balance for Latin 
25 On the basis of official data for the period 1955-1975. 
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America, i.e., 12 900 million dollars. Minerals also reflect a positive 
balance. As regards manufactures, there was a considerable deficit (30 000 
million dollars) in 1977 which was almost seven times the value of the 
region's exports of manufactures to the above-mentioned countries. 
The composition of trade with the European countries with 
centrally planned economies was similar, in that there was a trade surplus 
of 3 600 million dollars in agricultural commodities and of 200 million in 
mining products, while in the case of manufactures there was a trade 
deficit of 1 500 million dollars. Fuel also showed a negative balance, but 
only a small one so that total trade reflected a surplus (see annex, 
table III). 
3. Latin America's decreasing share of world 
trade in some basic commodities 
A further breakdown of raw materials exports provides a clearer picture of 
the commodities in which Latin America has lost ground in world markets. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA'S SHARE IN WORLD EXPORTS, BY SITC SECTIONS 
(Percentages) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 
Food 20.5 17.5 16.1 15.6 14.5 15.6 
Agricultural raw 
materials 8.8 7.0 7.9 6.1 5.4 4.8 
Minerals 14.5 14.6 16.7 15.7 13.2 13.0 
Non-ferrous metals 14.4 11.8 11.1 17.8 7.0 11.2 
Food includes, SITC sections 0, 1, 22, 4. 
Agricultural raw materials include, SITC section 2 (excluding division 22, 27, 28). 
Minerals include, SITC divisions 27, 28. 
Non-ferrous metals include, SITC division 68. 
Source: UNCTAD, Yearbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
1976; United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues. 
The developed countries drastically increased their mutual trade in 
foodstuffs, owing to the sharp rise in their production linked among other 
factors with the improvement of technology and internally implemented 
support policies. In the case of these items, Latin America lost slightly less 
ground than the developing world as a whole, as is shown in table 5. 
As regards minerals, where the developing world roughly maintained 
its share in the world market, Latin America lost some slight ground with 
respect to this group of countries during recent years. 
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Table 5 
EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE SHARES IN EXPORTS OF COMMODITIES 
(Index 1955 = 100) 
Latin America Developing countries Developed countries 
1970 1975 1976 1970 1975 1976 1970 1975 1976 
Food 76 71 76 75 67 72 121 130 126 
Agricultural raw 
materials 68 55 54 75 65 67 118 124 124 
Minerals 108 97 90 93 99 93 110 103 108 
Non-ferrous 
metals 78 49 77 85 65 72 107 115 130 
In non-ferrous metals, on the other hand, Latin America's loss of 
ground was substantial, even within the group of developing countries, 
which in their turn saw their share in world trade drastically reduced in 
favour of the developed countries. 
Equally severe was Latin America's fall in agricultural raw materials, 
where Latin America also lost ground within the group of developing 
countries, while the developed countries improved their share.26 
All in all, as may be seen from table 5, the developed countries 
increased their share of world trade in all four sectors. 
4. Evolution of the shares of different areas in European imports 
Three big economic groups were formed in Europe during the period 
under review, namely, the EEC, EFTA and CMEA, and although different 
in their scope and approach to integration their common aim was to 
promote trade among the countries forming part of each group. This trade 
grew rapidly; the proportion of imports by these three groups with respect 
to Europe's total imports rose from 33.2 per cent in 1955 to 44.7 per cent 
in 1977. The fastest growth was reflected by the mutual trade of the 
countries that subsequently formed the European Economic Community, 
which in 1955 represented one-third of its total imports but in 1973 a 
little over half (52.6 per cent). With the entry of the three new members 
—the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland— intra-EEC trade covered 54 
per cent of total imports that year, although in 1977 its share dropped 
slightly to 51.9 per cent of the total (see annex, table IV). 
The European countries with centrally planned economies are still 
the group registering the largest proportion of mutual trade, although that 
26For a more specific discussion of basic commodities, see the relevant section 
of this chapter. 
31 
proportion has gradually declined in the last few years, since their intra-
area imports dropped from 64.5 per cent of their total imports in 1955 to 
56.8 per cent in 1977. This declining trend, particularly in the 1970s, is 
connected both with a greater opening up to other countries and with the 
lifting of many barriers imposed by other countries on trade with this 
group. EFTA's intra-area trade also reflects a vigorous growth, although its 
proportion in relation to the other two areas is much lower: intra-area 
imports in 1977 represented 14.8 per cent of the total imports of its 
present members. 
The elimination of internal barriers, together with continued protec-
tion with respect to countries outside the area, increased intra-area trade 
but affected the rate of growth of purchases from the rest of the world. As 
regards trade outside the area, the various world regions were differently 
affected, however. On the whole, the developed market-economy coun-
tries improved or maintained their relative position in these countries' 
extra-area imports. This fact is related to the faster growth of world trade 
in manufactures mainly among developed countries, a trend that was 
encouraged by the tariff reductions agreed on within the context of 
GATT. This trend is most striking in the case of EFTA (as originally 
established), in whose total extra-area imports the developed countries' 
share rose from 66.3 to 75.2 per cent between 1955 and 1973, while the 
developing countries' share fell from 28.7 to 17.9 per cent between those 
years. 
In the European Economic Community, some loss of ground is also 
noted on the part of the developing countries, whose share in extra-
Community imports dropped from 39.8 per cent in 1955 to 34.7 per cent 
in 1973. From 1973 onwards, the developing countries' position changed 
owing to the sharp rise in oil prices which was reflected in a bigger share 
for oil-exporting countries, thus explaining the developing countries' 
increased share since that time (in 1977 they accounted for 44.6 per cent 
of the nine members' imports from outside the area). 
The case of the European countries with centrally planned 
economies is a little different, partly because they comprise an oil-
exporting area. In their trade, between 1955 and 1965 the share of the 
developed market-economy countries and that of the developing countries 
both increased, mainly at the expense of other countries with centrally 
planned economies, whose share fell from 37.6 per cent in 1955 to 9.3 per 
cent in 1965. Thenceforward the developing countries' share began to 
decline, and in 1977 it represented 24.4 per cent of extra-area imports 
(compared with 16.1 per cent in 1955 and 28.6 per cent in 1965), while 
the developed countries continued to increase their share (from 46.3 per 
cent in 1955 to 72.0 per cent in 1977) (see annex, table IV). The share of 
other countries with centrally planned economies pursued its downward 
trend, representing barely 3.6 per cent in 1977. 
The evolution of the share of the developing countries as a whole did 
not affect all the developing areas in the same way, since the oil-exporting 
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countries, for example, improved their share in Europe's extra-regional 
trade; if petroleum imports are excluded, however, a clearer view is 
obtained of the significance of this trend and the effects on each area of 
developing countries, and this will be done in the next section. 
5. Evolution of Europe's imports from developing countries 
As noted earlier, even if intra-area trade in the European integration 
schemes, as well as fuels, are excluded, the developing countries have still 
lost ground in Europe's total imports from the rest of the world. Besides 
the decline in the proportion of the whole group of developing countries 
in this extra-area trade, the share of each of the principal areas composing 
it —Latin America, South and South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East 27  — has diminished too. The decline has been different in each case, 
however, as is clear if the share of each of the four-regions in Europe's 
total imports from developing countries is examined. Such examination 
reveals that South and South-East Asia and the Middle East have gained 
ground in the Third World as a whole and that the same is true of Latin 
America, without prejudice to the fact that all these areas have never-
theless lost ground among Europe's extra-area supplies in favour of 
developed countries, as noted previously. Africa, for its part, has lost 
importance even within the developing world. Of Europe's total imports 
from developing countries, Latin America's share rose from 31.5 per cent 
in 1955 to 37.7 per cent in 1976, thus becoming the main supplier region 
in the Third World; the share of South and South-East Asia increased from 
24.7 to 31.5 per cent over the same period, making this region second in 
importance as a supplier. Africa's share, in contrast, fell from 40.1 per cent 
of these imports in 1955 to 24.2 per cent in 1976; while the Middle East, 
despite the fact that the exclusion of petroleum brings down its per-
centage, increased its share from 3.9 to 5.3 per cent (see annex, table V). 
These trends are also observable at the level of each of the major 
European groups, although with some important differences between 
them. From Latin America's point of view, the European Economic 
Community is the most unfavourable, since the region's share diminished 
as from 1970, while that of South and South-East Asia increased, and this 
process was accentuated with the entry of the new members to the 
Community in 1973 (see annex, table V). Africa showed a declining trend 
throughout the period. Furthermore, Latin America's share in EEC inputs 
in 1976, at 31.4 per cent, unlike the situation in other areas of Europe, 
was not very much higher than that of Africa (26.4 per cent) and was 
lower than that of South and South-East Asia (35.5 per cent). 
2 7 It should be remembered that fuels are excluded throughout this analysis. If 
they were included, the developing world and particularly the Middle East would 
increase their share in Europe's extra-area imports. 
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In the case of the European countries with centrally planned 
economies, Latin America's predominance as a supplier in comparison 
with other developing regions is quite clear and has increased; the pur-
chases made by these countries from Latin America rose as a proportion of 
total purchases from all the developing countries from 42.4 per cent in 
1955 to 52,9 per cent in 1976, although there was a decline followed by a 
recovery in the last few years. It should be noted, however, that purchases 
from Latin America by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe have 
traditionally been concentrated in a very few countries. In recent years, 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru have supplied a little over 80 per cent of Latin 
America's exports to that group of countries, followed by Colombia and 
Mexico with considerably smaller figures. A large part of the trade 
between these two areas has been carried out under bilateral compensation 
agreements, but there has been a recent tendency to replace this type of 
agreement by others which stipulate payment in convertible currency, and 
moreover, the strictly commercial agreements are gradually being replaced 
by more comprehensive agreements that include various systems of 
economic co-operation. 
In the case of EFTA, too, the developing world lost some of its 
importance, although in unequal proportions. Latin America is the most 
important supplier to this market among all the developing regions and its 
share in the total rose from 28.9 per cent in 1955 to 32.7 per cent in 
1973. With the withdrawal from EFTA of Denmark, and particularly the 
United Kingdom, Latin America acquired even more relative importance, 
since its share went up to 43.7 per cent in 1976, so that it became the 
primary supplier, followed by South and South-East Asia and finally by 
Africa, which has lost some of its share. 
6. Latin America's exports to Europe 
Let us now consider the question from a different angle: the evolution of 
Latin America's exports to Europe within Latin America's total sales 
abroad. Taking Latin America's exports as a whole, Europe has lost some 
slight importance as a market for the region, since its purchases have 
grown at a lower rate than those of other parts of the world. 
The situation of the various European groups differs greatly, 
however. As will be seen from table 6, the European countries with 
centrally planned economies increased their proportion of total Latin 
American exports from 1.9 per cent in 1955 to 7.4 per cent in 1977. 
Exports to the EEC practically maintained their share of the total (19.2 
per cent in 1977), thus preserving the EEC's position as the second most 
important market for the region after the United States, while EFTA's 
share shows a declining trend and its relative importance until 1975 was 
less than that of the Western European countries not included in either of 
these groups, which increased their importance up to that year although it 
declined slightly later (2.9 per cent in 1977). 
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Table 6 




     
Percent- 	Percent- 	Percent- 
age of age of age of 
Billions total Billions total Billions Latin 
of US Latin of US Latin of US Ameri- 
dollars Ameri- dollars A meri- dollars 	can 
can 	 can 	 export 
exports imports balancea 
EEC 	 1955b 	1.4 	15.1 	1.4 	16.0 	0.0 	+2.1 
1965b 2.5 19.2 2.0 16.7 +0.5 +19.3 
1970b 	3.4 	19.7 	3.3 	17.8 	+0.2 	+3.2 
1973b 5.3 17.9 5.4 17.2 -0.1 -2.5 
1973c 	6.6 	22.5 	6.8 	21.6 	-0.2 	-2.7 
1975c 8.2 16.9 11.2 19.7 -3.0 -36.5 
1976c 	9.8 	18.6 	10.4 	17.0 	-0.6 	-5.8 
1977 11.2 19.2 13.3 18.2 -0.7 -6.7 
EFTA 	 1955d 	1.2 	13.0 	1.0 	11.0 	+0.2 	+21.3 
1965d 1.5 11.4 1.3 10.9 +0.2 +10.9 
1970d 	1.6 	9.2 	1.8 	9.9 	-0.2 	-15.0 
1973d 2.4 8.1 2.7 8.4 -0.3 -10.9 
1973e 	0.9 	3.1 	1.3 	4.1 	-0.4 	40.2 
1975e 1.2 2.5 2.0 3.6 -0.8 -69.7 
1976e 	1.7 	3.2 	2.0 	3.3 	-0.3 	-18.2 
1977 1.9 3.1 2.1 3.1 -0.2 -11.1 
Rest of Western 	1955 	0.2 	2.4 	0.1 	1.4 	+0.1 	+47.8 
Europe 	1965 0.4 2.9 0.2 1.7 +0.2 +47.4 
1970 	0.6 	3.2 	0.4 	1.9 	+0.2 	+36.4 
1975 1.6 3.1 0.9 1.5 +0.7 +45.2 
1976 	1.5 	2.9 	0.9 	1.5 	+0.6 	+39.1 
1977 1.8 2.9 1.2 1.7 +0.6 +34.8 
European countries 1975 	0.2 	1.9 	0.1 	1.6 	+0.1 	+20.0 
with centrally 	1965 0.7 5.6 0.6 5.0 +0.1 +17.8 
planned economies 1970 	1.0 	5.7 	0.9 	5.0 	+0.1 	+6.1 
1975 3.9 7.9 2.5 4.5 +1.3 +34.0 
1976 	3.8 	7.2 	2.8 	4.6 	+1.0 	26.2 
1977 4.4 7.4 3.4 5.0 +1.0 +23.9 
United States 	1955 
1965 	
3.8 	40.3 	3.5 	40.2 	+0.3 	+7.6 
	
4.2 32.1 4.2 35.1 -0.0 -2.2 
1970 5.6 	32.2 	6.5 	34.7 	-0.9 	-15.3 
1975 	17.1 35.2 16.9 29.8 +0.2 +1.0 
1976 18.9 	35.9 	16.8 	27.5 	+2.1 	+11.4 
1977 	21.5 35.7 17.6 26.0 +3.9 +18.1 
'Source: UNCTAD, Yearbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1976. 
aThe percentages are calculated on the basis of a larger number of digits. bIncludes 
the six original members. eIncludes the nine members. dIncludes the original 
members of EFTA. eEFTA, excluding the United Kingdom and Denmark. 
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EFTA's decreased importance as a market for Latin America28 was, 
to a great extent, determined by the United Kingdom which was the main 
market for Latin American goods in that sub-region but which considera-
bly reduced its purchases of Latin American exports from 9.1 per cent in 
1955 to 4.3 per cent in 1975, with an annual growth rate of only 4.0 per 
cent. 
7. Trade trends in the major countries 
hi addition to the changes due to the behaviour- of the United Kingdom, 
significant differences are also discernible when the countries of the 
European Economic Community and of Latin America29 are considered 
separately. The rates of growth of Latin American exports to various 
countries show that Italy displayed the most vigorous growth rate as a 
purchaser (an annual average rate of 9.4 per cent in 1955-1975), followed 
by Germany (8.2 per cent), France, and the three remaining countries of 
the original Community (7.8 per cent) (see annex, table VI). 
In Latin America itself there are also marked differences in the 
development of exports to Europe from the various countries. The Latin 
American countries most noteworthy for the accelerated growth of their 
exports to Europe (both the market-economy countries and those with 
centrally planned economies) in the period 1955-1975 are Brazil (10.2 per 
cent annually), the Andean Group (7.9 per cent), the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries (7.8 per cent) and Mexico (6.1 per cent).3° 
8. Latin America as a market for European exports 
With regard to European exports to countries outside that area, a sharp 
increase is noted in sales to developed market-economy countries between 
1955 and 1973; their share in the total rose from 59.3 to 65.6 per cent, 
while that of the developing countries as a whole declined from 32.0 to 
24.2 per cent between those years. For Latin America the proportions 
were 8.8 and 6.0 per cent, respectively. This situation changed as a result 
of the rise in oil prices and the world recession in the next few years, so 
that exports to developed market-economy countries in 1977 represented 
57.1 per cent of Europe's total exports to countries outside the area, 
which is a little less than the share obtained in 1955 (see annex, table VII). 
The proportion of sales to Latin America remained practically unchanged 
in the 1970s, representing 6.3 per cent of the total in 1977. It should be 
noted that these are percentages of Europe's total sales to all external 
destinations, not only to developing countries. In earlier sections it was 
28
The data for Latin America cover 23 countries, excluding Cuba. 
29 CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
30CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
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seen that although Latin America's proportion of the subtotal of European 
purchases from developing countries increases if petroleum products are 
excluded, its Share of Europe's purchases from all parts of the world 
declined substantially. 
After 1973, European exports to developing countries increased, and 
in 1977 represented 26.3 per cent of total extra-area sales, which is higher 
than the percentage recorded in 1955 (see annex, table VII). 
Exports to countries with centrally planned economies also in-
creased (from 8.7 in 1955 to 10.3 per cent in 1977). As stated previously, 
this reflects the changes occurring in connexion with the barriers imposed 
on this trade in earlier periods; it should be noted that a large part of this 
increase represents the growth of trade within Europe between market-
economy countries and those with centrally planned economies. 
Among the three European groups considered there are significant 
differences in the evolution of their exports to countries outside the area, 
although in every case the share of exports to developed market-economy 
countries is seen to increase. The biggest difference is shown by the coun-
tries with centrally planned economies, whose proportion of total intra-
area exports fell from 60.0 per cent in 1955 to 35.2 per cent in 1977. 
Exports to developed market-economy countries grew more rapidly than 
in the other two groups, as did the developing countries' share; Latin 
America's share of the centrally-planned economies' extra-area exports 
rose from 4.4 per cent in 1955 to 7.7 per cent in 1977, that of the other 
developing areas increased from 10.8 to 23.8 per cent over the same 
period. 
As regards the EEC's extra-area exports, the biggest increase was in 
sales to developed market-economy countries and those with centrally 
planned economies. The former increased their share of the extra-area sales 
of the six original members of the Community from 55.3 per cent in 1955 
to 66.3 per cent in 1973. In the case of the present members of the 
Community, the share of the developed market-economy countries is 
slightly smaller and in 1977 had dropped to 51.9 per cent of total extra-
area exports. The developing countries, whose relative importance as 
markets for the Community had declined substantially between 1955 and 
1973, recovered their importance in the last few years, regaining their 
1955 level. As regards exports from the Community of six members, Latin 
America's share dropped from 10.9 per cent in 1955 to 6.2 per cent in 
1973, while that of the rest of the developing countries fell from 28.8 to 
17.8 per cent between those years. As regards exports from the Com-
munity of nine members, Latin America maintained its share (6.6 per cent 
in 1977), while that of the rest of the developing countries rose from 20.6 
to 31.5 per cent, between 1973 and 1977. The developing countries there-
fore represent an important part of the Community's external market 
(38.1 per cent in 1977) and, in particular, increased their relative im-
portance precisely during the period of recession, thereby constituting an 
important factor of impetus and economic recovery. 
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For EFTA, the export trends are similar to those of the EEC, 
although with certain differences. The share of intra-area trade is smaller 
than in the previous case (17.5 per cent of total exports in 1977), while 
the relative importance of the developed countries in extra-area sales is 
greater (72.2 per cent in 1977). In this case, too, the share of the 
developed countries increased and that of the developing countries de-
clined during the period considered. Likewise during the period of reces-
sion from 1973 onwards, the developing countries increased their relative 
importance in these sales and thus made a significant contribution towards 
a recovery: between 1973 and 1977, while Latin America's share of 
extra-area exports fell from 4.2 to 3.9 per cent, that of the rest of the 
developing countries rose from 9.5 to 13.4 per cent. 
Lastly, some differences are observable among the Latin American 
countries. The fastest growth was recorded by the purchases made by 
Brazil, whose share in Europe's total exports to Latin America increased 
significantly between 1955 and 1975 as regards both the EEC and EFTA 
and the European countries with centrally planned economies; its share 
declined only in exports from the rest of Europe. Thus Brazil is now a 
more important market for Europe than the Andean Group, as distinct 
from the situation in 1955 when this group of countries was the most 
important Latin American customer for the EEC and EFTA.31 Mexico, 
too, increased its share of Europe's exports to the region during this 
period, not only in the case of the EEC and EFTA and the countries with 
centrally planned economies, but also as regards the rest of Europe. 
Argentina's relative importance in Europe's exports to the region for these 
four groups of European countries, however, dropped substantially. 
9. Composition of Europe's exports to Latin America 
Manufactures 32 represent 87 per cent of total exports to the region by the 
EEC (nine countries), and an even greater proportion (92 per cent) of 
exports by EFTA (average 1975-1977). 
Table 7 
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, AVERAGE 1975-1977 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total to 








EEC(9) 256 762 	118 838 	30 731 16 045 	2 499 52 896 	9 849 
EFTA 	45 835 19 008 8 703 	2 408 620 	7 129 1 879 
31 See annex, table VIII. 
32 Defined as SITC sections 5-8, excluding division 68. 
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As may be seen from these data, Latin America imported during that 
period four times more manufactures than Japan, about two thirds of the 
volume imported by the United States, and one-third of that imported by 
EFTA from the Community. 
As regards exports by EFTA, Latin America's imports amounted to 
78 per cent of the value of sales to the United States and three times the 
value of imports by Japan. 
If manufactures are broken down by SITC sections it will be noted 
that Latin America's relative importance in the exports of certain products 
by both the Community and EFTA is even greater. This is so in the case of 
chemical products (SITC' 5) where Latin America's imports represented 
somewhat less than half of EFTA's purchases from the Community, while 
the United States' imports of these products represented a value similar to 
that of Latin America's imports from the EEC. A little more than a 
quarter of the total volume of chemical products exported to developing 
countries by the EEC (9) is destined for Latin America. The situation is 
very similar in the case of EFTA's exports of these products: although the 
absolute figures are lower, the relative importance of Latin America is still 
substantial, and in relative terms Latin America imported more (35 per 
cent) 33 than the rest of the developing areas. 
The Community's exports of manufactures to the Middle East and 
Africa have increased in volume in the last few years owing to the greater 
availability of foreign exchange in some countries after the rise in oil 
prices, so that the volume of their respective imports is now bigger than 
those of Latin America. 
In the case of the European countries with centrally planned eco-
nomies, the composition of their exports is somewhat different, with a 
comparatively lower proportion of manufactures in exports to both 
developed and developing countries. This is explained especially by the 
bigger proportion of fuels, which in 1977 represented 37.8 per cent of 
their total exports to the developed countries compared with 34.7 per cent 
of manufactures. In exports to Latin America, manufactures predominated 
with 52.0 per cent of total exports, while fuels represented 22.4 per cent. 
Exports of agricultural commodities were also fairly important that year, 
representing 16.3 per cent of exports to the region. Compared with other 
developing areas, the importance of manufactures in total exports to Latin 
America is relatively less, although their absolute value is clearly greater. 
10. Structure of Latin American trade with Europe 
Raw materials (SITC sections 0,1, 2, 4 and division 68) predominate in 
Latin America's exports to Europe. Although exports of manufactures 
have grown rapidly, they still represent a small proportion of total exports, 
33 On the bases of data from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
February 1980. 
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which partly explains Latin America's loss of ground compared with the 
developed countries. It must also be borne in mind that most exports of 
manufactures come from the three biggest countries: quite apart from the 
size of these countries, the dependence on commodity exports in the other 
countries of the region is even greater. Moreover in the case of the latter a 
very high proportion of total exports to Europe is made up of a few basic 
commodities. This is true of the exports to Europe (the OECD countries) 
of several Latin American countries in which only two products repre-
sented a high proportion of total sales in 1976: Chile, 72.9 per cent 
(copper and iron); Costa Rica, 95.5 per cent (coffee, bananas); El 
Salvador, 92.7 per cent (coffee, cotton); Nicaragua, 83.4 per cent (coffee, 
cotton); and Honduras, 80.6 per cent (coffee, bananas).34 
In the case of the EEC (9), raw materials represented 80.0 per 
cent 35 of the region's total sales to that destination in 1977, while the 
share of these products in Latin America's total exports was only 51.6 per 
cent.36 In contrast, exports of manufactures (SITC sections 5, 6, 7 and 8, 
excluding division 68) to the EEC attained an importance close to that of 
manufactured products in Latin America's total exports: 13.0 per cent of 
the total was exported to the Community as against 14.4 per cent of 
exports to the world. Petroleum exports (SITC 3) to the EEC represented 
only 6.4 per cent of total sales to that destination, while their share in 
Latin America's total exports was nearly three times higher (33.4 per 
cent). 37 This partly accounts for the weak development of trade between 
the Community and Latin America, particularly in comparison with other 
developing areas, as noted earlier. Only minor changes took place in trade 
during the period under review, but they show a high rate of growth for 
manufactures: in 1955 these products represented only 3.5 per cent of 
total exports to the six members of the Community, compared with 13.0 
per cent in 1977 in the case of the nine EEC members, as mentioned 
above. 
The composition of exports to EFTA is similar to that of exports to 
the EEC: raw materials absorbed 70.0 per cent of Latin America's total 
exports to that destination in 1977. Here too the growth of manufactures 
was significant, and in 1977 these represented 18.0 per cent of the total 
for the present EFTA members. In the case of the original members they 
represented only 1.6 per cent in 1955. 
The structure of exports to European countries with centrally 
planned economies is even more asymmetrical: 1977, raw materials repre-
sented 95.7 per cent of the region's total exports to that destination while 
340n the basis of data from OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series C. 
35 0n the basis of data from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
36 Excluding fuels. 
37It should be recalled that the figures include exports by the Netherlands 
Antilles. 
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the share of manufactures was 3.8 per cent. There have been practically no 
changes in the composition of these exports over the past 20 years; in 
1955, 3.4 per cent of the total were manufactures and 96 per cent basic 
commodities. Consequently, these exports are not considered in the analy-
sis of the trend followed by sales of manufactures. 
Apart from these structural differences between the region's exports 
of basic commodities and manufactures to the world and to Europe, 
within the manufactures group there are also some differences in composi-
tion according to destination. Latin America's intra-regional trade is more 
diversified in composition, as shown in table IX of the annex, the three 
destinations listed cover 87.3 per cent of total exports of manufactures in 
1977. 
11. Latin America's commodity exports to Europe 
In 1977, Europe absorbed 51.6 per cent38 of Latin America's total 
commodity exports (excluding petroleum). The EEC (9) is the most 
important market; it absorbed 28.6 per cent of these total exports, 
surpassing the United States whose relative importance has diminished in 
the past 20 years to only 21.7 per cent in 1977. EFTA's importance has 
also decreased to a mere 4 per cent of the total of these commodities, 
while the relative importance of the European countries with centrally 
planned economies and the rest of Western Europe has increased, repre-
senting respectively 14.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent of total commodity 
exports in 1977. Since the Community is the most important market for 
this type of product, the development of its trade with Latin America will 
be analysed more fully here. 
The EEC's commodity imports from all sources averaged 25.4 per 
cent of total Community imports in the three-year period 1975-1977. 39 
Intra-EEC trade in these products, particularly those subject to the 
Common Agricultural Policy, as will be seen later, has grown rapidly and 
represented 43.5 per cent of Community raw material imports during 
these years. 
Latin America is an important supplier of basic commodities to the 
EEC (9), even though its share in Community imports from outside the 
EEC is slightly lower than the Community's purchases from the United 
States, which provided an average of 18.1 per cent of extra-Community 
purchases of these products in 1975-1977, while Latin America's share was 
15.8 per cent, 40  i.e., slightly higher than Africa, which provided 14.1 per 
cent. There are many commodities of which Latin America is the main 
38According to data from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 
and UNCTAD. 
39  United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
40Jbid. 
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supplier, for example coffee and bananas, in which it covers half of the 
Community's total imports. The region also covers a considerable percent-
age of iron, copper, sugar and cotton imports. Table X of the annex 
summarizes the situation of 18 basic commodities which between 1972 
and 1974 represented 66.8 per cent" of Latin America's exports to all 
destinations and 64.7 per cent of the EEC's imports from the region. As 
can be seen from this table, the proportion of the EEC's total imports 
from Latin America represented by this group of products did not change 
substantially over the period; there are marked differences between the 
various products, however, as regards access conditions and other problems 
encountered in the Community market:" 
12. A more detailed view of primary commodities 
Despite the considerable drop over the last few years in the share of 
primary commodities43 in Latin America's total exports, they still repre-
sented over 87 per cent of total exports in 1976 if petroleum is included, 
and 51.2 per cent if it is excluded. 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
IN TOTAL EXPORTS 










B + C 
A 	A 
1955 9 400 2 820 6 306 97.1 67.1 
1960 10 170 3 240 6 610 96.9 65.0 
1965 12 940 3 670 8 635 95.1 66.7 
1970 17 430 4 150 11 475 89.6 65.8 
1976 52 670 19 020 26 980 87.3 51.2 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979. 
For every individual country of Latin America, the share of primary 
commodities (excluding petroleum) in its total exports continues to be 
high, as will be noted from table 9. 
41World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, 1976. 
42 For a more detailed analysis by individual commodities, see the relevant 
section below. 
43Defined by SITC sections 0, 1, 2, 4 and division 67 and 68 (plus section 3 for 
fuels). Division 67 (iron and steel) is included because these products are usually 
exported from developing countries after only simple processing. 
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Table 9 
COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF BASIC COMMODITIES 
(EXCLUDING PETROLEUM) IN TOTAL EXPORTS, 1974 
Country Year Percentage 
1. Cuba 1975 99.8 
2. Peru 1975 87.4 
3. Chile 1975 93.6 
4. Honduras 1976 90.0 
5. Dominican Republic 1975 89.5 
6. Guyana 1975 89.4 
7. Paraguay 1975 88.4 
8. Nicaragua 1976 84.0 
9. Argentina 1976 76.9 
10. Guatemala 1975 75.8 
11. Brazil 1977 74.5 
12. Colombia 1976 74.2 
13. Costa Rica 1976 73.0 
14. El Salvador 1974 70.1 
15. Uruguay 1976 66.6 
16. Haiti 1977 62.4 
17. Bolivia 1975 61.7 
18. Mexico 1976 56.5 
19. Panama 1975 50.7 
20. Barbados 1977 49.8 
21. Suriname 1975 49.3 
22. Jamaica 1976 42.1 
23. Ecuador 1976 39.1 
24. Venezuela 1975 4.3 
25. Trinidad and Tobago 1977 3.6 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; UNCTAD, Hand-
book of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979. 
Thus, the structural dependence on basic commodities still affects 
the Latin American countries and will continue to do so for a long time 
yet. Such dependence brings with it a number of problems which have 
been discussed in the most widely varying international forums: price 
instability and, in many cases, a long-term trend towards a deterioration of 
the terms of trade; an insignificant stimulating effect on the economies 
and societies, etc. 
Commodity exports to Europe constitute an important part of Latin 
America's total sales, as may be seen from table 10. 
Clearly, Europe has considerably strengthened its position as an 
outlet for total commodity exports from Latin America, and since the 
beginning of the 1970s has established its share at around 50 per cent, if 
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Very different results are arrived at from a study of table 11, i.e., if 
consideration is given to Latin America's relative position in Europe's total 
commodity imports. 
Table 11 
EUROPE: COMMODITY IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA, 
AFRICA AND THE WORLD 
(Millions of dollars FOB) 
Year 
Imports Percent- 
Total 	from 	age of 


















1955 23 270 2 458 10.6 3 070 13.2 7 631 32.8 
1960 28 620 2 867 10.0 3 489 12.2 8 606 30.1 
1965 37 595 4 157 11.1 3 972 10.6 10 499 27.9 
1970 51 240 5 729 11.2 5 238 10.2 13 783 26.9 
1975 120 560 13 846 11.5 8 542 7.1 129 190 24.2 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979. 
Note: SITC division 67 (iron and steel) has been excluded from this calculation. 
In fact, the region has not significantly improved its position as a 
supplier of basic commodities to the European countries in the past two 
decades, although the situation in this respect of other developing areas, 
such as Africa, and of the developing countries as a whole is, relatively 
speaking, even worse. This table reflects a basic fact which will be analysed 
in greater detail later in this study: the more than proportional increase in 
Europe's commodity imports from other developed countries (either 
through intra-European trade or from North America and Oceania), 
particularly in the field of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. This 
took place at the expense of the developing countries, which saw their 
share in Europe's imports of basic commodities shrink from just under 
one-third to less than one-quarter of the total. 
As regards the composition of Latin America's exports to Europe by 
groups of products, the changes occurring over the past 20 years can be 
seen in table 12. 
Food (including beverages, tobacco and oilseeds) clearly predomi-
nates throughout the period under review, with 62.4, 64.2, 69.5, 64.7 and 
71.4 per cent of total commodity exports to Europe in the years 1955, 
1960, 1965, 1970 and 1976, respectively, and its importance seems to 
have been enhanced in recent years. The relative drop in raw materials of 
agricultural origin is very marked, both from the comparison of Latin 
American exports by commodities and from Latin America's relative 
position as a supplier of the European market, while minerals and crude 
fertilizers are shown as the most dynamic sector in both these senses. 
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Table 12 
EUROPE'S COMMODITY IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EUROPEAN IMPORTS AND 
OF TOTAL LATIN AMERICA EXPORTS 























A. Food (including beverages, tobacco and oilseeds) 
1955 11 690 1 550 4 190 13.3 37.0 
1960 14 290 1 855 4 350 13.0 42.8 
1965 20 390 2 910 5 540 14.3 52.5 
1970 26 410 3 720 7 160 14.1 51.2 
1976 71 400 10 510 19 260 11.7 54.6 
B. Raw materials of agricultural origin 
1955 7 360 544 1 070 7.4 50.8 
1960 8 480 478 970 5.6 49.3 
1965 9 250 555 1 190 6.0 46.6 
1970 10 570 515 1 100 4.8 46.8 
1976 23 850 892 2 020 3.7 44.2 
C. Crude minerals. etc. 
1955 2 050 129 495 6.3 26.1 
1960 2 820 219 730 7.8 30.0 
1965 3 770 342 1 060 9.1 32.3 
1970 5 900 680 1 650 11.5 41.2 
1976 12 610 1 305 2 870 10.3 45.4 
D. Iron and non- ferrous metals 
1955 4 575 270 551 5.9 49.0 
1960 7 300 336 580 4.6 57.9 
1965 9 615 378 845 3.9 44.7 
1970 18 500 837 1 565 4.5 53.5 
1976 39 040 1 138 2 830 2.9 60.3 
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Internationa 
1976: Supplement, 1977. 
de and Development Statistics, 
13. Exports of manufactures from Latin America to Europe 
Latin America's exports of manufactures to the world, though still repre-
senting not more than 12.7 per cent of total exports, have grown rapidly 
over the past 20 years. This has been due in part to the increase in goods 
produced with more advanced technology (capital goods, consumer dura-
bles and basic intermediate products). The 1976 figures for exports of 
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engineering products from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to-
talled 1 654 million dollars. 
In 1976, exports of intermediate iron and steel goods by six Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) amounted to 251.8 million dollars, of which 43 per cent went 
to the industrialized countries." Exports of motor cars, trucks and buses 
from these same countries came to 415.9 million dollars, and sales to the 
industrialized countries formed 32.3 per cent of this total. Another 
important group includes radios, television sets and other light electrical 
and electronic items, with exports totalling 211.5 million dollars and a 
very high proportion (65 per cent) destined for the industrialized coun-
tries. Available information for 1975, however, indicates that exports of 
the majority of these types of products declined that year, particularly 
those destined for the developed countries. 
Inter-Latin American trade showed the most dynamic performance 
with an average annual growth rate of 24.7 per cent between 1970 and 
1976; in this last year of the period it accounted for 39.5 per cent of total 
exports of manufactures (S ITC 5, 6, 7 and 8, except divisions 67 and 68). 
The United States was the most important market outside the region 
and in that same year received 27.7 per cent of total exports of these 
products. Sales to Europe grew at a fairly high rate between the years in 
question, exceeding the rate of growth of exports to the United States. 
Nevertheless, the total value of exports to Europe represented 20.3 of the 
total, i.e., just over two-thirds of the value of these exports to the United 
States. Of the total exports of manufactures to Europe (1 447 million 
dollars' worth) in 1976, 74 per cent went to the EEC (9), 13 per cent to 
EFTA and 11 per cent to the socialist countries of Europe: consequently, 
a major part of the analysis will be devoted to the study of trade with the 
Community. 
A notable fact is the marked predominance of "traditional" manu-
factures in sales to the developed countries (amounting to about three-
fifths of total sales of manufactures, compared with two-fifths, for 
example, in Latin America's intra-regional trade in manufactured 
products). On the other hand, there are some noteworthy differences 
between Western Europe and the United States. In the latter market the 
relative importance of chemical products and machinery and transport 
equipment is practically equal, with each group absorbing one-fifth of the 
total, whereas in the case of Western Europe the share of exports of 
chemical products is over twice the value of exports of machinery and 
transport equipment. This is partly explained by the existence of trans-
national corporations, since these companies generate the major part of 
manufactured exports and European companies predominate in the chemi-
cals sector, as will be seen in chapter III. 
44 Including the United States, Canada, the rest of the continent except Latin 
America and CARIFTA, the EEC, EFTA, Eastern Europe and the rest of Western 
Europe. 
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14. Composition of exports of manufactures to the EEC 
Of the imports of manufactures from Latin America by the European 
Economic Community (9), 58 per cent are in SITC sections 6 and 8 
(excluding division 68) and consist in general of manufactured products 
other than metal manufactures, machinery or chemical products (see 
annex, table IX). Latin America's share in total imports of these latter 
products is insignificant as most trade in manufactures is between de-
veloped countries. Trade in manufactures is important because of the high 
degree of competitiveness that has developed in many products belonging 
to this group both in Latin America and in other developing countries. In 
1977, most of the imports of these types of manufactures effected by the 
EEC (9) from the region were textiles, including clothing, leather and 
footwear, which totalled a value of 373 million dollars, compared with a 
total for the group of 765 million dollars.45 These imports have grown 
vigorously, since in 1965 they represented virtually insignificant values (see 
annex, table XI). Moreover, these products are important not only for 
their volume but also because they are exported by the relatively less 
developed countries as well as the three major countries, Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. Furthermore these products have stiffer barriers to face in 
their access to the developed countries' markets, and most of them belong 
to the "sensitive" category of the Community's Generalized System of 
Preferences. 
The region's exports consist not only of traditional manufactures, 
however, but also of those produced by modern industry. Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico, in particular, export by no means insignificant 
amounts of manufactures of this type. In 1977, Brazil's sales to the EEC 
of engineering products amounted to 187.6 million dollars; of these, 
power-generating machinery alone (SITC 711) accounted for 81.7 million 
dollars. The value of these same products exported to the rest of Western 
Europe was 35.7 million dollars. Information at hand would seem to 
indicate that exports of these items are increasing rapidly. 
15. Latin America's trade balance with the major European areas 
Latin America's exports to the European Economic Community have not 
increased at the same rate as imports from that origin, particularly in the 
last few years, so that its trade balance with the Community, which was 
positive up to 1970, has since been converted into a growing deficit which 
amounted in 1975 to 3 billion dollars, or 36.5 per cent of total exports to 
that market. A very similar situation has arisen with regard to trade with 
EFTA: at the end of the 1960s the trade balance was converted into a 
45These figures, drawn from OECD's "Trade by Commodities" are in CIF 
terms, and therefore are not strictly comparable with those referred to above. 
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deficit for Latin America, and in 1975 it amounted to 800 million dollars, 
or 69.3 per cent of total exports to EFTA. Trade with the rest of Western 
Europe and the European countries with centrally planned economies 
shows a favourable trend for Latin America, with increasing trade sur-
pluses throughout the period. 
In 1976 Latin America's position improved, and this trend con-
tinued in 1977. With respect to Europe as a whole, Latin America 
obtained a surplus of 700 million dollars, mainly owing to a trade surplus 
with the countries with centrally planned economies. Trade with the EEC 
and EFTA reflected a negative balance, but this was considerably smaller 
than in previous years. With respect to the rest of the European countries, 
Latin America obtained a positive balance (see table 6). 
B. Trade policies of developed countries and 
problems of access to their markets 
This section deals with the European Economic Community, because it is 
the most important European area for Latin America and has certain 
common policies which justify its treatment as a group. 
A study of the Community's trade policy reveals two features which, 
especially in recent years, have given rise to serious concern about the 
effects they might have on the growth of Latin America's exports to that 
group of countries. 
The first of these features is the emergence and strengthening of 
distinctly protectionist tendencies which affect a number of products of 
great interest to Latin America and which, although not expressly directed 
against the region, can be said to affect Latin American exports more 
seriously than those of other developing areas. Moreover, these tendencies 
are not peculiar to the EEC but are shared by other developed areas. 
Secondly, the various agreements concluded by the EEC with several 
countries of the Mediterranean area, and particularly the Lome Con-
vention of which 57 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the 
so-called ACP countries) are members, have led to the formation of a trade 
grouping of the Community with a great many developing countries, 
which undoubtedly has connotations of discrimination against countries 
not forming part of that grouping, especially the Latin American coun-
tries. 
The first group of problems (protectionism) is amply illustrated in a 
recent statement by the Director-General of GATT to the effect that the 
measures designed to restrict imports adopted in recent years, or about to 
be adopted, affect from 3 to 5 per cent of world trade to a value of 30 to 
50 billion dollars. Among the categories of goods affected are beef, tex-
tiles, leather manufactures, footwear, steel, transport equipment, house-
hold electrical products including electronic articles, etc. To this list 
should be added those agricultural commodities which, in the case of the 
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EEC are included in the common Agricultural Policy and for many years 
have been the subject of import restrictions.46 
The above-mentioned manufactured products are all of great present 
or potential interest to Latin America and account for a significant part of 
the growth of exports from the region in the last few years. Their potential 
interest is all the greater because, for the production of most of these 
goods, Latin America has advantages in the way of cheaper manpower 
than in the developed countries (including skilled as well as unskilled 
manpower), its natural resources endowment, and the degree of maturity 
attained by its industry. If the protectionist trends of the industrialized 
countries continue, not only will the region's export capacity be seriously 
affected but also its import capacity, and this, besides obstructing the 
industrialization process, could not but have some negative effects on the 
industrialized countries themselves, since they are the origin of most of the 
region's imports of equipment and intermediate goods. 
Generally speaking, the protectionist policies adopted by the indus-
trialized countries are due to concern over unemployment or balance-of-
payments disequilibria, or they are designed to defend industries con-
sidered of strategic importance. It should be noted, however, that the 
harm these restrictions do to the developing countries is undoubtedly 
greater than the alleviation they bring to the countries adopting them, 
since the values involved have a much greater relative significance for the 
former's exports than for the latter's imports. It would seem, moreover, 
that in the face of a situation which is difficult for all concerned, the 
developed countries have a greater capacity for defence in view of their 
superior position in financial, economic and technological terms, and they 
should therefore strive to find solutions to their conjunctural problems 
that will not involve sacrifices of this kind for the developing areas. 
Specifically, the most significant immediate negative effects are 
being felt by the textile, clothing and footwear, and leather manufactures 
sectors, at least in the case of the restrictions imposed by the EEC: exports 
of steel products, metal manufactures and machinery, electronic items and 
transport equipment to this group have not yet acquired much im-
portance, although they should do so in the future. 
In analysing the second category of problems, i.e., the EEC's 
measures which discriminate against Latin America and favour other coun-
tries, specific reference must be made to the more favourable, non-
generalized, trade treatment granted to those countries with which the 
EEC has concluded trade agreements.47 These countries already number 
over 70, if account is taken of: 
46 CEPAL, The economic and social development and external relations of 
Latin America, (E/CEPAL/1024/Rev.l) op. cit. 
47See the discussion later in this study on the nature and scope of generalized 
preferences. 
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(a) The non-reciprocal preferences accorded to the 57 ACP signa-
tory countries of the Lome Convention, the three Maghreb countries and 
the four Mashrek countries which enjoy preferential trade treaties, and 
(b) The reciprocal preferences implicit in the agreements existing 
with the four Mediterranean countries which are forming a customs union 
with the EEC (Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus) and the eight member 
countries of EFTA and Israel, which have signed agreements with the EEC 
with a view to the establishment of a Free Trade Association. 
Apart from these agreements there are examples of special deals with 
individual countries on a single product or group of products. Included in 
this category are the agreements with Yugoslavia on beef, and the special 
agreements with Commonwealth member countries to compensate for the 
loss of customs benefits resulting from the entry of the three new 
members into the Community. It has been estimated48 that the agree-
ments with Canada involve concessions in respect of agriculture, fishery 
and forestry exports which amount to a value of over 250 million dollars. 
Other countries enjoying these special benefits are Australia and New 
Zealand. 
The Lome Convention grants, in principle (with the sole exception 
of those products which are subject to the Common Agricultural Policy), 
completely free access for all products of the 53 ACP countries, with no 
reciprocity obligations. There are also three supplementary agreements on 
industrial co-operation, technical and financial assistance and the stabiliza-
tion of export earnings (STABEX). 
Table 13 summarizes the different treatment given under EEC's 
trade policy to Latin America compared with the ACP countries in the 
field of basic commodities. It will be noted from the table that as regards 
the 23 commodities analysed, which represent about two-thirds of Latin 
America's total exports to Europe, in 1974 Latin America still had a bigger 
share than the ACP countries (4 901.5 million dollars against 4 511.7 
million). The situation has probably changed in recent years as a result of 
the Lome Convention, the difficulties of access for beef and sugar to the 
EEC and the problems of fish meal production in the region. In any case, 
it can be seen from the table that Latin America's treatment is signifi-
cantly more unfavourable. This will probably have a greater impact in the 
future, with less favourable commodity prices and markets than in the 
past, when these conditions were particularly satisfactory in some years. 
The preferential treatment reserved for the ACP countries is obvious 
from comparing their position both as regards tariffs and as regards the use 
of the STABEX mechanism. Note should also be taken of the special case 
of sugar, which, though not benefiting from the STABEX system, is 
subject to a special supply agreement whereby the EEC guarantees the 
48  United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, 21 February 
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ACP countries the purchase of sugar quotas at prices that must not be 
below the support prices paid to producers in the Community itself. 
As regards manufactures, it should be noted that although many of 
the ACP countries represent a distinctly lower net export potential than 
Latin America, .their position compares very favourably with that of the 
Latin American countries, since their completely liberalized access is not 
subject to the quota system in force for "sensitive and semi-sensitive" 
products in the EEC's Generalized System of Preferences. Moreover, some 
ACP countries are already in a position to take advantage of this improved 
treatment. The Lome Convention only contains a safeguard clause au-
thorizing reArictive measures to be implemented in such a way as to cause 
a minimum of difficulties to the ACP countries, in the event that their 
exports should give rise to serious disruptions in the economy of the 
importing country. 
In addition to the Lome Convention, whose main features have just 
been outlined, there are also the above-mentioned preferential agreements 
with other countries, especially of the Mediterranean basin. These coun-
tries, some semi-industrialized and others approaching the stage of full 
industrialization, are strong present and potential competitors of Latin 
America. 
All the foregoing information reveals a situation of distinct dis-
crimination against Latin America, which is difficult to justify in the light 
of the existing legal instruments (UNCTAD and Part IV of GATT). It is 
worth recalling that although Part IV of GATT provides for the granting of 
special preferences to developing countries, in the Principles and Objec-
tives included in the same chapter it is stated that the basic objectives of 
the Agreement include improving the level of living and the progressive 
development of the economies of all the contracting parties, and that the 
achievement of these objectives is particularly urgent if the contracting 
parties are developing countries. 
In other words, the preferences should not become advantageous for 
one group of countries at the expense of the rest. Nor is it a valid argu-
ment that the countries with which the EEC has signed preferential agree-
ments are relatively less developed than the Latin American countries, 
since so far the EEC has granted special preferences to countries with 
widely varying income levels, many of them higher than those of some 
Latin American countries. 
It may therefore be affirmed that the granting of special preferences 
to only one group of countries violates the spirit of the world movement 
towards generalized preferences and also the spirit and basic motivations 
of Part IV of GATT. 
Furthermore, Latin America's importance as a buyer from the EEC 
(7.2 per cent of total sales in the period 1973-1975 compared with 5.6 per 
cent for the ACP countries), particularly in some specific items such as 
chemical products and machinery in which its share is close to that of the 
United States, contrasts very strikingly with its under-privileged position as 
54 
a supplier (2.9 per cent of total EEC imports in 1974, as against 4.3 per 
cent for the ACP countries). 
It would seem that the lack of a united approach on the part of the 
Latin American countries has been one of the factors that have so far 
prevented the region from having more bargaining power with respect to 
the EEC, 49 although possibly the historical ties between the EEC and 
many of the ACP countries have played an even more important role. 
The conclusion is that the problem of trade discrimination against 
the region is destined to be one of the focal points of discussion between 
the EEC and Latin America, unless clear measures are adopted to improve 
the conditions of access for Latin American products to the Community 
Market. 
The Community's scheme under the Generalized System 
of preferences and its utilization 
A detailed description of the nature of the Community's scheme under the 
Generalyzed System of Preferences was included in an earlier (1975) 
document of the Economic Commission for Latin America. 5° Since then 
there have been changes in the lists of products covered, but basically the 
structure of the scheme and its significance for the Latin American coun-
tries remain the same. 
The principal Latin American beneficiaries of the scheme in 1975 
were Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The trade of these 






million units of account 
75 	 >7 	), 
Mexico 59 /5 
Peru 32 33 1, 73 
Venezuela 1 
301 
The corresponding total for all beneficiaries was 1 792 million units 
of account. 
490n this subject, see CEPAL, The economic and social development and 
external relations of Latin America, op. cit., pp. 236-243; and Leopoldo Tettamanti, 
Relaciones economicas de America Latina con la CEE, E/CEPAL/L.159, June 1977. 
50CEPAL, Latin American Development and the International Economic 
Situation, Part IL E/CEPAL/981/Add.2, 21 February 1975. 
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About two-thirds of Latin America's exports to the EEC is made up 
of 25 basic commodities. 51 Sixteen of these are subject to tariff duties, 
but only three receive preferences. These preferences are in the form of 
only partial tariff reductions and the margins of advantage over countries 
not receiving preferences are quite small. The scheme of the EEC has been 
intended and designed from the start to encourage exports of manu-
factures and semi-manufactures from the developing countries rather than 
exports of primary goods. Indeed, exports of many agricultural primary 
goods are actually discouraged by the Community through the imple-
mentation of its Common Agricultural Policy. 
On the other hand the expressed intention. to stimulate exports of 
industrial goods from the developing countries has been partially frus-
trated by limitations which the Community itself has placed on such 
exports. These limitations are in the form of tariff quotas and ceilings 
which prevent duty-free entry once the specified limits have been reached. 
Unfortunately some of the products affected are precisely those non-
traditional exports which the Latin American area has been striving to 
develop in order to reduce its debilitating dependency on a few export 
products subject to sharp international price and demand fluctuations. 
Forty-six sensitive industrial products are subject to tariff quotas, 
with advance allocation of each quota among the Member States of the 
Community. Certain tariff quotas include a reserve share to enable alloca-
tion to be adjusted according to use of the quota. Semi-sensitive products 
number 131 and are subject to ceilings at the Community level. For almost 
all other non-agricultural products (the so-called non-sensitive ones) 
ceilings at the Community level are applied when the category of sensitivity 
of the products is changed. Individual exporting countries are in principle 
limited to a specific percentage of the Community quota (the butoir), 
which means that no one country may export more than 50, 30, or 20 per 
cent of the ceiling, depending on the product. These butoirs are set out 
product-by-product in the list of goods receiving preferences. 
Industrial raw materials are excluded from the preferences scheme 
but in general these have low or zero duties. 
According to information provided to UNCTAD by the European 
Economic Community, there is a great disparity between the value of 
imports, from all sources, of products covered by the preferences scheme 
and the value of imports of the same products which actually entered the 
Community with preferential treatment, 52 the ratio being 3 to 1. Some 
Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) showed much less 
disparity according to figures for 1975 provided by the source referred to. 
51 See list in CEPAL The Economic and Social Development and External 
Relations of Latin America, op. cit., p. 230. 
52 See UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences: Replies received from 
preference-giving countries, TD/B/C.5/30/Add.4, 20 June 1977. 
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Argentina's percentage corresponded to the world average and Venezuela's 
percentage was quite low. 
Probably the two main factors which severely limit utilization of the 
preferences are (a) the quotas and ceilings which the Community imposes 
for certain sensitive and semi-sensitive products and (b) insufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the scheme on the part of exporters, 
contributed to by the complexity of its regulations. With respect to the 
first of these factors, in 1976 five Latin American countries exceeded the 
maximum amounts established by the Community (Brazil with seven 
products, Mexico and Venezuela with two each, and Argentina and 
Colombia with one each). All beneficiary countries under the scheme, 
including Latin American countries, were limited in their duty-free exports 
of 23 other products to the Community owing to the latter's quantitative 
restrictions. This makes a total of 36 product-cases where Latin American 
countries were affected by the application of such restrictions under the 
preferences scheme. For the developing countries as a whole 105 products 
were affected. The categories of exports to which the 36 products corres-
pond are hides and skins, wood, cement, yarn, fabrics and apparel, shoes, 
citric and glutamic acid, petroleum derivatives, certain manufactured metal 
articles and building materials. 
For 13 of the products where a quantitative restriction under the 
scheme affected a Latin American country or countries the maximum 
quantity permitted to enter duty free is less than half a million dollars. For 
other products the amount is less than 800 000 dollars. Moreover, for yet 
other products the limits are very low in relation to total exports of the 
"beneficiary" country to the Community (e.g. hides and skins exported by 
Argentina, shoes and planed lumber exported by Brazil). 
C. Individual analysis of main basic commodities 
Fourteen commodities are considered here: wheat, maize, rice, meat, 
cotton, sugar, cocoa, coffee, bananas, bauxite and aluminium, copper, tin, 
iron and, of course, petroleum. They represented an average of 64.8 per 
cent of Latin America's exports in the period 1973-1975. 
Table 14 provides information on Latin America's share in European 
imports of these goods in terms of quantity and value. Because of the 
source used,53 these tables cover only the European countries belonging 
to the OECD, i.e., they do not include the socialist countries of Europe. 
These latter countries are, however, included in the data on com-
modity exports by SITC sections, 54 and the evolution of their imports 
from Latin America will be dealt with in greater detail later on in this 
study. The share of the European member countries of CMEA is still 
53OECD, Trade by Commodities, various years. 
54 See tables 10, 11 and 12 above. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SHARE IN 
COMMODITY IMPORTS OF EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF OECD 
(Percentages) 
SITC Commodity 
On the basis of value On the basis of volume 
1960 1965 1970 1974 1976 1960 1965 1970 1974 1976 
011 Meat 44.9 28.5 18.7 9.4 8.5 26.4 21.1 21.6 10.6 
041 Wheat 8.8 17.0 4.1 3.4 2.3 8.8 18.3 4.2 2.5 2.2 
042 Rice 0.3 11.1 14.0 12.4 14.1 2.2 14.1 19.3 12.9 15.6 
044 Maize 33.4 20.6 28.2 17.5 12.8 33.4 20.4 29.6 17.5 10.9 
051.3 Bananas ... 74.6 83.0 83.4 n.a. ... 76.2 84.0 84.4 n.a. 
061 Sugar 53.7 55.0 26.4 36.6 26.9 48.4 37.1 33.8 34.4 31.1 
071 Coffee 63.6 64.2 64.2 57.6 54.0 56.3 58.2 61.6 55.2 52.4 
072 Cocoa 13.0 7.0 7.4 11.9 8.8 11.8 5.0 7.1 9.5 8.0 
263 Cotton 15.5 30.0 24.6 20.3 14.7 14.3 28.4 ... 19.9 13.1 
281 Iron ore 17.1 19.4 20.8 26.8 29.0 11.3 14.6 18.1 24.3 27.1 
682 Copper 18.9 14.6 17.0 10.8 13.4 19.1 16.6 17.4 11.5 14.9 
283.3 Bauxite ... 20.0 25.1 23.3 n.a. ... 7.6 7.9 8.4 n.a. 
685, 283.4 Lead 19.2 12.2 13.0 10.7 n.a. 17.4 11.2 12.2 10.7 n.a. 
686, 283.5 Zinc 8.2 4.8 5.4 10.8 n.a. 10.0 1.2 6.7 15.4 n.a. 
283.6 Tin ... 33.3 60.5 54.9 n.a. 55.8 76.3 70.2 n.a. 
331, 332 Petroleum 13.8 9.4 3.9 1.9 1.7 10.0 7.9 ... 2.1 1.9 
Source: OECD. Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series C, several volumes. 
considerably lower than that of the member countries of the OECD, in 
spite of having risen from 9 per cent in 1960 to 15.2 per cent in 1973, 
essentially owing to Cuba's exports to its fellow socialist countries. 
There has been a steady increase in the volume of commodity ex-
ports throughout the period under review, although in some cases (such as 
that of agricultural products of tropical origin), this indicator displays 
slower growth than world demand for these products and the rate of 
growth of exports to those countries by other parts of the world 
(particularly Africa). In others, as noted in section B, barriers were 
established for Latin American exports to Europe, particularly to the EEC. 
This happened in the case of temperate-zone agricultural products and, to 
a certain extent, sugar. Demand for non-ferrous metals depends on the 
level of industrial activity of the consumer countries and has therefore 
grown considerably in the last few decades. 
Although it is true that in terms of volume commodity exports have 
grown steadily, the same cannot be said of the series of unit value indexes 
for the period concerned. This is because of the price fluctuations which 
affected nearly all commodities. 
Figure 1 presents a series of international price indexes for the 
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of world inflation prepared by the World Bank on the basis of the prices of 
exports of manufactures from the developed countries. This figure shows 
to what extent prices have suffered fluctuations, sometimes extreme, in 
the course of time, in sharp contrast with the progressive rise in the prices 
of manufactures (and of petroleum) which represent the bulk of the 
imports of the Latin American countries. Although admittedly there has 
been a notable recovery in price levels since 1973, in the first place it 
should be noted that the actual increase in terms of purchasing power has 
been seriously affected by the rises in world price levels and, secondly, it is 
a well-known fact that for many of these products (sugar and copper being 
two particularly serious cases for the region), in 1976 and 1977 there were 
occasionally sharp drops from the 1974 levels, with prices sometimes even 
sinking below the 1972 levels. 
I. Temperate-zone agricultural commodities 
These commodities have been seriously affected by the restrictions 
imposed by importing European member countries of OECD, and in 
particular by the EEC. The countries most affected have been Argentina, 
followed by Uruguay, Brazil, and others, although on a much lesser scale. 
Between 1970 and 1974, meat imports from Latin America by the 
European OECD countries55 dropped to less than half their previous 
volume. Because of the mechanism used (complete suspension of imports) 
beef was the sector most seriously affected by the restrictive policy for 
imports of agricultural origin by the EEC. Wheat has also been severely 
affected (in this case, too, imports by the European OECD countries 
declined to half), although the drop in exports to Western Europe may 
have been partially compensated for by the considerable increase in 
exports to the Soviet Union. The decrease in maize imports, on the other 
hand, has not been very great and it has been accompanied by a marked 
increment in sales to the CMEA countries. In more general terms, Latin 
America's share in imports of wheat, maize, rice and meat by the Euro-
pean member countries of OECD fell from 23.2 per cent in 1965 to 10.8 
per cent in 197456 as a result essentially of the EEC's Common Agricul-
tural Policy, which led to growing self-sufficiency through the mechanism 
of imposing variable levies on imports.57 Exports of vegetable oils are in a 
similar position, although the effects on import values have not been so 
55 As regards this information, and all that following in relation to "the OECD 
European countries", there is a small overestimation in the figures for 1974 owing to 
the inclusion of Finland, which was not a member of the OECD in 1965. 
56By 1976, the situation had worsened for all these products but wheat. 
57Designed to compensate for the difference between the price of imported 
products (CIF plus fixed customs duties) and the domestic support price established 
for each year. 
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marked, since there was no previous significant flow of these products. 
The increase between 1965 and 1974 (from 69 to 254 million dollars) in 
the imports of European countries (OECD) from Latin America hides the 
barriers that have prevented this item from representing a much higher 
figure. Moreover, 1974 was a year of unusually high prices for vegetable 
oils. 
2. Tropical agricultural commodities 
Particularly notable among these commodities is the case of sugar, which 
like the temperate-zone commodities is subject to the EEC's Common 
Agricultural Policy. For sugar, as for other tropical commodities, the 
signature of the Lome Convention distinctly improved the relative position 
of the Caribbean countries in this respect,58 but in normal years there is 
still a situation of surplus production in the Community which makes it 
difficult to import from the rest of Latin America. Imports from "devel-
oping America"59 (that is, including non-self-governing territories, for 
purposes of comparison) by the European member countries of the OECD 
dropped from 48 to 33 per cent between 1960 and 1976, while the 
increase in volume over the same period was practically negligible, i.e., 
from 2 450 000 tons to 2 500 000. Moreover, if Finland and Yugoslavia, 
which were not members of OECD in 1960, are excluded, the figure for 
1976 actually shows a decline in volume terms. Latin America's prospects 
of helping to supply Western Europe's demand for sugar, except in years 
when there may be a sugar shortage in the Community, show no signs of 
improving. The preferential treatment given to the Caribbean signatory 
countries of the Lome Convention and the export quota for European 
countries which are not members of the EEC may be expected to be 
maintained. Cuba's case is quite different: there is an agreement in force 
with the countries of CMEA —of which this country is actually a 
member— signed in 1965 and renewed up to 1980, guaranteeing the 
market of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe at price levels which, 
except in very special periods such as the second half of 1974, are higher 
than world prices. 
As regards coffee, the United States, which is the traditional market 
for Latin America, has failed to maintain its volume of imports (17 per 
cent less in 1974 than in 1959). The European market, on the other hand, 
has expanded notably in the last two decades, exceeding that of the 
United States and becoming stabilized at over half of the total world 
imports of this commodity (52.7 per cent in terms of value in 1974). This 
58 As a result of this Convention, the Caribbean countries have been able to 
retain their position as traditional suppliers of sugar to the United Kingdom market; 
at the same time they enjoy tariff examptions and the use of the stabilization of 
export receipts mechanism (STABEX) envisaged for the member countries. 
59 See table 14. 
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explains why Latin America's coffee exports, in spite of having lost ground 
to Africa in both the world market and in Europe, where they dropped 
from 63.6 per cent of the total imported in 1960 to 54.0 per cent in 1976, 
have found their most dynamic market in Europe. What has shown itself 
to be even more dynamic, although still at relatively low levels, is the 
market of the CMEA countries, which doubled its volume of coffee 
imports from Latin America between 1960 and 1974. 
Access to the EEC market presents some difficulties ranging from 
the customs tariffs (5.4 per cent), from which the member countries of the 
Lome Convention are exempt, to the excessively high level of internal 
taxes in certain countries such as Germany and Italy, where the internal 
tax (without considering the tariff) amounted to 130 per cent and 110 per 
cent, respectively, of the CIF import price in 1973. 
Cocoa presents many characteristics in common with coffee: slow 
growth of world demand, high level of internal taxes in the EEC countries, 
and strong competition from other developing areas. Inasmuch as the 
customs tariff is as high as for roasted and soluble coffee (12 per cent for 
cocoa butter and 16 per cent for cocoa powder), the customs exemption 
granted to the ACP countries under the Lome Convention is relatively 
more detrimental to the Latin American countries, particularly if it is 
taken into account that their share of total imports by the European 
OECD countries had already dropped from 11.8 to 8.0 per cent in terms 
of volume between 1960 and 1976. In the case of both coffee and cocoa, 
attention is drawn to the lack of growth of Latin America's production. 
The case of bananas, which has been thoroughly studied by 
the Intergovernmental Group set up by FAO, in co-operation with 
UNCTAD 60 is very typical of a certain situation in the production and 
marketing of basic commodities concerning which a recent CEPAL docu-
ment61 suggests the need for "a complete restructuring of all phases of the 
process of production and marketing of this commodity so as to enable 
the producing countries to have a larger share in them as the only means of 
increasing their net foreign exchange earnings". These marketing mecha-
nisms, in which transnational corporations play a predominant role, are 
responsible for the fact that the export price of bananas is only 11.5 per 
cent of the final retail price. To this situation is added a decline in export 
earnings in real terms, due to the deterioration in the terms of trade, which 
is more evident in the case of bananas than in that of any other com-
modity. In spite of a relatively high tariff barrier in the EEC's common 
external tariff (20 per cent) and of the competition from the non-self- 
60See the UNCTAD documents Pricing policy in relation to marketing and 
distribution of bananas (TD/B/C.11CONS.10/L.5) and The marketing and distribu-
tion system for bananas (TD/B/C.1/162), both issued in 1974. 
61lnformation note on recent trends in some primary commodity markets 
(E/CEPAL/1.122), 20 August 1975. 
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governing territories of America and the African countries, Latin America 
increased its share in the volume of imports by Europe (OECD) from 46.0 
per cent of the total in 1965 to 62.5 per cent in 1974. Satisfactory results, 
with good prospects of a subsequent improvement, have also been 
recorded in the CMEA countries, particularly the German Democratic 
Republic, where per capita consumption of bananas has exceeded that of 
certain Western European countries such as Italy. 
3. Raw materials of agricultural origin 
For lack of space, this analysis will exclude items which are of medium 
importance to several Latin American countries and will deal only with 
cotton, which, as can be seen from the following table, represented 47 per 
cent of the region's total exports of these materials in 1974. 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA'S EXPORTS OF RAW MATERIALS OF 
AGRICULTURAL ORIGIN TO EUROPE (OECD), 1976 
(Millions of dollars) 
Hides and skins 86.1 
Natural rubber 3.2 
Wood and cork 94.9 
Pulp and paper 58.5 
Agricultural and animal raw materials 
not elsewhere specified 95.3 
Textile fibres of which: 551.2 
Wool and other animal hair 259.1 
Cotton 263.8 
Total 888.4 
No major tariff or non-tariff barriers exist for exports of raw cotton 
to Europe and to the Community in particular, although there are fairly 
stiff barriers for the more highly processed forms of cotton exports.62 The 
common external tariff is zero, except in the case of combed or carded 
cotton, which in any case represents a minimal percentage of Latin 
America's total exports. Nevertheless, the region's share in the total 
volume of imports dropped both in absolute terms (from 438 600 to 
199 500 tons) and in relative terms (from 28.4 to 11.2 per cent) between 
1965 and 1976.63 This decline was essentially due to the lower imports 
62See part B of this chapter. 
63This drop would be even greater if the figure for Finland, which was not a 
member of OECD in 1965, were deducted from the 1974 figures. 
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from those countries (Brazil, Mexico and Peru) which had been the biggest 
exporters in 1965, since the countries of the Central American Common 
Market and Colombia significantly increased their share in the total 
volume of trade. This drop in exports to Europe from Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru seems to be due essentially to the development of the national textile 
industry and, therefore, the use of a relatively larger part of production for 
domestic activities. 
4. Non-ferrous metals 
This section will deal with exports of metals (SITC 68) but not of crude 
ores (SITC 283), since in global terms the former are more important than 
the latter. Reference will be made to exports of crude ores when, as in the 
case of tin, lead and zinc, they represent a value close to or higher than 
exports of refined metals. 
Copper, 80 per cent of which is exported by Chile (and which 
represented an average of nearly three-quarters of this country's exports in 
the period 1973-1975) is by far the region's chief export commodity in 
this category .64 Latin America's share in Europe's total imports decreased 
sharply between 1960 and 1976 (from 19.1 to 14.9 per cent in terms of 
volume). 
Moreover, the depressed situation with respect to world copper 
prices is only too well known (see figure 1), and is essentially attributable 
to a greatly excessive supply due partly to the slow economic recovery of 
the industrialized countries and partly to the lack of agreement among the 
member countries of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC)65 to implement policies for the self-limitation of 
supply. The working groups convened by UNCTAD in 1976 and 1977 
with a view to preparing the ground for an agreement to regulate the world 
copper market have so far shown no significant results. 
The problems of copper's entry into the European countries are 
connected not with customs duties (the EEC's tariff is zero), but, for the 
reasons explained above, with demand. The present tension will probably 
continue, especially as in several countries of Latin America (Chile, Peru, 
Panama, Colombia, Mexico) there is a strong possibility of opening up new 
mines for development, some with a very great production potential. A 
certain trend towards a decline in the production of copper in the 
developed countries will apparently not be sufficient to counteract, within 
a reasonable period, the present situation of excessive supply on the world 
market. 
64 it represented about 85 per cent of Latin America's total exports of 
non-ferrous metals to Europe in 1970-1972. 
65This body, of which two Latin American countries —Chile and Peru— are 
members, controls 30 per cent of world production and 70 per cent of world exports. 
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As regards the processing of copper, it should be noted that, as in 
the case of tin referred to below, Latin America exports a relatively higher 
proportion of crude ore (20 per cent) (in terms of the export value of 
crude ore in relation to the total export value of the ore and the metal) 
than other developing areas such as Africa (3.8 per cent). 
5. Iron ore 
This commodity does not have any difficulties in terms of access to the 
European markets either, since the tariff is zero. Latin America's share in 
the total volume of Europe's imports has risen steadily between 1960 and 
1976, from 11.3 per cent to 27.1 per cent. The region's exports of iron ore 
to Europe are almost exclusively from three countries (Brazil, Venezuela 
and Peru), since Chile, the fourth exporting country of the region, sends 
Europe only a minimal proportion of these exports. 
With the development of new and large-scale projects in Brazil, in 
some of which there are European interests, it may be assumed that Latin 
America's share in iron ore exports to Europe will increase in the future. 
The possible development of the Mutim mines in Bolivia, which have an 
enormous potential (no less than 40 per cent of the total potential reserves 
of all the developing countries) will add an element of great importance to 
Latin America's position in the world iron ore market. Nevertheless, the 
evolution of exports of this commodity, even more than in other cases, is 
closely linked with the reactivation of the economy in the industrialized 
centres. 
6. Petroleum 
Latin America's importance as a supplier of petroleum to Western 
Europe has diminished considerably in the last two decades, its share of 
total European petroleum imports having dropped between 1960 and 
1976 from 13.0 to 1.7 per cent. It is well known that Europe obtains most 
of its supplies from the Middle East, while a considerable proportion of 
the remaining imports come from Africa and the Soviet Union. 
Western Europe's share in Latin America's total petroleum exports 
to all destinations is much more than this —it amounted to 7.5 per cent in 
1976— but even so this represented a substantial drop compared with 
1955 (18.8 per cent). 
The proportion of fuels in the region's total exports to Europe 
dropped from 18.5 per cent in 1965 to 11.0 per cent in 1976. 
It is estimated that with the increase in petroleum exports from 
Mexico66 which are already partly under way, all these indicators will rise, 
as European countries are among the possible purchasers of Mexican 
crude. 
66Agreements to sell petroleum to France and Spain have been announced. 
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III. DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
A. Background and trends67 
Direct private investment by the United States continues to predominate 
in the world, although European investment already accounts for a very 
large share of the total. Nearly 38 per cent of the accumulated total of 
direct foreign investment in the world in 1971 originated in European 
countries, compared with 52.1 per cent in the United States. A further 
indicator of the pre-eminence of investment by United States enterprises is 
that these invested 23 581 million dollars in continental Europe in 1973, 
while investment by continental Europe in the United States amounted to 
6 595 million dollars.68  
The considerable importance achieved by the European enterprises is 
reflected in some significant data as well as in the percentage quoted 
above. Of the world's 650 largest industrial enterprises in terms of total 
sales, 185 are European, according to a United Nations report based on 
figures published by Fortune. 69 According to the same source, 21 of the 
50 largest enterprises in the world are European. Of these 21 enterprises, 4 
have annual sales exceeding 10 thousand million dollars. The total sales of 
Royal Dutch Shell, the biggest of these enterprises, amount to 36 
thousand million dollars, i.e., practically the gross domestic product of 
Venezuela, and exceed the GDP of all the Latin American countries except 
for the three largest (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina). 
The predominance of United States enterprises is linked, inter alia, 
to the role of the dollar in the international monetary system and to the 
great effort to create technology made by the United States with major 
government support, as a result of which its enterprises hold a vanguard 
position in very dynamic sectors of international manufacturing. It should 
also be stressed that the 228 subsidiary companies of continental Euro-
pean enterprises operating in the United States and the 905 subsidiaries of 
United States companies operating in continental Europe deal predomi-
nantly with the same branches of industry, the majority of the enterprises 
in both cases being in the electrical, machinery and chemicals sectors. 
The situation seems, however, to be changing to the advantage of 
Europe. The importance of the manufacturing subsidiaries of major 
67This and the following section include elements and information from 
Alfredo E. Calcagno, "Las inversiones extranjeras directas en America Latina", 
CEPAL (mimeographed), January 1978. Some of the data, concepts and proposals in 
this chapter also reflect preliminary results of the work of the joint CEPAL/CTC 
Unit 68United States Department of Commerce, "Survey of Current Business". 
69  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Multinational 
Corporations in World Development", 1973. 
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European companies compared with those of the United States increased 
substantially as from the 1970s, once the reconstruction of Europe had 
been completed and European enterprises were being consolidated, aided 
by the creation of the European Economic Community. More than half 
the subsidiaries of European enterprises existing in the world in 1971 had 
been established after 1965. According to available data, as of 1970 the 
proportion of such subsidiaries established after 1965 was 67 per cent in 
the case of France, 55 per cent in the Netherlands, 53 per cent in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, 47 per cent in 
the United Kingdom, 41 per cent in Sweden, 38 per cent in Switzerland 
and 37 per cent in Italy. In the case of the United States, however, this 
percentage was only 18 per cent, i.e., the majority of the subsidiaries had 
already been established prior to 1965. 7°  
If the group of developing countries is considered as a whole and the 
situation in 1967 is compared with that of 1976, 71 it may be observed 
that the share of the United States in the total direct private investment 
made by the member countries of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) in the total number of developing countries increased from 50 to 
52 per cent, while that of Japan increased from 2 to 5 per cent. Europe's 
share, however, dropped from 44 to 39 per cent, basically owing to the 
decline in the United Kingdom's share from 19 to 14 per cent, and to 
smaller decreases in those of France and the Netherlands. Among the 
European countries, Germany's share increased sharply (from 3 to 7 per 
cent). 
Europe's performance in the developing countries as a whole is 
therefore different from its performance in the world as a whole and in 
Latin America, as will be seen below. In the first case, the relative im-
portance of Europe decreased, whereas in the other two it increased. This 
may apparently be explained by the different relative weight of Great 
Britain in the two cases, and by the ground lost by that country. 
A European Economic Community press bulletin (17/78 of 11 May 
1978) refers to the stagnation of the global flow of investment by the 
Community in the developing countries, and to a dramatic drop in long-
term investment, especially in the mining sector, where the surveying 
expenses of the European firms in the Third World accounted for only 13 
per cent of the total, compared with 57 per cent in 1961. 
70These proportions are based on the number of affiliates established prior to 
1970 (a total of 5 567 for the European countries referred to and 9 127 for the 
United States). This indicator is less representative than the capital invested in these 
affiliates or their output, but in any case it gives an idea of the relative importance of 
the growth of the European transnational corporations compared with those of the 
United States before and after 1965. The data have been taken from Lawrence 
G. Franco, "The European Multinationals", London, 1976. 
71 Data prepared by the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit on the basis of OECD data; 
see annex table XIL 
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1. European direct private investment in Latin America 
Total accumulated direct private investment from all sources in Latin 
America increased from around 17 thousand million dollars to around 30 
thousand million dollars between 1967 and 1976.72 
An indicator of the presence of foreign capital in the different Latin 
American countries may be obtained by noting the proportion of the gross 
domestic product of the Latin American countries accounted for by the 
transnational corporations in 1975. If Venezuela is omitted from the 
calculation, owing to the distortion caused by the presence of large-scale 
investment in petroleum in that country, this indicator was an average 5.5 
per cent in 1975. Brazil and Panama were above this average, and Chile 
well below it. Somewhat below it were such countries as Argentina and 
Colombia, while Mexico and the majority of the remaining countries 
showed values close to the regional average. 
For the years following 1967 there are no complete data by coun-
tries of origin and destination. 73 This restricts the analysis, makes it 
necessary to use sources which are not uniform, and also means that 
caution must be observed with the conclusions. With these remarks in 
mind, developments from 1967 to 1976 and the situation at the beginning 
of the latter year may now be considered. 
Between those two dates, the market economy countries of Europe 
recorded an increase from 23 to 26 per cent in their share of direct 
accumulated investment in Latin America. The share of the United States, 
on the other hand, dropped from 66 to 61 per cent, and that of Canada 
from 6.5 to 4 per cent. Japan's share increased substantially, from 2.4 to 
4.8 per cent. In short, the share of the United States decreased, that of 
Europe increased and that of Japan doubled. 
Within Europe as a whole, some countries increased their share in 
the accumulated total of foreign investment in Latin America, while for 
others this indicator dropped substantially. Although there is no standard 
72 Alfredo E. Calcagno, Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en 
America Latina, CEPAL (mimeographed), January 1978. The data used were taken 
from OECD, Les actifs correspondant aux investissements directs du se'cteur prive des 
pays du CAD dans les pays en voie de developpement —etat d la fin de 1967, Paris 
1972, and data supplied later by OECD. These data correspond to the 20 countries of 
Latin America, excluding Cuba, plus Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and 
Tobago. The subsequent OECD data referred to were taken from the publication 
Cooperation pour le developpement - examen 1977. From the issues of this publica-
tion corresponding to data for 1974 and 1975 a decrease instead of an increase may 
be seen in the accumulated amount of investment. It is assumed that this must be 
interpreted as the stagnation of this investment, and not as being due to methodol-
ogical causes..  
73
For these data and others, information supplied by the Joint CEPAL/CTC 
(Centre for Transnational Corporations) Unit has been used. 
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information to determine the comparable shares of the countries of 
Europe, that of the Federal Republic of Germany can be said to have 
increased substantially (by approximately 50 per cent over what it was in 
1967), as did the shares of Switzerland (which more than doubled) and 
France, where there was a moderate increase. The relative share of the 
Netherlands dropped substantially (its percentage of the total dropped to 
approximately half of what it was in 1967), and that of the United 
Kingdom decreased moderately. 
It is useful to observe the evolution of European private investment 
in Latin America in a long-term historical perspective. Up to 1914, the 
United Kingdom controlled nearly half of total direct private investment 
from all sources in Latin America, followed by the United States, France 
and Germany in that order. 
This means that at that time Europe had a far higher percentage than 
the United States. Between the end of the First World War and the end of 
the Second, however, the United States increased its share considerably 
and came to exceed that of the United Kingdom, thus becoming the 
region's top investor: indeed, as far back as 1945 the United States was 
ahead of all the European countries together. In the same period, invest-
ment by the European countries came to a standstill. Of the latter, France 
substantially decreased its direct private investment in Latin America, even 
in absolute terms. From the end of the First World War until the mid-
1960s, the predominance of the United States increased, but from the 
mid-1950s Europe resumed an upward curve in absolute terms, although 
its share continued to decrease in proportion to the whole for some years 
more. It was from the mid-1960s that Europe began to increase its share 
compared with the United States, as pointed out above. This increase in 
the relative importance of the European countries between 1967 and 1976 
represents a partial recovery of the loss which they experienced in previous 
periods and especially during the immediate postwar period. 
An analysis based on a differentiation by the number of affiliates 
established as opposed to investment shares, similar to that made at the 
beginning of the section for the whole world, leads to similar conclusions. 
2. Latin America in the world total of direct European investment 
The other question which should be asked is what weight Latin America 
had in total private investment of European origin in the whole world. 
Using data on the number of affiliates, 74 it may be observed that in 1971 
the majority of European manufacturing subsidiary companies were 
situated in the European developed countries themselves and in the United 
74J.W. Vaupel and J.P. Curhan, "The World's Multinational Enterprises: a 
Sourcebook of Tables", Boston, Harvard University, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1973. 
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States. Table 16 shows that 59 per cent of the subsidiaries of seven 
European countries 75 were located in the developed countries of Europe, 
the United States and Canada. Of the total number of subsidiary com-
panies of the same seven European countries located in developing coun-
tries, the percentage established in Latin America (15 per cent) was larger 
than that established in Asia and Oceania or in Africa and the Near East. 
The case of the United Kingdom is different from that of the above seven 
countries: the majority of its subsidiary companies are located in Asia, 
Oceania, Africa and the Near East, as may also be seen from this table. 
Table 16 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAJOR MANUFACTURING 
SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
(Percentages) a 
Region in which the subsidiary company is installed 
Country or region of 
the parent company 
United 	Less 
Devel- 
States o ped devel- Latin 














United States 13 35 4 27 15 7 4 246 
Developed Europe 
excluding the 
United Kingdom 12 47 9 15 8 8 2 599 
United Kingdom 13 26 3 6 27 25 2 265 
Japan 5 1 2 18 65 9 479 
aFor the United States: data at 1 January 1968. For other countries: data at 1 
January 1971. 
bincluding: Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
cIncluding: Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. 
United States subsidiary companies also tend to be located in de-
veloped countries, 48 per cent of them being in the United Kingdom and 
the other developed countries of Europe, but as far as the developing 
world is concerned, in this case too the largest share corresponds to Latin 
America (27 per cent). The case of Japanese subsidiary companies is some-
what different: the majority are located in Asia and Oceania (65 per cent), 
but even so more are located in Latin America (18 per cent) than in Africa 
and the Near East (9 per cent). 
The same conclusion emerges from the data, incomplete though they 
may be, available on accumulated investment. In fact, the amount of 
European investment in Latin America appears to be similar to the total 
75These seven countries are: Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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amount of European, Japanese and Canadian investment in Africa. 
Assuming that Japanese and Canadian investment in the latter continent is 
not very large, it may be deduced that Latin America accounts for a rather 
larger (although not very different) share of investment of European origin 
than Africa, and very probably Asia, where it may be assumed that 
European investment accounts for a smaller sum than Africa. 
3. The situation in Latin America by countries 
Of the total accumulated direct private investment in Latin America from 
all sources at the beginning of 1976, the largest proportion was to be 
found in Brazil (31 per cent), Mexico (16.4 per cent) and Argentina (6.8 
per cent); the rest of the countries together absorbed the remaining 45.8 
per cent.76 If Venezuela, whose situation is special owing to petroleum 
investment, is excluded, the figures change but the order of magnitude is 
maintained. 
Brazil substantially increased its relative importance between 1967 
(22.1 per cent) and 1976 (31 per cent). 
If the countries of Latin America with the largest shares in direct 
total private investment from all sources are considered and European 
investment in each of them is compared with that from other sources, the 
following situation emerges. 
In Brazil, European investment substantially increased its share of 
accumulated total private investment from 31 per cent in 1969 to 42.7 per 
cent in 1976 (see table 17). In the latter year, total investment from all 
sources amounted to around 9 000 million dollars (see annex, table XIII) 
according to the source indicated. Particularly outstanding among the 
European countries on account of the increase in their relative importance, 
and especially because of the considerable weight they thus acquired in the 
whole, were the Federal Republic of Germany (from 10.3 per cent in 1969 
to 12.4 per cent in 1976) and Switzerland (from 6.1 per cent to 10.9 per 
cent between the same years). Investment by France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden also increased more than proportionally. How-
ever, Belgium and Great Britain lost relative importance, while Italy simply 
maintained its share in the whole. 
Among non-turopean developed countries, the relative decrease in 
the share of the United States from 47.7 per cent in 1969 to 32.2 per cent 
in 1976 (owing to less rapid growth than others) and in that of Canada is 
noteworthy. Japan, however, which accounted for only 0.3 per cent of 
total external direct private investment in Brazil in 1969, rose to 11.2 per 
cent in 1976. 
More than half of the total direct investment made in Latin America 
in 1974 and 1975 by DAC countries went to Brazil, and if Mexico and 
Peru are added, 90 per cent of the total is accounted for. 
76 A.E. Calcagno, op. cit. 
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In Mexico (see table 17) the share of the main European countries 77  
in the accumulated total of external direct private investment increased 
from 14.8 per cent to 19.6 per cent between 1970 and 1975, although of 
course this percentage was still much smaller than that of Brazil. The share 
of the United States, on the other hand, despite having dropped from 79.4 
per cent to 72.2 per cent between the same years, remained over-
whelming. 78  
Table 17 
BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, MEXICO: SHARE OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES TOTAL DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(Percentages) 
Brazil Argentina Mexico 
1969 1976 1969 1970 1975 
Germany 10.4 12.4 9.0 3.4 5.8 
Great Britain 6.4 4.7 15.7 3.3 4.7 
Switzerland 6.1 10.9 2.7 4.2 
Netherlands 0.5 2.6 ... 1.8 1.9 
France 2.0 3.6 10.8 1.6 1.5 
Italy 0.9 0.9 8.8 2.0 1.5 
Belgium 2.2 1.2 
Luxembourg 1.0 2.8 
Sweden 1.0 2.4 ... ... ... 
Total Europe 31.0 42.7 44.3 12.8 19.6 
United States 47.7 32.2 51.2 79.4 72.2 
Canada 9.8 5.4 1.6 2.0 
Japan 0.3 11.2 0.9 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0a 1 oa 0a 1 oa 0a 
Source: Annex table XIII, based on the Bulletin of the Banco Central do Brasil, 
December 1977. 
Annex tables XIV and XV, based on A.E. Calcagno, "Las inversiones directas 
extranjeras en America Latina", op. cit., tables 17 and 20. 
aThe total used to determine the percentages is the sum of the countries for 
which data exist. 
With regard to Argentina, data are available only for 1969 (see table 
17), corresponding to direct private investment in manufacturing. In that 
year, four European countries79 accounted for 44.3 per cent of total 
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These countries are the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and Italy. 
78 See annex, table XIV. 
79
These countries were Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy (see annex, table XV). 
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foreign investment, while the United States controlled 51.2 per cent. This 
means that although only four countries are considered, Europe accounted 
for higher percentages of the total than in the cases of Brazil and Mexico. 
It is probable that these proportions have not changed substantially since 
then. 
In the case of Venezuela, 73 per cent of the total accumulated direct 
investment in 1967 was accounted for by the United States and 23 per 
cent by Great Britain and the Netherlands together —mostly in the oil 
industry. After the nationalizations it is estimated8° that 85 per cent of 
total investment was made by the United States, i.e., the majority of 
investment other than in oil in Venezuela originated in that country. 
Panama is a special case because of its position as an international 
financial centre, which explains how in 1975 it came to have accumulated 
2 300 million dollars of direct private investment. Of this sum, it is 
estimated that 80 per cent came from the United States. 
4. Foreign investment in Latin America by sectors of economic activity 
Considered over the long term, the sectors in which direct foreign invest-
ment in Latin America has been located have changed substantially, with a 
very large decrease in mining, petroleum and services, and a proportionally 
large increase in manufacturing. Although data are not available for invest-
ment from all sources, information on investment by the United States 
shows that between 1929 and 1976 the share of mining and smelting 
decreased from 21 per cent to 8 per cent of the total, that of petroleum 
from 17 per cent to 10 per cent and that of the other sectors (including 
public services, trade, agriculture and other sectors) from 55 per cent to 32 
per cent. Investment in manufacturing, however, increased over the same 
period from 7 per cent to 50 per cent.81  
The decrease in the proportion of direct investment devoted to 
mining and oil activities has been partly influenced by the nationalization 
processes carried out at various stages in many Latin American countries. 
The substantial reduction of investment in public services, which was 
very considerable up to the Second World War, was also due to fairly 
widespread nationalization processes in the region. The share of trade and 
finance in some cases increased, and in particular investment in manufac-
turing activities, both in absolute and relative terms, rose substantially. 
The larger part of this investment was devoted to production for the 
domestic or sub-regional markets; only recently was some investment 
devoted to producing for export, especially in the case of United States 
80A.E. Calcagno, op. cit. 
81 A. E. Calcagno, op. ctr., table 11. Information for 1976 excludes the 
Bahamas, Bermuda and other dependent territories where investment in services is 
proportionally much greater than in other countries of the region. 
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enterprises in what are known as the maquila industries (export industries 
using imported inputs) in Mexico. 
In manufacturing, the relative importance of foreign exterprises 
compared with national public and private enterprises has generally been 
greater in sectors with vigorous demand and more modern technology. In 
the case of Brazil, foreign enterprises had a particularly large share in the 
ownership of assets in the electrical (61 per cent), transport equipment (63 
per cent), machinery (46 per cent), rubber (61 per cent), and non-metallic 
minerals (35 per cent) industries in 1974; their share in the tobacco 
(99 per cent) and food (31 per cent) industries was also considerable.82 
Recent capital inflows have shown a strong preference for chemical indus-
tries. 
In the case of Mexico there are no recent data on the proportion of 
investment by foreign enterprises in specific sectors. However, data on the 
sectoral destination of the investment of United States enterprises in that 
country also show a predominance of manufacturing, and within this 
sector, of the chemicals and machinery industries, which constituted half 
the accumulated investment in manufactures from this source. The 
maquila industries are also important in this country. 
In the case of Argentina, European enterprises mainly devoted 
themselves to the motor-vehicle and steel industries (France), to buses and 
trucks, tractors, electrical articles and tobacco (Germany), and to motor-
vehicles, rail equipment, rubber articles (especially tyres), electrical and 
office articles and steel (Italy). The United States enterprises, for their 
part, covered the motor-vehicle, metal, chemicals, rubber, food and textile 
industries. 
Progress in the integration process in the countries of the Cartagena 
Agreement may be reflected in a relative increase in investment in the 
metal manufactures and machinery and chemicals industries, to judge by 
the interest shown by foreign enterprises in taking part in the development 
of sectors where the programming has already been decided upon (motor-
vehicles, metal manufactures and machinery and petrochemicals). 
B. Interest of European private investors 
in Latin America83  
For the overall operations of the transnational corporations, the output of 
affiliates located in countries other than the home country represents a 
82 A.E. Calcagno, op. cit., table 11 of the Annex. 
83
The reasons for this interest which will be analysed here generally apply to 
private investment from all sources (Europe, United States and Japan), but invest-
ment from other countries tends to be more enterprising and prepared to accept 
different conditions, as is explained in another section of this chapter. 
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very important element of expansion. A United Nations document84 
contains estimates regarding the operations of the transnational corpora-
lions of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Japan in 1971. In that year, exports by these 
enterprises from their home countries amounted to around 150 000 
million dollars, while the output of their affiliates situated in foreign 
countries was estimated at around 260 000 million dollars. Export figures 
from the home country and production figures for affiliates abroad can 
only be compared with reservations and only for certain specific aims. 
Despite this, however, the fact that for these countries the output of the 
affiliates was 1.75 times85 the exports made by the transnational corpora-
tions from their home countries illustrates the importance of this output 
for growth potential, the obtaining of profits and the achievement of 
economies of scale in the effort to create technology, both for the 
transnational corporations themselves and for their home countries. 
A similar conclusion is reached if the case of 50 major enterprises in 
the United States in 1970 is considered." Among these enterprises are to 
be found some of the largest producers of motor-vehicles, capital goods 
(electrical and non-electrical machinery), electronic and computing equip-
ment, chemicals, petroleum, foodstuff, etc. For 35 out of these 50 enter-
prises, sales abroad accounted for between 30 and 65 per cent of the total; 
for 22 of them, sales abroad accounted for 40 per cent or more of the total. 
Information on profits is available for 30 of the enterprises: in 23 of 
them, profits obtained abroad accounted for between 30 and 98 per cent 
of the total, while in 17 of the 30 enterprises, profits obtained abroad 
were equivalent to or greater than 40 per cent of the tota1.87  
84United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 
(ST/ECA/190), New York, 1973. 
85For the United States of America and the United Kingdom the ratio is even 
greater than this average. 
86 A.E. Calcagno, op. cit., based on the report of the sixth meeting of members 
of Congress and of the European Parliament, September, 1974, The multinationals: 
their functions and future, Washington, 1974. 
87According to the same source, the proportion of profits obtained abroad is 
generally greater than the relation of sales abroad to total sales. This would appar-
ently indicate that the operations of the affiliates are, proportionally, economically 
more profitable, although this observation should be considered with caution 
because it may be affected by the quality of the data. In a study published by the 
United States Department of Commerce (Survey of Current Business, US Direct 
Investment Abroad in 1975, by Obie G. Wichard and Julius N. Friedling), August, 
1976, p. 40 onwards, there is a fact which points to a similar conclusion: for the 
group of enterprises considered, the declared rate of direct investment in manufactur-
ing in 1975 was greater in Latin America (14 per cent) than in the developed 
countries (11 per cent). In this case too, however, there may be problems due to the 
quality of the data, the different risks involved in operations in different countries, 
and the different sectoral structure. 
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In the case of Latin America, exports by the developed countries of 
Europe as well as the United States and Japan to the region reflect only 
very partially and inadequately the magnitude of the interest of these 
developed countries and their enterprises in Latin American markets: in 
the case of several sectors which are very dynamic for European countries, 
such as motor-vehicles and transport equipment, capital goods and chemi-
cal products, the production of the Latin American countries themselves 
with direct and large-scale participation by European enterprises is greater 
than the exports of those same enterprises to Latin America from their 
home countries. However, production in the Latin American countries 
with large-scale participation by these transnational corporations also 
induces the purchase of parts and spares and equipment from the home 
countries of the corporations. 
The share of European private investment in Latin America, then, is 
very substantial compared with investment by other developed areas and is 
on the increase; furthermore, Latin America absorbs a very large propor-
tion of total European investment in the developing world —comparatively 
more than other areas— and clearly constitutes the most important area 
for many of the more dynamic manufacturing activities. These conclusions 
emerge from section A of this chapter, and raise two questions which will 
be dealt with below. These are: 
1. How can the great interest of private investors and the transna-
tional corporation operating in Latin America be explained? 
2. What significance does this interest have for the countries of 
Latin America? 
1. Factors which explain the interest 
Among the important factors affecting this interest, the following may be 
highlighted: (a) size of the market; (b) cost of labour; (c) degree of manu-
facturing development, education and training of labour; (d) natural re-
sources; (e) environment. These factors are discussed below after consider-
ing the degree of interest of the affiliates' operations for the transnational 
corporation as a whole. 
(a) Size of the market 
Simplifying the question in order to discuss it in general terms, 
three main types of goods may be distinguished here, although exceptions 
and qualifications are called for:88  
(i) goods requiring simple and practically changeless technology, 
generally non-durable consumer goods; 
(ii) consumer goods requiring medium, or high-level technology, 
mainly consumer durables; 
88The groups presented here are similar to those identified in Chapter V, 
although in the interests of this analysis some sectors are omitted and the division of 
the groups is not quite identical. 
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(iii) basic capital goods and intermediate goods, mainly chemicals. 
With regard to the goods in the first group, a large proportion of 
Latin American demand is covered by domestic production. The domestic 
market for these goods in already considerable in Latin America and will 
grow a great deal more as the large percentage of the population which is 
at present marginal is incorporated into the labour and consumer markets. 
Foreign investment and the transnational corporations generally speaking 
have little direct share in the production of these sectors in the Latin 
American countries, with some exceptions such as the tobacco industry. 
Consumer goods of intermediate or high-level technology, generally 
consumer durables (motor vehicles, domestic appliances, etc.) and some 
non-durables, are in demand among the intermediate and high-level income 
strata. Bearing in mind the size of the population and the proportion of it 
which belongs to the intermediate strata,89 the Latin American market for 
these goods already has a position of considerable importance among all 
the regions of the world. Taking the region as a whole, the size of its 
market for these goods is smaller than that of the developed and some 
developing regions. However, bearing in mind population growth projec-
tions, a reasonable hypothesis would be that the size of the combined 
Latin American market for these goods will increase more rapidly than 
that of other regions and will only be smaller than that of Southeast Asia 
and China, while it will be larger than that of the main individual 
developed areas and the other developing areas.9° Of course, Latin 
America does not operate as a single market, insofar as it is not integrated, 
but neither are the other developing areas with which it can be compared. 
In constrast, the United States, the EEC, Japan, China and CM EA do 
operate in an integrated manner. In Latin America four major units at least 
must be distinguished: Brazil, Mexico, the Andean Group and Argentina. 
To increase the real demand for these goods, a large share of national 
savings is mobilized through credit machinery in order to acquire them. 
Advertising, the demonstration effect of consumption in more developed 
countries and the action of the transnational corporations themselves are 
also important elements in expanding demand in these sectors. The poten-
tial Latin American market would be still greater in comparison with 
developed areas if its problems of marginality could be overcome and the 
89 See Chapter I, section 10. 
90
France, Ministere de L'Industrie et de la Recherche, Specialization Interna-
tionale du Travail et Redeploiement Industriel, pp. 73 to 76. This research study 
distinguishes 15 areas of the world: Black Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa, Canada, the European Economic Community, China, 
Scandinavia, the United States, European countries with centrally planned 
economies, Mediterranean Europe, Japan, the Arab world, the Alpine countries and 
the Soviet Union. The measurement of the future size of the market exclusively 
based on population is a simplification, which means that these conclusions of the 
study must be taken only as approximate indications. 
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600 million inhabitants which the region will posses towards the end of 
the century could really be incorporated into the market. 
The level of protection afforded to national industry by Latin 
American countries, which has declined but will continue to be significant 
and on average greater than in the developed countries over the next 
decades, contributes to ensuring a large market for the domesctic produc-
tion of this type of goods. 
The real future participation of transnational corporations in Latin 
American production in these sectors will possibly continue to be substan-
tial: naturally, the modes of participation at present differ from one case 
to another and may evolve, in the future, from direct production in the 
hands of the transnational corporations to their participation in specific 
aspects of the production, marketing and distribution cycle, such as the 
supply of technology." 
The increase in the domestic output of the two groups of consumer 
goods mentioned and other not explicitly considered here generates the 
market for the goods of the third group, i.e., capital goods and chemicals. 
In this group the Latin American market at present and for the next 10 
years may be calculated as being smaller than that of several of the main 
developed areas, to judge by the comparison made in the above-mentioned 
study.92  However, the size of the regional market for these goods com-
pares favourably with several others in the 14 areas mentioned in the 
study. In this case too the size of the Latin American market varies 
according to whether one may assume a real and substantial integration of 
the whole of the region, or alternatively, the continuation of the present 
division into four major units and other smaller ones. In any case, each of 
these four major units very probably compares favourably with a fair 
proportion of the units which make up effectively integrated markets in 
Asia or in Africa. 
In this third group, too, the level of protection of domestic or 
regional production will presumably continue to be significant, and thus 
effectively ensure a market for domestic output. 
In this group, the interest of foreign investors and the.transnational 
corporations is considerable compared with other developing areas, and it 
should increase further as the region grows and these industries develop 
from the levels already reached. 
(b) Cost of labour 
This cost in generally considerably greater in developed countries 
than in the Latin American countries. Comparisons of this type should be 
made with caution, however, owing to the difficulties inherent in the 
differences in quality and significance of the informition available for 
different countries, and because the data used here refer to periods as long 
91 See section C of this chapter. 
92 
France, Ministere de l'Industrie et de la Recherche, op. cit. 
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ago as the years 1970 and 1972 in some cases, since which time the 
situation may have changed. Furthermore, productivity in physical units in 
generally greater in developed countries than in Latin America, which may 
wholly or partly offset and even more than compensate for differences in 
the cost of a unit of labour. For this reason the data given below are only 
useful as indicators to show the apparent existence of an important 
phenomenon. 
In table 18 it may be seen that for manufacturing on average, the 
cost of an hour's work in Great Britain, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and the United States was between 
2.9 and 7.1 times that of Brazil. Comparing these developed countries with 
Mexico, also for the average of manufacturing industry, an average hour's 
work in Great Britain, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Canada and the United States costs between 3.3 and 8.3 
times that of Mexico. 
If the comparisons are made in respect of the operations of a single 
enterprise (specifically General Motors), large differences may also be 
seen. In comparison with Argentina, an average hour's work cost between 
2.3 and 6.3 times more in Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. In comparison with 
Brazil, the cost was between 4.1 and 5.6 times greater in the five countries 
mentioned, and in comparison with Mexico, an hour's work cost between 
1.1 and 2.9 times more in the same five countries. 
Taking average wages per hour in different assembly plants in some 
sectors, wages in the United States were 4 times higher in electronics, 4.2 
times greater in semi-conductors and 6.3 times greater in machinery than 
in Mexico. 
In the clothing industry, average wages per hour in the United States 
were 4.3 times those of Mexico, 5 times those of Honduras, 6.3 times 
those of Trinidad and Tobago and 6.7 times those of Costa Rica. 
The differences were still greater in comparison with South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, although in these countries wages have 
apparently tended to increase in recent years. 
Although a more profound analysis of this question would be out of 
place here, it is well known that a similar phenomenon is found in 
connexion with other developing countries, particularly North Africa and 
some Asian countries. There are still large differences in the cost of labour 
between the more industrialized countries of Europe and some Mediterra-
nean countries of the same continent, especially in the more depressed 
regions of the latter. 
The difference in the cost of labour offers an incentive for the 
transfer of some sub-sectors or operational sectors which make intensive 
use of skilled or unskilled labour from developed to some developing 
countries. This process has expanded considerably in recent years using a 
variety of methods: co-production, sub-contracting, transfer of plants 
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from developed and developing countries to produce specific goods in the 
latter, etc. 
This trend could also be affected in different ways by a further three 
factors: (i) more intensive competition among transnational corporations, 
especially among those from different developed countries, could accen-
tuate it; (ii) the economic difficulties of developed countries and uncer-
tainty about the world economy could slow it down in the short and 
medium term, as has already begun to happen; (iii) the different degrees of 
industrial development, labour skills and education in the different devel-
oping regions could influence to some extent the direction of the trend, 
depending on the level of skill and technology requirements in each sector 
of production. The first two factors mentioned are dealt with in section C 
of this document. The third is considered below in this section. 
The difference in the cost of labour, in conjunction with the dif-
ferent levels of per capita income, has also produced labour movements 
from countries with lower income levels towards more developed coun-
tries. This is the case of migration from Mediterranean countries to more 
developed countries in Northern Europe and from Latin America to the 
United States. According to a recent study by UNCTAD, 20 296 experts 
and professionals emigrated from Latin America to the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom between 1961 and 1972, 80 per cent of 
them to the United States.93 These migratory processes are not devoid of 
problems, and the loss of professionals and skilled workers which they 
represent for Latin American developing countries would perhaps not 
occur to the same extent if labour-intensive industries or processes were 
transferred from developed to developing countries on a greater scale. 
(c) Degree of manufacturing development, education and training of 
labour 
Although these elements could be dealt with separately, they are 
presented here as a group because they are closely related from the 
standpoint of this analysis. 
Reference has already been made in Chapter I to the considerable 
degree of development achieved or on the point of being achieved by 
industry in many Latin American countries, subject to the appropriate 
differences depending on countries and sectors. This development takes 
the form of a diversified manufacturing structure, an industrial environ-
ment suitable for the establishment of new activities, and the already quite 
considerable experience of entrepreneurs, experts and workers in the 
operation of plants, production under efficient conditions, the solution of 
problems of marketing and financing of enterprises, etc. The gradual 
reduction of protection and the growing move outwards to win external 
markets which took place in the recent years are certainly linked with this 
93A.E. Calcagno, based on UNCTAD, La transferencia inversa de tecnologia: 
dimensiones, efectos economicos y cuestiones de politica, Geneva, 1975. 
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development, in the form of a greater ability to produce under competitive 
conditions of cost and quality. 
The general improvement in the level of education and especially the 
training of labour at all levels is another aspect of this development. This 
topic was dealt with in Chapter I in connexion with skilled labour. As 
already noted, in Latin America a large proportion of the population is 
already, in terms of training and experience, in a position to undertake the 
management of enterprises, professional activities and skilled manual 
work, and a very large and growing number of such persons are to be 
found in the cities, working in industry, commerce and other services. 
Accoi ding to the study already referred to, 94 the Latin American 
countries are in a less favourable position than the developed areas of the 
world as regards these factors too, but of course these are averages made 
up of very different situations according to countries and sectors. 
The region also possesses a still limited but significant capacity of 
technological innovation and adaptation, as referred to earlier in Chapter I. 
In brief, the "acquired" comparative advantages have been changing 
and are continuing to change with time for the countries of Latin America, 
in accordance with the development of each industrial sector. In manu-
facturing, where efficiency is closely linked to the above-mentioned availa-
bility of skilled labour and entrepreneurial capacity, experience in the 
production and handling of plant, capacity for technological innovation, 
the existence of an industrial environment, and the very process of 
installing and developing many manufacturing sectors which produce 
consumer durables and capital and intermediate goods has definitely 
helped to improve the comparative advantages of these countries for 
producing goods of this kind. Costs, quality and even the innovative 
capacity of Latin American countries have improved substantially over the 
last decade, so that these countries are now in a position to produce on a 
competitive basis even goods which require skilled labour and relatively 
advanced technology. The comparative advantages can only be considered 
dynamically and not statically, if it is sought to avoid a halt and even 
reverses in manufacturing progress. 
Another way of expressing these factors is that Latin American 
countries have outward-looking economies which favour the continuing 
development of many of the sectors of industry already in existence, and 
open up the possibility of developing new sectors. 
These factors enable a large number of Latin American countries to 
export-  manufactures, including metal manufactures and machinery and 
chemical products, and stimulate the interest of foreign investors in 
coming to the region and contributing to its production and exports. As 
noted in another section of this document, the possibility of exporting 
manufactures, the production of which requires a considerable and in-
creasing degree of skilled labour, in turn conditions the possibility of 
94 France, Ministere de l'Industrie et de la Recherche, op. cit. 
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increasing the proportion of the population which will come to form part 
of those strata, and of maintaining the improvement in living standards of 
those who already belong to them. It is therefore not only possible but 
also necessary for the transnational corporations in Latin American coun-
tries to adapt to the shift towards exporting manufactures employing more 
advanced technology. 
(d) Natural resources 
The availability of abundant and varied natural resources —including 
energy resources— in Latin America has traditionally been an important 
element in attracting foreign private investment. In recent years, pessi-
mistic projections of the future supply of some of these basic commodities 
for the developed countries, and the effects of the rise in oil prices, have 
increased the interest of such countries in ensuring a stable supply of 
mineral and energy resources in particular, and thus in associating with 
Latin American countries for the production and processing of these 
goods. 
The traditional forms of participation of foreign private investors in 
the domestic production of minerals and energy have lost importance, and 
in some cases have tended to disappear because of nationalization and the 
interest of many Latin American governments in claiming sovereignty over 
their natural resources. 
Interest in obtaining technology and capital from abroad for the 
extraction and processing of natural resources has stimulated the search 
for new forms of co-operation in keeping with the degree of maturity 
achieved by the Latin American economies and their needs. This is 
manifested, inter alia, in the methods which tend to be used to associate 
national public or private capital and foreign capital, and especially in the 
fact that in many cases —as in those where production or processing have 
been nationalized— certain services are bought without relinquishing any 
or all of the ownership of the production process to foreign hands. 
Long-term sales contracts to developed countries, in some cases in con-
nexion with the provision of certain technological and other services, have 
also been introduced. This topic is dealt with below in section C of this 
chapter. 
(e) Environment 
Pollution of the environment has become an important item in 
world industrial policy and the location of economic activities over the last 
few years. The importance which the developed countries attribute to the 
problem and how to tackle it varies from country to country. However, in 
all of them the need arises, to a variable degree, for more investment and 
higher costs in some sectors, and this affects the comparative advantages of 
these countries vis-a-vis developing countries. The latter, of course, also 
face problems of pollution which cause considerable concern. However, 
their relative importance and the way in which they are dealt with may be 
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different, bearing in mind the other serious problems of mass poverty 
which they face. 
The favourable conditions discussed in this section and their proba-
ble intensification in the future should strengthen the bargaining position 
of the region in negotiating the conditions of its relations with foreign 
private investment and with the developed countries which best answer its 
development needs. The extent to which this power can be used is another 
problem. 
It should be mentioned that future developments in foreign private 
investment will also depend on what happens in the developed countries. 
In Chapter V consideration will be given to several factors which may 
determine the future international division of labour between Latin 
America and Europe. 
2. Possible contribution of direct foreign investment 
What can Latin America obtain from direct private investment in general, 
and from European investment in particular? Without attempting to 
expand this topic beyond the scope of the present document, some points 
may be mentioned briefly. 
Firstly, it is indispensable that this investment should contribute 
effectively to promoting the development strategy measures defined by 
each Latin American country, which in turn take into account the needs 
and priorities of its current stage of development. 
Furthermore, direct private investors and the transnational corpora-
tions must adjust to the rules and modes of action defined by the 
governments in each case; progress in the preparation of a code of conduct 
at the international level will ensure that the treatment the corporations 
receive will meet mutually acceptable standards of uniformity and modera-
tion. 
More specifically, three main contributions may be expected from 
direct private investment and the transnational corporations: (i) technolo-
gy; (ii) better access to external markets of manufactures, including those 
employing more advanced technology; (iii) organizational skills. The first 
two would appear to be particularly important, bearing in mind that they 
are vital to the present stage of development of many Latin American 
countries, and in both of them the external contribution is fundamental. 
The question of access to external markets not only concerns direct 
foreign investment and the transnational corporations, but is also closely 
linked to the trade policies of the developed countries and to their policies 
for the restructuring of their industry. The fact that the spheres of 
influence of the decisions made by governments and private enterprises in 
developed countries are to some extent separate should not be any reason 
for preventing these questions from being dealt with and settled jointly. 
The interaction between governments and enterprises in developed coun-
tries for the purposes of winning external markets, including those of 
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developing countries, is very effective in many important respects; in Latin 
America, the use which governments make of their bargaining power will 
determine whether there is joint consideration of questions involving the 
transnational corporations and the policy of governments of developed 
countries with regard to exports of manufactures. As for the financial 
contribution of foreign direct private investment, while it is not negligible 
it does not appear to be the most important contribution from the point 
of view of Latin American countries. Of course, no general assertion can 
be made on this score since the situation differs according to countries and 
sectors. Some medium-sized and small countries in Latin America, with 
inadequate capacity for domestic savings and limited access to interna-
tional public and private loans, may still attach considerable importance to 
this contribution. Indeed, both for these and larger countries, the scope of 
this financial contribution is of some relevance, particularly in the case of 
sectors which involve large investment, large-scale immovilization of 
capital and high risk. The relatively ready access which foreign direct 
investment enjoys with respect to international financial resources of 
origins different from that of the investing enterprise itself is also impor-
tant. In any case, the financial contribution of the enterprises themselves 
and their countries of origin is usually of limited interest to recipient 
countries, at least in recent experience, as regards the average transnatioit.,.. 
affiliate.9 5 
C. Norms and modes of operation of direct foreign investment, 
including the activities of the transnational corporations 
The questions which will be dealt with in this section is to what extent 
significant changes are taking place or may take place in the norms which 
govern private investment and the transnational corporations, and in their 
modes of operation, in response to Latin American development needs. 
Many countries in the region have three chief preoccupations: (a) to 
avoid all interference by foreign investors in internal political matters; 
(b) to ensure that these investors adapt their actions to the development 
strategy and policy orientations of each country; (c) to ensure that the 
modes of operation of foreign private investors are those which are most 
appropriate to the country's situation and needs. 
Reference will be made at a later stage to the first and second of 
these questions. The third will be the central topic of the rest of this 
section. 
With regard to the first question, the operation of transnational 
corporations has political implications which may be of importance. The 
report of a group of experts convened by the United Nations, in referring 
to their forms of action, states that "in home countries, they may attempt 
to influence foreign and domestic policy by utilizing their broad financial 
95 A.E. Calcagno, op. cit. 
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power and their often close relationship with government cadres. They can 
lobby for or against governments of host countries, depending on whether 
or not they receive specially favourable terms of treatment. In host 
countries, the affiliates of multinational corporations can seek to influence 
government policies in undesirable ways. Being closely connected with 
domestic groups favouring foreign investment, they can use their own or 
their parent company's resources to support particular political parties of 
their choice, and they can rally against groups advocating social re-
forms".96 The sensitivity of governments and public opinion to these 
problems has increased in recent years. 
The co-operation which the Latin American countries require from 
foreign investors with regard to technology, access to external markets and 
administration of enterprises and plants is indispensable for their devel-
opment. Interest in finding formulae and machinery to avoid possible 
problems and ensure that this investment is in keeping with the devel-
opment policies being followed has so far been clear and is increasing. 
With regard to the second point —the adaptation of foreign invest-
ment to the development policies and strategies of the countries— the first 
requirement is for the governments themselves to establish clear policies 
and communicate them to the transnational corporations. For the sectors 
of industry which, for reasons of economies of scale, can develop more 
efficiently on the basis of subregional or regional markets, it is very 
desirable to define measures for co-ordinating policies among several 
countries so that it is the transnational corporations which can adapt their 
activities to the guidelines established by the governments, instead of these 
enterprises being the forces which in fact define the development criteria 
and orientations of the sector. In this connexion it is useful to compare in 
Latin America the cases of LAFTA and the Andean Group. In the former, 
progress with regard to complementarity agreements was very limited and 
in some cases practically non-existent, with the result that the transna-
tional corporations chiefly had the initiative. However, in the case of the 
Andean Group, in the sectors reserved for programming, which are new 
and generally contain economies of scale, it is the countries themselves 
which define the development guidelines of each sector, the siting of 
plants and the specialization of each of the countries. The governments 
thus retain the initiative, and transnational corporations wishing to operate 
in that market adapt their actions by negotiating with each of the govern-
ments on the basis of the guidelines agreed upon by the five countries. 
The examples of the metal manufactures and machinery, motor-vehicles 
and petrochemicals sectors are cases in point. One very important aspect 
of the adaptation to official development strategies and policies is the 
concern of governments, especially in recent years, regarding the impact of 
96  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The impact of 
multinational corporations on development and on international relations, 
ST/ESA/6, New York, 1974, p. 45. 
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transnational corporations on the balance of payments. Balance-of-
payments problems have once again converted the external sector into a 
limiting factor of development, and the effects of foreign investment in 
this respect have come under close scrutiny. 
In the first place, transnational corporations influence imports. 
These corporations generally operate in sectors of industry where the 
import coefficients are higher than the manufacturing average. Their 
presence promotes the development of these sectors and in many cases 
encourages an increase in the consumption of goods with a high import 
content, which aggravates the tendency towards a trade deficit in the 
recipient countries. At the same time, their export coefficient is very 
small. In the main, the transnational corporations have been reluctant to 
export, except where investment has been conditioned on the export of 
part of the production. Tendencies of transnational corporations to export 
from Latin American countries are still incipient, despite their recent trend 
towards greater flexibility and despite the new modes and policies which 
will be discussed below. In the case of the United States transnational 
corporations which operate in Latin America, for example, half of their 
accumulated investment in 1973 corresponded to manufactures, and 
during the period 1973-1976, 94 per cent of their sales were destined for 
the Latin American domestic market and only the remainder was sent 
abroad.97  
Secondly, there are the effects of intra-company trade and the 
problem of transfer prices, referred to later in this chapter, which may 
adversely influence the balance of payments, although it is difficult to 
evaluate this factor exactly. There are also the payments of profits, 
interest and royalties. For an idea of the impact of this type of payment, 
the example may be taken of United States investment in Latin America, 
which during the period 1966-1976 gave a negative balance on current 
account of 7 300 million dollars, resulting from the net outflow of capital 
from the United States to a value of 7 500 million and of net income to 
that country of 14 800 million in terms of dividends and interest.98  
With regard to the adaptation of the transnational corporations to 
the development strategies of the countries, the case of the foreign banks 
operating in the region is important: they collect the national savings of 
97A.E. Calcagno, Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en America 
Latina, January 1978; Fernando Fajnzylber and Trinidad Martinez Tarrago, Las 
empresas transnacionales, expansion a nivel mundial y proyeccion en la industria 
mexicana, Mexico, D.F., 1975; Daniel Chudnovsky, Empresas multinacionales y 
ganancias monopolicas en una economfa latinoamericana, Siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, 
1974. 
98Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Survey of Current Business, August 1977, vol. 57, No 8, p. 32. Also see Obie 
Wichard, US Direct Investment Abroad in 1975. 
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the countries in which they operate and serve as channels for granting 
them credits. 
With regard to the third aspect mentioned —modes of operation in 
some countries of Latin America and in the rest of the world— there have 
been development in at least three directions referred to here: (a) regula-
tion of foreign direct private investment by means of general or specific 
legal provisions, a possible code of conduc agreed upon internationally, and 
prescribed legal provisions issued at the level of a country or group of 
countries; (b) the definition of some areas in which the action of foreign 
private investment is either admitted, excluded or else admitted only 
subject to conditions; (c) negotiation and action on a case-by-case basis 
with specific foreign enterprises and the use of incentives to ensure that 
their modes of operation are more in keeping with national development 
objectives. An exhaustive review of developments in these fields in Latin 
America is beyond the scope of the present document, and moreover 
there is the problem of a lack of data, which can only be obviated by basic 
research. But the elements available do allow a preliminary review from 
which some tentative conclusions may be drawn. As will be appreciated, 
not only has the form in which these three elements (regulation, definition 
of sectors and case-by-case bargaining) have been used varied from one 
country to another, but the relative weight given to each in relation to the 
others has also been different. In some countries or groups of countries, 
governments appear to have attached greater weight to legal regulation 
than to case-by-case bargaining, while in others this individual bargaining 
was apparently used to a larger extent than legal regulation. Naturally, in 
most cases the three types of instrument were used: they are of course 
complementary and not mutually exclusive. 
One of the main aims of these three complementary forms of 
guiding the activities of foreign investors in Latin America is to bring 
about the use of some of the new modes of co-operation between foreign 
investors and recipient countries worked out in recent years which may 
respond better than the traditional methods to the region's requirements. 
Here the Latin American countries have potential advantages deriv-
ing from certain factors which will be highlighted in the course of this 
section: (i) the forms of operation of the transnational corporations are 
not static: on the contrary, they are evolving throughout the world, and 
there is a notable emergence of new modes and types of arrangements; 
(ii) the "newcomer" enterprises, in attempting to increase their presence in 
a particular region of the world, tend to be more flexible and offer more 
favourable conditions for penetrating oligopolistic markets, and they 
usually carry along with them the already-established enterprises, which 
must also become more flexible in order to compete with the new 
enterprises; (iii) a tendency to play a more active role vis-d-vis the transna-
tional corporations through regulations, nationalization and individual 
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negotiations is to be observed on the part of governments of many 
developing countries, so that the action of the former will be more 
favourable to them; (iv) co-operation among countries in some cases has 
increased their bargaining power and manoeuvring capacity vis-d-vis the 
transnational corporations; (v) the inflationary recession in the developed 
countries and the uncertainty of the world economy have influenced the 
policies of transnational corporations with regard to investment in devel-
oping countries, while the energy crisis and the problems of the environ-
ment have also modified these policies and the sectoral pattern of invest-
ment; (vi) in some cases, public enterprises, with greater scope and 
economic and financial capacity, and with government support, are in a 
better position than medium-sized or small private enterprises in Latin 
America to bargain with the transnational corporations on an equal 
footing; deliberate and more energetic State policy in support of Latin 
American private enterprise, and the setting-up of multinational enter-
prises among several countries of the region, will no doubt reduce the 
shortcomings of local private enterprises. Naturally, the use made of these 
new trends depends on the resolution with which each government defines 
and applies clear policies in keeping with the new opportunities. 
The remainder of this chapter will start by examining these new 
modes of co-operation and then go on to describe the forms of action 
which the Latin American countries are using to guide the activities of 
foreign private investors. 
1. Modes of co-operation and the experience of Latin America 
In the world in general and in the developing countries in particular, 
especially in Latin America, there are different modes of co-operation with 
foreign private investors and the transnational corporations. Without 
attempting to cover all the types, the following are presented here: 
(a) Co-production and specialization agreements between plants 
situated in developed countries and plants belonging to local enterprises in 
developing countries; 
(b) Sub-contracting; 
(c) Co-operation arrangements limited to aspects of technology and 
marketing; 
(d) Joint ventures. 
(a) Co-production and specialization agreements 
This is an importante and frequently used mode of co-operation. An 
analysis of it is of considerable potential interest to Latin American 
countries, both because it may become very widespread and because its 
characteristics lend themselves to making arrangements which fit in with 
the requirements of Latin American countries. It takes place when a plant 
belonging to a foreign enterprise located abroad and a national or regional 
public or private enterprise, or an affiliate of the same foreign enterprise 
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located in a developing country, share out between them the components 
or the types and models of a specific good, each one of them producing 
and marketing a part. A basic feature of this mode of operation is that the 
developing country imports certain of the sector's goods which it does not 
produce, but also exports others in which it specializes with the co-opera-
tion of the transnational corporation which facilitates those exports. 
Where —and this is extremely common in Latin America with the import 
substitution process— the enterprise or affiliate in the developing country 
only produces for the domestic market, this cannot really be considered 
co-production since it does not permit exports. 
Where, under the terms of the arrangement, the transnational 
corporation exports exclusively to regional markets involved in integration 
processes, this again constitutes co-production, but only in a limited form, 
since it does not allow the developing country to penetrate the markets of 
developed countries. 
Two cases may be distinguished within this mode of co-operation: 
co-production and specialization. In the case of co-production, both 
parties produce and trade among themselves components which are incor-
porated into the final article assembled by one or both of them. The 
foreign enterprise supplies part of the production equipment, licences and 
technical assistance. Once the plant located in the developing country is 
operating, the foreign enterprise supplies from its own country or another 
developed country the parts of the article which call for more advanced 
technology. In turn, the plant in the developing country prepares com-
ponents whose technology and production are within the scope of this 
country's level of development: in the metal-transforming industries (pro-
duction of capital equipment, motor-vehicles, etc.) there are a number of 
cases where components with fairly demanding requirements are produced 
competitively in Third World countries. The parts produced in developing 
countries will be those with the highest labour component and advantage 
is taken of the lower labour costs in these countries compared with the 
developed countries. The assembly of the finished article is carried out in 
the developed or the developing country according to the technological 
requirements involved and the relative labour and capital content of the 
process. 
In recent years, significant examples of this type of co-operation 
have begun to appear in Latin American countries. Such is the case of Fiat 
and Volkswagen in Brazil and Nissan in Mexico: parts and components are 
produced in these countries and exported outside the region for incorpora-
tion in the production of the home countries of these transnational 
corporations, or for distribution by their marketing network. In a way, 
this is an extension of the form in which the motor-vehicle industry is 
organized in each developed or developing country: a large number of 
plants produce parts and components at a very specialized level and these 
are then incorporated into the final good in the assembly plants or used as 
spares. A similar form of organization can be used in other metal- 
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transforming industries such as those producing capital goods. In Japan, 
extensive use has been made of this method, linking large enterprises with 
medium-sized and small ones. 
In the case of co-production, the foreign enterprise generally con-
tinues to keep the enterprise in the developing country up to date on the 
new technological changes which take place in the production of the good, 
when the initial installation period is over. 
In the case of specialization, instead of distributing the production 
of the components among the plants situated in both countries, it is the 
production of the types or models of the final good which is distributed. 
As in the previous case, the types or models involving higher technological 
requirements, or those which because of their higher quality and cost 
require more expensive labour, are produced in the plant located in the 
developed country. The plant in the developing country, for its part, 
produces other models whose production is in decline or has been discon-
tinued in the developed countries. This type of arrangement has been 
made recently in a few cases between Latin American countries and 
European transnational corporations in the motor-vehicle industry. 
Volkswagen has produced a car model in Brazil and a jeep-type vehicle in 
Mexico for export outside the country and outside Latin America. In the 
case of Argentina, Peugeot has continued to produce a car model for 
export outside the country and outside the region. In these cases, too, 
lower labour costs in the developing country make it possible to continue 
for a time the production of models which might not otherwise be 
competitive in the international market. 
Cases of co-production and specialization where a leading role has 
been played by transnational corporations and production has been dis-
tributed among different developed countries have been frequent. 
Plants installed in developing countries under these arrangements 
may remain in a situation of dependence upon the foreign enterprise 
possessing the technology and the access to the external markets. 
However, these problems can be handled through negotiation, especially if 
the developing country has a large domestic market and productivity 
advantages, some degree of industrial development, cheaper labour than 
developed countries, etc., all of which carry weight in the negotiations. Of 
all these factors, the most important in achieving greater bargaining power 
is the size of the market the country can offer to the foreign enterprise as 
well as the security it offers, in the form of some degree of protection 
vis-à-vis the exterior and, in the case of integration schemes, tariff or 
non-tariff area preferences. Comparing these arrangements with the sub-
contracting arrangements discussed below, it must be concluded that 
co-production and specialization are definitely better: the degree of 
dependence upon the foreign enterprise is less and it is easier to avoid its 
consequences, while the favourable effects of the plants on the rest of 
industry are greater (dissemination of technology, creation of new activi-
ties, labour training manufactured exports with more value added). 
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(b) Sub-contracting 
Under this scheme, a firm in a developing country produces parts or 
components for a firm in a developed country, for incorporation in a final 
good in the country of origin of the latter, or else the sub-contractor 
carries out some stages of production, in which case the good is transferred 
from the developed to the developing country at a certain point in 
production, the agreed state of production is incorporated into it, and it is 
re-exported to be finished in the developed country. The stages carried out 
in the developing country are generally low-skilled and labour-intensive. 
The technical specifications are set by the foreign enterprise, which also 
provides technical assistance and equipment. 
This type of arrangement is aiso made within both developed and 
developing countries between large enterprises and medium-sized and small 
ones. 
In Latin America sub-contracting has acquired importance in recent 
years mainly in Mexico, with the maquila industries which have resulted in 
the installation of clothing, electronics and other plants, especially near 
the frontier with the United States. In 1975, the value added by such 
industries in Mexico amounted to 468 million dollars. The gross value of 
exports of these manufactures in that year was 1 020.6 million dollars, or 
26.3 per cent of the country's total exports and 46% of total exports of 
manufactured products. 99 These operations have been facilitate in the 
case of United States tariff items 806-30 and 807-00, where the basis for 
payment has recently been established as the estimated value added abroad 
and not the total value of the import, in order to make sub-contracting 
possible through the transfer abroad of a part of some productive proces-
ses to take advantage of cheap labour. 
The advantages of these arrangements for countries with surplus 
under- or unemployed manpower are clear in terms of providing employ-
ment and generating foreign exchange. From another point of view, 
however, the activities located in developing countries are in a very 
vulnerable position vis-à-vis the foreign enterprise, which at any moment 
may decide to transfer production to another country. Investment in the 
developing countries is generally minimal. In the great majority of cases, 
only low-skilled, low-wage labour is used. There is very little in the way of 
dissemination of technology or stimulus for the creation of other indus-
tries, i.e., external economies, since the semi-processed goods used are 
imported entirely from a developed country, with the sole aim of incor-
porating a labour-intensive process and re-exporting them. These limita-
tions have led in the case of Mexico to an attempt to induce these 
industries to acquire other inputs in the country, and to locate them not 
99
Economic Commission for Latin America, La exportation de manufacturas 
en Mexico y la politica de promotion, CEPAL/MEX/76/10, August 1976. 
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only on the frontier but also in other regions so that they may be better 
integrated with the rest of the manufacturing sector. 
(c) Co-operation arrangements limited to aspects of technology and 
marketing 
These arise out of the tendency to break down private investment 
packages into their main components. It should be recalled that this 
investment mainly contributes technology, access to markets, organiza-
tional skills and financing. Traditionally, almost until the end of the 
1960s, these elements came in a single investment package —the foreign 
enterprise was the owner or had a majority share of the capital and 
management of the plants established in developing countries with its 
participation. The new trend subsequent to this date in the majority of the 
developing countries, especially in those reaching a stage of semi-indus-
trialization, consists in breaking down this package, and obtaining sepa-
rately and independently the elements which each country requires. The 
ownership and management of the plants is thus no longer exclusively, or 
at least principally in the hands of the foreign investor. On the contrary, 
means are being sought of obtaining specifically those elements which the 
developing country does not have. Even the technology is broken down 
into its different parts or components, in an attempt to find in each case a 
source of supply which is cheaper and more suited to the conditions of the 
country, in terms of making more use of domestic resources for produc-
tion, in order to promote the creation of a national capacity which will 
help to close the technological gap and at the same time gear production 
more specifically to local conditions. 
These arrangements also avert or reduce some of the drawbacks 
observed in the case of exports made through intra-company transactions. 
As is well known, a large proportion of the exports made in the world by 
transnational corporations is composed of transactions between affiliates 
of the same enterprise or between these and the parent company. The fact 
that the same enterprise is both buyer and seller means that it is more 
difficult to check that the prices fixed really correspond to those of the 
competitive market for the goods, and that the developing country really 
obtains earnings corresponding to the value added by the activities of the 
enterprise in its territory and pays fair prices for the same goods imported 
by the enterprise itself. The well-known examples of prices being set at 
lower or higher levels than normal for the goods exported or for the inputs 
and equipment imported have made developing countries sensitive about 
the question of whether the earnings they receive as exporters and the 
prices they pay as importers are correct. Although the data on such 
matters should be considered as indicative, due to difficulties in judging 
their quality, the fact that intra-company transactions account for large 
proportions of exports of manufactures by transnational corporations 
must be significant: in the case of the United States, this proportion is 
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nearly 50 per cent in 1972, while it was 73 per cent in Brazil and 82 per 
cent in Mexico.100 
In view of this, Latin American and other developing countries 
frequently prefer specific co-operation arrangements in technology and 
marketing. In such cases the developing country in question must have 
adequate knowledge of the alternative sources available in the world to 
obtain these elements, as well as the capacity to analyse the different 
alternatives bearing in mind its specific needs and decide between them 
from a technological, economic, financial, etc., standpoint. 
In some cases an attempt is made to transfet technology to national 
enterprises, or to firms whose capital or management is to a majority 
degree in local hands, so as to combine this transfer with technical 
assistance in management and the training of personnel. In other cases, the 
transfer of technology is arranged without the provision of other services. 
These methods allow national enterprises to gain access to forms of 
transfer of technology which were traditionally reserved by the transna-
tional corporations for their own affiliates or for situations in which they 
held a dominant position. In this case, the national enterprise shares 
production, export markets and the creation and adaptation of techno-
logy. In Brazil, some examples of new modes of transfer of technology 
involve petrochemicals, computers and aircraft construction. One case 
concerns the design and manufacture of civilian aircraft: the foreign 
enterprise provides technical assistance for the production of parts, 
assembly, quality control, etc. and has the right to export, but the 
Brazilian State enterprise can export too, probably using the distribution 
network of the foreign enterprise. Mexico, also, has achieved both greater 
national technological capacity and more selective and disaggregated incor-
poration of foreign technology. In synthetic fibres, for example, competi- 
1000n intra-company trade, see United States Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Implications of multinational firms for world trade and investment and for US trade 
and labour, op. cit., p. 314 et seq. With regard to transfer prices (in particular 
possible undervaluations of imports and exports), see United States Senate, Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, Multinational corporations in Brazil and Mexico: structural 
sources of economic and non-economic power, op. cit., p. 19. et seq.; Constantine 
Vaitsos, Intra-country income distribution and transnational enterprises, Oxford 
University Press, 1974; Daniel Chudnovsky, Empresas multinacionales y ganancias 
monopolicas en una economic latinoamericana, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 
1974, Ronald Muller and Richard Morgenstern, "Multinational corporations and 
balance-of-payments impacts in less developed countries: an econometric analysis of 
export pricing behaviour", in Kyklos: International Review for Social Sciences, 
Vol. XXVII, 1974 (reproduced in El Trimestre Economic°, Mexico City, July-
September 1974, No 163, pp. 665 et. seq.). In this last-mentioned article, estimates 
of the undervaluation of some exports by transnational corporations in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela are given, ranging on average between 40 and 45 per 
cent of the prices paid in the open market 
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tion was encouraged between foreign enterprises of different origins, and 
the final selection took into account the provision of technical assistance 
both at the start and in the future and also the right to acquire separately 
the different technological components. In these and similar cases it is 
endeavoured to make the agreements for the transfer of technology more 
flexible for the developing country, to reinforce its capacity for the 
national generation of technology, and to improve its position as regards 
bargaining and selecting technologies. 
The methods of transfer of technology range from those which are 
very systematic and complete, such as the "product-in-hand" agreements,'°1  
to more partial examples of sales of technical services or patents. We refer 
here, of course, to cases in which the national enterprise is free to export 
all or part of its production abroad: if production is only for the domestic 
,market of the developing country, this is merely the well-known case of 
sales of technology which do not allow exports, and its analysis does not 
concern us here. 
"Product-in-hand" agreements generally consist of the foreign enter-
prise selling the plant on a turnkey basis to the public or private national 
enterprise, initially training the technical staff and a certain proportion of 
the skilled labour, and later providing advisory services during the first 
years of operation of the plant until it is in a position to be run entirely by 
the developing country. This method may be of interest for relatively less 
developed countries when they tackle sectors where they lack not only the 
necessary technological grounding, but also the degree of general industrial 
development which would provide the environment and external econo-
mies to tackle such production by themselves. Naturally, this mode of 
operation will presumably prove more expensive for the country and for 
the national enterprise involved, with the result that they will not choose 
it when they are in a position to avoid doing so. Its consequences have 
some important features in common with the case where an affiliate of the 
transnational corporation, rather than a public or private national enter-
prise, is set up in the developing country, with a majority share of its 
capital and management in foreign hands, to produce specific goods. 
In the other case of the sale of specific technical services or patents, 
the enterprise which is mainly nationally-owned acquires from foreign 
enterprises on a selective basis those aspects of technology which are not 
available in the country. This case is more interesting because it may prove 
cheaper and also opens up the possibility of selecting and combining 
technologies of different origins, in accordance with the characteristics and 
conditions of the developing country and the sector in question. 
In Latin America cases along these lines have been common, but 
only for production for the domestic market. In the dealings between 
transnational corporations and European centrally-planned economies, on 
101A.E Calcagno, op. cit., p. 99. 
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the other hand, there have been some cases in recent years where the 
agreement to sell technology also includes arrangements regarding sales of 
a part of the production outside the market of the producer country. 
For the countries of Latin America which are reaching a stage of 
semi-industrialization, arrangements for the selective purchase of techno-
logy are also more advantageous in that they allow the development of a 
national capacity for design and engineering, which is essential for con-
tinued progress in the creation of competitive conditions for the export of 
manufactures. It is worth mentioning the case of Japan, which by law 
forbids United States engineering firms to operate in its territory. 
However, co-operation between external and national engineering firms in 
developing countries makes it possible to train nationals of the country 
and develop the latter's potential. 
The examples already given for Brazil and Mexico indicate the 
beginning of a new stage for Latin America. 
Specific co-operation in marketing and distribution in external 
markets may form part of a wider arrangement which also includes 
co-operation in production or, alternatively, it may take the form of an 
agreement which only concerns exports to international markets. For 
those machinery and chemical sectors where the developing countries also 
need to buy technology, there is generally combined co-operation in the 
production and marketing of certain parts and components produced by 
national enterprises or by affiliates in the developing country, which are 
distributed over the network of the foreign enterprise in external markets, 
or are incorporated in goods finished in and sold by the developed 
country. 
The second case, restricted to marketing, may occur in more tradi-
tional sectors (food, clothing, etc.) where the developing country does not 
suffer from any substantial technological shortcoming as regards produc-
tion, but where transnational corporations have trade marks, new forms of 
presentation, advertising machinery or distribution networks which make 
it possible to penetrate the markets of developed countries. For the 
developing country, the choice between an international distribution 
arrangement with a transnational corporation, or alternatively selling on its 
own account, which may require the setting-up of a special enterprise or 
distribution network in some markets of developed countries, constitutes a 
dilemma whose solution depends on the developing country's capacity, the 
competitive or oligopolistic characteristics of the markets to be conquered, 
and the marketing margins of the goods in question. 
In Latin America these modes of specific co-operation in marketing 
are fairly recent. The examples quoted above for Brazil and Mexico 
illustrate these trends. 
(d) Agreements between two or more parties to carry out joint ventures 
These usually include capital, technology and management skills 
from one or more foreign enterprises and even from different developed 
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countries, combined with national elements from the developing country. 
In some cases, none of the parties has a majority share in the capital or 
management. The foreign enterprises supply the more advanced techno-
logy and facilities for export. Financing may be obtained externally and 
internally by means of joint efforts. National participation in such ven-
tures is increasing, even in cases requiring technology of some importance. 
Agreements to set up mixed-economy companies with shared 
ownership, signed between Governments or public enterprises of Latin 
American countries and transnational corporations, are increasingly 
frequent. 102 
2. Instruments of orientation 
Bearing in mind these modes of co-operation among developing countries 
and foreign enterprises in the world and in Latin America, consideration 
may now be given to the instruments and methods which the governments 
1u2Among these mention may be made of the agreements made by the 
Government of Brazil: (a) in the metal-transforming sector, setting up Usiminas 
Mecanica, with Gutehoffnung (Germany) and Nippon Steel (Japan); (b) in the iron 
and steel industry, Industria Metal N.S. Aparecida, with Thomas Firth and John 
Brown (United Kingdom); Usiminas, with Nippon Steel; Forja Acesita, with 
Sumitomo (Japan); (c) in petroleum, Petrocoque; (d) in aluminium with ALCAN 
(Canada); (e) in chemicals, Ciquine do Nordeste, with Adela (Luxembourg) and 
Royal Dutch Shell (United Kingdom-Netherlands); Ultrafertil S.A. with International 
Finance Co. (United States) and private Brazilian groups; Cia. Brasileira de Estirenos, 
with Koppers (United States) and Huels (Federal Republic of Germany); Oxiteno 
S.A., with IFC (United States) and local groups; Cia. Quimica do Reconcavo, with 
Morton Norvish (United States); Nitriflex S.A., with Goodyear (United States); 
Isocianatos do Brasil, with E.1. du Pont (United States); Salgema Industria Quimica, 
with E.L du Pont (United States) and a private Brazilian group; Ciquine, with 
Mitsubishi (Japan) and a local group; Politeno S.A., with C. Itoh (Japan) and a 
private Brazilian group; (f) in mining, Termisa Terminais Salineros, with Morton 
Norvich (United States), and for bauxite, with ALCAN (Canada); (g) in telecommu-
nications, Rio Grandense de Telecomunicagoes, Ericsson (Sweden) and the State 
Government of Rio Grande do Sul; (h) in automobiles, Fiat (Italy) and the State of 
Mirias Gerais; (i) in electronics, the agreement with Ferranti (United Kingdom); (j) in 
atomic energy, with Urangesellschaft (Federal Republic of Germany). In other Latin 
American countries, cases include the following, In Venezuela, the agreement between 
the CorporaciOn Venezolana de Guyana, Reynolds International (United States), 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo (Japan), on aluminum. In Ecuador, CEPE (State-owned) 
and Texaco-Gulf (United States) for producing petroleum, and the CorporaciOn 
Financiera - Comision de Valores, a State company, and a Swiss group, for the watch 
industry. In Trinidad and Tobago, the Government, Kawasaki and Mitsui (Japan) and 
Este N.V. Hoesch Hoogorem (Netherlands), for the steel industry. (A.E. Calcagno, 
"Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en America Latina", op. cit., 
p. 98). 
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of countries in the region are using to achieve forms of activity more in 
accordance with their needs and policies. These are of three kinds: 
(a) Regulations; 
(b) Definition of areas; 
(c) Negotiation on a case-by-case basis. 
(a) Regulations 
Apart from certain restrictions common to all transactions with the 
exterior, especially in connexion with foreign exchange controls, up to the 
Second World War foreign investment was not, generally speaking, subject 
to any particular rules. Specific legislation began to appear after the war, 
including restrictions which ranged from the prohibition of investment in 
certain sectors of the economy (publishing, domestic transport, public 
services, etc.) to the prior authorization required to set up an enterprise 
(Chile, Mexico, Argentina). In Mexico, the Government reserved the right 
to make this authorization subject to the condition that, in certain cases, 
at least 51 per cent of the shares must be in the hands of nationals of the 
country. 
A period of relative liberalism followed the acceptance of foreign 
investment, during which the companies slowly adapted to the import 
substitution process set in motion in the majority of Latin American 
countries. 
At the end of the 1960s, there was renewed discussion on the need 
for regulations to govern foreign investment, and this led to various 
examples of legislation which will be commented on briefly below. 
In the framework of the Cartagena Agreement, the member coun-
tries adopted unified legislation in 1970, contained in Decision 24 of the 
Agreement and modified by Decisions 37 and 37A of 1971 and 103 of 
1976. This legislation defines a foreign enterprise as one in which national 
investors possess less than 51 per cent of the shares, or one in which 
foreign investors, even when national investors possess 51 per cent or 
more, control the management of the enterprise either technically, finan-
cially, administratively or commercially. It lays down that an authoriza-
tion is required for all new investment, re-investment, contracts for the 
transfer of technology, external credits, and external payments in respect 
of remittances of profits, royalties or the repatriation of capital. Such 
authorization is to be granted provided the investment, which must be 
specified in detail, meets certain conditions aimed at protecting national 
industry. 
Other elements contained in the text provide that: 
— reinvestment of profits shall be limited to 5 per cent (increased to 
7 per cent in 1976) of the invested capital per year; remittances of profits 
in convertible currency shall be limited to 14 per cent (increased to 20 per 
cent in 1976) of invested capital in any one year (this provision may be 
repealed by the Governments of the member countries); 
— access to domestic credit shall be restricted to short-term credit 
only (in 1976 the maximum term was set at 3 years); 
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— the participation of foreign enterprises in the benefits of the tariff 
liberalization programme of the Cartagena Agreement shall be conditioned 
upon their transformation into mixed enterprises (that is to say, an 
enterprise in which between 51 and 80 per cent of the capital belongs to 
national investors) within a maximum of 15 years (20 for Bolivia and 
Ecuador) as from 1 January 1974. 
It is interesting to note that foreign enterprises which devote 80 per 
cent or more of their production to exports outside the Andean region 
were exempted from all the above restrictions. In 1976, this exemption 
was extended to the enterprises operating in the tourism sector. 
The regulations of the Cartagena Agreement are among the most 
complete in Latin America and are certainly those which have had the 
greatest impact on public opinion. 
The Mexican law on foreign investment of 1973, in view of the free 
exchange system existing in that country, does not place any restriction on 
the repatriation of capital or on remittances of profits. 
All foreign investment which acquires control of more than 25 per 
cent of the capital of an enterprise or 40 per cent of fixed assets, or which 
leads to control of the effective management of an enterprise, requires 
prior authorization by the Comisibn Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras 
(set up by this same law). Except in specific cases authorized by this 
Commission, foreign investment cannot exceed 49 per cent of a firm's 
registered capital, and participation in administrative organs cannot exceed 
the share of the capital. 
All foreign investment must be registered in the Registro Nacional de 
Inversiones Extranjeras and the shares in foreign hands must be nomina-
tive. 
Partial restrictions are also laid down for foreign investment in 
specific sectors (mining, secondary petrochemicals, and parts for motor-
vehicles), while total restrictions are imposed in respect of investment in 
hydrocarbons, public services and basic petrochemicals. 
Mention should also be made of Mexico's 1972 law on the trasfer of 
technology, under which the purchase of foreign technology must receive 
prior authorization and be recorded in a national register of all.transfer of 
technology contracts. 
In Argentina a law governing the participation of foreign investment 
in the economy was in force between 1973 and 1976. It provided inter alia 
for: 
— compulsory authorization and registration, subject to certain con-
ditions designed to safeguard national interests, including a prohibition on 
the purchase of domestic enterprises and even of shares belonging to 
national investors; 
— prohibition or restriction of foreign investment in certain specific 
sectors; 
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— the possibility that the government may require the transforma-
tion of foreign enterprises into mixed or national enterprises over the short 
period of three years; 
— fixed annual limits for the repatriation of capital and remittances 
of profits. 
This law has since been replaced by another with a much more 
liberal regime for foreign investment. It classifies new foreign investment 
in three categories: 
(a) investment requiring prior approval by the Government, with no 
period of tame fixed for granting such approval (article 4); 
(b) investment registered automatically (article 5); 
(c) other investment requiring the prior authorization of the Gov-
ernment, which must be granted within a fixed period (article 6). 
With regard to the right to remit profits and distribute capital, three 
situations are distinguished: 
(a) periods of free exchange (international) when there are no 
restrictions on the purchase, sale or transfer of foreign currency; naturally, 
both registered and non-registered investors have this right; 
(b) periods of exchange controls: only registered investors have this 
right; 
(c) periods of exchange controls and of difficulties in external 
payments: the right of registered investors to remit profits and repatriate 
capital may be suspended. Only in the case of remittances of profits will 
the foreign investor be given bonds and debentures expressed in foreign 
currency (articles 11, 12 and 13), and the repatriation of capital may take 
place when there is no obvious difficulty in the external payments situa-
tion. 
A special tax applies to registered foreign investors with respect to: 
(a) payments of profits in excess of 12 per cent of the capital 
registered; 
(b) the surplus product of the investment realized, in excess of the 
capital which can be repatriated (article 15). 
This law governs the relations between the foreign mother company 
and its subsidiary in the country, and: 
(a) recognizes them provided they respect normal market prices and 
practices; 
(b) imposes restrictions on this principle in the case of loans 
and contracts coming under the law on the transfer of technology 
(article 20).103  
In the case of Brazil, there are various legal provisions which define 
the treatment of foreign investment. They provide for: 
103CEMLA, Boletin Mensual, Mexico City, vol. XXIII, No Z March-April, 
1977, pp. 96-105. 
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— total or partial prohibition on investment in certain specific 
sectors; 
— obligation to use the register of the Central Bank through FIRCE 
(Fiscalizacion de Registros de. Capitales Extranjeros), which issues a certifi-
cate of registration recording investment, reinvestment, changes in money 
values authorized by law, remittances of profits and other movements of 
funds; 
— restriction of remittances of profits deriving from activities 
producing goods and services to an annual 8 per cent of the registered 
capitaL 
Compared with other Latin American countries, relatively wider use 
has apparently been made in Brazil of negotiation on a case-by-case basis 
rather than regulations to persuade foreign investors and transnational 
corporations to engage in activities which are favourable to national 
development objectives. This will be discussed below. Perhaps the reason 
for this is that the Government wishes to maintain greater flexibility in 
applying its policy. 
In addition to the regulations mentioned, some countries (Brazil and 
Mexico) have modified their legislation on patents and trade marks, by 
reducing the period of protection on unused patents. 
(b) Definition of areas 
With regard to the areas in which the participation of foreign capital 
is admitted, excluded or admitted under certain conditions, the provisions 
contained in the laws of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil were already 
mentioned above. 
Apart from regulations, nationalization was the main instrument 
used in the shift from the freedom existing before the Second World War 
to the present situation in which foreign investment is often restricted or 
prohibited in certain sectors. 
Two main periods of nationalization may be distinguished —one 
immediately after the war (1945-1954) and the other at the end of the 
1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (1968-1975). 
Up to the 1960s, foreign investment in Latin America was principal-
ly directed to public services and the mining sector. These activities were 
the target of the nationalizations carried out following the Second World 
War.104 Encouraged by the substantial amounts of foreign currency 
accumulated during the war and the favourable conditions in international 
trade, in this period many countries (especially Argentina, but also Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela) nationalized the greater 
part of their public services owned by foreign companies (railway, 
telephone and electricity companies). 
1"The expropriation of the Mexican oil companies in 1938, which preceded 
the process analysed here, should be mentioned. 
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In the same period a movement to control the primary industries 
(generally mining) developed in the region, and in a few cases it took the 
form of nationalization (as in the case of the tin mines in Bolivia in 1952 
or the expropriation of the United Fruit Company begun in Guatemala in 
the same year). 
In addition to the very special case of Cuba, the second wave of 
nationalizations in Latin America began around 1968 and were aimed 
almost exclusively at foreign investment in the mining sector. In Peru, 
mining enterprises which almost entirely belonged to the United States, 
including the International Petroleum Corporation, Gulf Oil, Cerro de 
Pasco and Marcona Mining, were nationalized. The same was done in 1971 
in the Chilean copper mining industry, which accounted for around one-
third of the United States' total mining investment other than in oil in the 
region, the main companies affected being Kennecott and Anaconda. In 
the same year the bauxite mining industry in Guyana was nationalized. 
In the petroleum sector, Argentina nationalized the production and 
refining of petroleum in 1964, but three years later it returned part of the 
assets to the foreign enterprises and increased their share in the sector. As 
from 1 January 1976, Venezuela nationalized all the assets of the petro-
leum enterprises. The governments of Trinidad and Tobago in 1974 and 
Ecuador in 1977 acquired the property of the main petroleum companies 
in both countries. 
As a result of these measures, the share of the mining and petroleum 
sectors in the total sum of foreign investment in Latin America has 
diminished notably. In the case of the United States, this percentage had 
already dropped to 19 per cent in 1975, from 49 per cent in 1960, and 
very probably it has decreased sharply in the last two years as the result of 
the nationalization process in Venezuela. 
This does not mean that direct foreign investment in the region's 
mining sector is going to disappear, since investment of some importance is 
still taking place, such as Japanese investment in Brazil, or United States 
investment in Chilean copper. 
These nationalizations in the public services and mining sector were 
accompanied, particularly in the last fifteen years, by very large increases 
in investment in sectors of industry where, with few exceptions, the 
countries of the region allowed foreign investment, whether regulated or 
otherwise. 
(c) Negotiation and incentives on a case-by-case basis 
Negotiation and action on a case-by-case basis for each sector of 
production or each foreign investment, and the use of incentives, are 
important instruments whose effectiveness is linked to, although not 
exclusively dependent on, the bargaining power of each country as deter-
mined by the factors analysed in the last section of this chapter, in 
particular the size of the domestic market. From this standpoint the larger 
economic units of Latin America, such as Brazil, Mexico, the Andean 
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Group and Argentina are in a better bargaining position than the other 
groups and individual countries: a co-operation policy covering the whole 
region and providing reasonably dependable access to the Latin American 
market as a whole by means of preferential trade agreements would 
further increase this bargaining power. 
With regard to European private investment in particular, it may be 
recalled that: (i) in recent years private investment by European enter-
prises throughout the world, and apparently in Latin America too, has 
increased more rapidly than that of the United States, which would 
indicate that European enterprises have achieved a larger share of external 
markets; (ii) since the beginning of the 1970s, the rise in wage levels in 
these countries to levels approaching those of the United States, and the 
falling value of the dollar in relation to some European currencies, have 
tended to reduce the competitiveness of the exports of some of these 
European countries, and to increase their interest in setting up subsidiaries 
in developing countries; (iii) in Latin America, these European enterprises 
are still generally in a minority position compared with the United States. 
In view of the above, credence may be given to the frequent affirmation 
that the attitudes of European transnational corporations and private 
investors are generally more flexible, in that they accept more favourable 
conditions for the Latin American countries so as to gain entry to them or 
increase their share in their markets. The newcomers must offer more 
favourable conditions in order to penetrate oligopolistic markets, although 
not all European countries have the same attitude to winning of markets: 
some, like Germany, are more active than others, for example Great 
Britain. The fact is that the transnational corporations of the United States 
are no longer dominant in some sectors, especially in increasing foreign 
investment. In order to protect themselves from growing competition from 
the newcomers, the transnational corporations of the United States must 
also increase their flexibility and accept new conditions, which will be 
more favourable for Latin American countries. This, of course, varies from 
one sector to another. These new conditions include: the export of part of 
production towards markets outside Latin America; association with Latin 
American capital; a better disposition towards accepting the breakdown of 
the private investment package into its components of technology (and 
this in turn into its different parts), marketing, management and financing; 
better conditions for the transfer of technology, etc. 
These negotiations and incentives are generally aimed at procuring a 
better adaptation of the activities of private investors and the transnational 
corporations to the development strategies and policies of each country, 
and obtaining modes of operation more in accordance with each country's 
characteristics and needs. 
Incentives and other similar forms of action have been applied to an 
increasing extent. In the Brazilian motor-vehicle sectors, for example, as 
part of the negotiations to allow the establishment of a plant in the 
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country, the foreign enterprise undertook to make a specific amount of 
exports per year, while another enterprise in this same sector located the 
production of a forerunner of the latest model in Brazil for export to the 
international market. Also in Brazil the amounts exported by each of the 
main foreign enterprises, compared with their import requirements, are 
published periodically, and some enterprises can obtain special benefits in 
exchange for exporting each year an amount which offsets the outflow of 
foreign currency which the enterprise itself causes through imports, 
royalties and remittances of profits. In any case, the mere publication of 
these amounts constitutes a form of influencing the conduct of the 
enterprise through public opinion. 
In Mexico, too, a foreign motor-vehicle company was induced 
through negotiation to export parts and components to the home country, 
and something similar took place in Argentina with another motor-vehicle 
company which set up production of a successful model which still had a 
market but had ceased to be produced in the home country. 
The growing preference of Latin American countries for foreign 
capital to function in association with national public or private capital, 
and not alone, also stems from the desire to achieve a greater degree of 
national control over important economic decisions and to increase local 
participation, so as to be able to progress in the acquisition of a basic 
technological and industrial capacity in order to operate on a competitive 
basis. This association has mainly been obtained through negotiations at 
the moment when the foreign investment enters, the country or when a 
project is started, or by means of regulations, as in the case of the Andean 
Group. The examples of mixed enterprises quoted above for Brazil were 
obtained, generally speaking, through negotiations on a case-by-case basis. 
These instances of negotiations on a case-by-case basis and of regula-
tions are recent; they are proving positive not only because they facilitate 
the development of national technological capacity but also because of 
their excellent effects on the balance of payments and the country's 
decision-making capacity. The national enterprises are strengthened and 
modes of operation are achieved which are better suited to the needs of 
these countries. A growing predisposition may be observed on the part of 
the transnational corporations towards flexibility in relation to these 
trends and to acceptance of changing conditions within certain limits, 
since the benefits they obtain are wholly acceptable and the arrangements 
are much more stable, which clearly reduces the economic and political 
risks they run. 
3. The special case of minerals 
While investment in mineral resources has features in common with the 
above case, it also presents a number of special characteristics. 
Up to the Second World War, the main form of producing and 
processing minerals in Latin America was long-term concessions and 
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package investment in which financing, technology, organization of 
production and marketing were all provided together, the minerals 
frequently being exported with a low degree of processing. Faced with the 
policies of Latin American governments aimed at nationalizing the 
ownership of natural resources and increasing the degree of processing in 
their countries, external private investors showed flexibility towards new 
modes of operation which were more in keeping with these new policies. 
The interest of Latin American countries in exporting minerals with a 
higher degree of processing, and in taking a greater part in their 
international transport and distribution, is clear, bearing in mind that at 
present those countries only obtain a fraction —sometimes rather small—
of the final price which the consumer pays. 
By dividing up the investment package, the transnational corpora-
tions provide Latin American enterprises or governments with modern 
technology for mining or processing; draw up risk contracts for surveying 
in such a way that the remuneration of the foreign enterprise is dependent 
on the discovery of resources; take part in the international marketing of 
raw or processed mineral resources; and make long-term purchase contracts 
sometimes tied to the provision of technology or to the association of 
foreign investment in the production or processing of the resources, 
sharing in transport and utilizing specialized technology. The interest of 
the developed countries in ensuring a regular supply of certain minerals 
encourages them to accept these new forms of co-operation, which in 
some cases take place with the direct or indirect participation of their 
governments. 
The conditions of co-operation have been changing not only with 
respect to the moment when production begins, but also subsequently. 
Before the nationalization of the foreign oil enterprises, the governments 
of Venezuela and of other oil-exporting countries progressively increased 
the share of the final price which remained in the producer country. In 
some cases, these countries did this by applying taxes or other policy 
measures, bearing in mind the specific factors influencing at any given 
moment the real possibility of modifying these shares. 
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IV. FINANCING 
A. Changes in the external financing of 
Latin Americal" 
In the last few years some important changes have taken place in Latin 
America in the field of external financing: 
(a) The current account deficit on the balance of payments of 
non-oil-exporting countries of the region has increased strongly, both in 
absolute terms and in comparison with exports. Although in 1977 the 
deficit dropped to 16.7 per cent of exports, a ratio not very different from 
that corresponding to the 1966-1969 period, the price paid for this drop 
was a heavy sacrifice in the rate of economic growth, since the gross 
domestic product of the region increased by only 4.4 per cent in 1977, 
compared to the 6 per cent anual average for the 1966-1969 period. The 
domestic social implications of this reduced growth rate have been pointed 
out in earlier chapters. 
The world recession, for its part, has affected the growth rate of 
Latin American exports. In order to deal with this, the countries could 
either restrict their economic growth rates to such levels as their lower 
import capacity allowed, or borrow more. In practice, they have opted for 
a combination of both alternatives. Thus, balance-of-payments deficits and 
the corresponding foreign debt have been the instruments used by the 
Latin American countries to prevent problems such as unemployment and 
critical poverty from becoming even more acute. At the same time, these 
policies have helped to avert a more serious drop in the growth rate of 
world trade, and also helped developed countries, from which the Latin 
American countries by most of their imports, to tackle own balance of 
payments, employment and recession problems. 
(b) Public sources have, to a considerable degree, lost their relative 
importance as providers of external funds for Latin America, and the 
region has tended, save in exceptional cases, to be excluded from con-
cessionary financing. Furthermore, its participation in non-concessionary 
public sources has decreased considerably. Conversely, there has been a 
steady increase, both in absolute and relative terms, of funds from the 
private sector, particularly from banks. 
(c) The conditions of external financing have deteriorated. Grace-
periods and terms have generally been reduced, and rates of interest have 
risen. As regards Eurocurrency credits granted by banks (which constitute 
1°5This section summarizes and updates some of the main conclusions appear-
ing in recent studies undertaken by CEPAL. See The economic and social develop-
ment and external relations of Latin America (E/CEPAL/1024/Rev.1) and Dos 
estudios sobre endeudamiento externo Carlos Massad and R. Zahler, CEPAL Cuader-
no No 19 (Spanish only). 
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an important part of the funds required by non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries) to all the developing countries, in 1974 48.5 per cent 
corresponded to credits with terms of over 7 years, whereas in 1976 this 
proportion had dropped to less than 5 per cent. 
(d) As a result of these developments, the foreign debt of non-oil-
exporting Latin American countries108 rose considerably from 37 000 
million dollars in 1973 (150 per cent of goods and services exports) to 
82 000 million in 1976 (220 per cent of goods and services exports). 
(e) The growth of the debt and the deterioration of lending condi-
tions has caused greater attention to be paid to the ratio between debt 
servicing and exports in many countries. Debt servicing payments have so 
far not represented a serious problem, since exports continue to show 
relatively buoyant growth, but if this increase in exports were to slacken, 
such payments would affect imports more seriously and foreign debt 
would become a more important problem for many of the Latin American 
countries. 
(f) The fact that a considerable part of Latin American external 
financing comes from private sources makes many of the countries in the 
region very sensitive towards maintaining their creditworthiness. 
B. European financingl°7 
Net flows from Europe to Latin America have lost relative importance in 
the total external financing of the region although they have increased in 
absolute terms. Between 1969 and 1973 these flows remained relatively 
stationary, ranging from 800 to 950 million dollars per year but they 
increased by almost 70 per cent in 1974 and totalled over 1 820 million 
dollars in 1975.108 The European share of total external financing, 
however, dropped from about 32 per cent in 1970 to 16.2 per cent in 
1972, rising to 25 per cent in 1974. 
Of the total 8 000 million dollars representing the net cumulative 
European flows towards Latin America between 1969 and 1975, by far 
the greatest part (92.5 per cent) came from EEC countries. Special 
1o6This refers to officially guaranteed debt and to the estimated long-, 
medium- and short-term bank debt without official guarantee outstanding at the end 
of each year. 
107The lack of available information has made it necessary to use various 
sources to prepare this section. In some cases these use definitions and criteria which 
do not coincide with one another, and an attempt has been made here to bring these 
sources into line. The conclusions, should, however, be interpreted with some 
caution. The European member countries of CMEA are not included. 
108Data on European participation in capital flows received by Latin 
American countries were prepared on the basis of information supplied by OECD and 
figures published by the IDB. 
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mention, because of its importance and growth, should be made of the 
flow from France (a little over a quarter of the total)1°9 West Germany 
(20.8 per cent) the United Kingdom (18.5 per cent), Italy (15.7 per cent) 
and the Netherlands (8 per cent). 
Five groups of Latin American countries may be distinguished: 
(i) Brazil and Argentina, for both of which European participation in 
external financing is important. In 1975 these countries absorbed 37.5 per 
cent and 15.5 per cent respectively of the net resources coming from 
Europe; 
(ii) Countries in which the participation of European external 
financing is quite important but somewhat irregular: Chile, Peru, Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Haiti and Jamaica; 
(iii) Countries in which European participation is decreasing: Mexico 
(which, however, in 1975 was still absorbing 6 per cent of the resources 
coming from Europe), Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana and, to a certain extent, 
Trinidad and Tobago. In the particular case of Uruguay, not only has 
European participation been decreasing, but the overall balance for the 
period between 1969 and 1974 has been in Europe's favour; 
(iv) Countries in which European participation is of limited relative 
importance or of small magnitude: Colombia, the Central American coun-
tries, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay; 
(v) The three offshore financial centres of the region (Panama, the 
Bahamas and Bermudas) jointly negotiated a high proportion of the 
resources received from Europe in 1975. This does not imply, however, 
that the final destination of this capital has always necessarily been Latin 
America. 
The remainder of this section will deal with some of the principal 
components of European financing for Latin America: medium- and 
long-term capital markets, banks, suppliers' credits and official flows. 
1. Medium and long-term private markets 
The problem of access to European bond markets is highly interesting for 
Latin American countries. Throughout the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth, many Latin American countries resorted to 
British, French, and even Belgian and German capital markets by floating 
loans or issuing bonds to finance public works. The crisis of the thirties 
put an end to a long phase in the relations between Europe and ,Latin 
America in this sphere. During the next forty years there were no new 
issues of Latin American bonds in any European market, and although at 
the beginning of the sixties there were some cases of isolated operations, it 
was only with the entrance of the IDB to the Italian market in 1962 and 
109Transfers from France to French overseas territories in Latin America have 
not been included, 
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two years later to the British and German markets that a new stage in the 
Latin American presence in European markets began. From 1966 onwards 
this presence was expanded with the first placements of Mexican, Brazilian 
and Argentinian bonds in the Euromarket. 
In view of their individual characteristics it might be advisable to 
examine briefly the differences existing between national European capital 
markets and the so-called Euromarket. 
In most of the European markets, all types of bond issues and 
regulated by the legislation existing in the country where they are made. 
Besides protecting the national investor, this legislation also establishes the 
priority of national bond issues, particularly those of the Government or 
of State entities, and to this effect, maximum amounts per issue are fixed 
and a system of prior authorizations and waiting lists —which do not 
always respect the order in which the applicants appear— is established. 
Several countries also have regulations restricting the purchase of foreign 
bonds by institutional investors (insurance companies, social security 
bodies, etc.). 
The above reasons, often combined with ignorance about the 
solvency and reliability of the country making the issue, and sometimes 
with insufficient regulation by developing countries of their own bonds in 
the secondary market, have considerably restricted the access of most 
developing countries to European capital markets. This accounts for the 
fact that, in the case of Latin America, only Mexico has had regular access 
to some of those markets in the last decade, together with Brazil in recent 
years, and still more recently Argentina. 
The distinctive characteristic of "international issues" or Eurobond 
issues (i.e., those made in the Euromarket, or "international market") is 
that they are made in more than one country, with a currency that is not 
the one used in the country where they are placed. The issue of Eurobonds 
is less regulated than issues in national markets.11° The most important 
limitation lies in the fact that countries possessing a strong currency tend 
to discourage issues in their own currency. This affects in particular bond 
issues in Swiss francs and German marks, and the latter are in fact treated 
like bond issues made in the German market. These limitations explain 
why most Eurobond issues are made in dollars. Moreover, in the remaining 
European markets international issues are ruled by the same system of 
waiting lists as those in national currencies. Similarly, institutional inves-
tors are also subject to regulations in relation with the purchase of 
Eurobonds. 
For the purposes of the present study, another difference between 
these two kinds of issue should be analysed before considering the degree 
of European participation in the absorption of Latin American bonds. 
10Particularly because they are not subject to maximum limits and because 
they do not have to fulfil all the numerous requirements in force in some countries in 
matters related to information on issue and the issuing entity. 
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It may be assumed that all or most placements in individual 
European markets are absorbed by nationals of the country making the 
issue or by foreigners who own funds deposited in the country. In 
contrast, given the peculiarities of the Euromarket it is impossible to 
determine the nationality of the ultimate possessors of the bonds issued. 
There is practically no systematic information on the destination of this 
type of issue and it can only be assumed that a large part remains in the 
hands of the banks taking part in their placement and that approximately 
half of all Eurobonds are finally placed in Switzerland.111  
For these reasons, the only possible way of evaluating European 
participation in the placement of Latin American bonds is in terms of the 
market in which the issue was carried out, in the case of issues in national 
markets, and of the currency denomination in the case of international 
issues (Eurobonds). 
An important aspect which is worth stressing is that Latin American 
placements in European markets represent only a very small proportion of 
the total placements there. This implies that on the one hand, Latin 
America has made very little use of these markets, partly because of 
problems of access to them, and on the other, that the access of medium-
and small-sized countries of the region, which until now have had little or 
no participation in this market, would not necessarily involve competition 
with issues by larger countries of the region which already have a certain 
access to it. 
(a) Issues in the national markets 
Between the early sixties and mid-1977, Latin America issued bonds 
in European markets amounting to 1 114.6 million dollars. This figure 
equals 29 per cent of all placements of the region for the same period. 
European participation in Latin American placements has been irregular 
and does not show any definite trends. 
Of this total amount, a little over three-quarters (838.2 million 
dollars) was placed by the IDB to finance Latin American development 
projects. The Latin American beneficiary countries include, in particular, 
Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Ecuador. 
The European market where the most placements were made was 
Switzerland (491.3 million dollars or 44.1 per cent of the total), followed 
by West Germany (26.3 per cent of the total) and Italy (11 per cent of the 
total). The limited amount of placements in France and the United 
Kingdom contrast with their importance as financial markets, with the 
intensity of their financial links with Latin America in the last century, 
and with the present-day importance of their trade relations with Latin 
America. 
111 See Development Assistance Committee Secretariat, Report on regulations 
and practices affecting capital market access and OECD, Financial market trends, 
June 1977. 
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The main problems Latin American countries have to face in con-
nexion with placements in national European markets include institutional 
aspects related to European markets and existing regulations on bond 
issues; lack of knowledge on the part of European investors about the 
Latin American governments and institutions issuing bonds; guarantee 
problems; and lack of knowledge on the part of Latin American countries 
(save the largest) about the procedures and modus operandi of European 
markets. 
(b) Bond issues in the international market 
Between 1966 and the first half of 1977, the Latin American 
countries placed a total of 938 million dollars in bonds in European 
currencies in the international European market. These placements in-
creased enormously in 1976 and 1977, amounting to 253.9 million dollars 
in 1§76 and 304.1 million dollars in the first half of 1977 alone. 
This shows that as from this period some Latin American countries 
have started once again to make substantial issues of bonds, a practice 
which had been almost negligible since before the Second World War. 
Among Latin American countries, as in the case of issues in 
European national markets, Mexican bond issues were predominant in 
1976 and in the first half of 1977, amounting to 535.6 million dollars 
(57.1 per cent of the Latin American total) in this period, followed by 
Brazil with 35 per cent of the total over the same period. 
The principal currency in which these issues were made was German 
marks (832.7 million dollars, representing 88.7 per cent of the total). 
Issues were also made in Dutch florins and in units of account of the 
European Economic Community. 
Banks 
The following information refers only to outlays by private banks in 
the form of officially-guaranteed loans with a term of over twelve months. 
Consequently, substantial amounts of credit from private banks are not 
included.112 
112The series used to determine European participation in the external 
financing of the region provided by banks are those published by the World Bank 
relating to private bank outlays, for loans exceeding twelve months, made to official 
organizations or those with official guarantee. Short-term loans have therefore been 
excluded, and only effective loans have been considered. For Chile and Mexico 
information is available only for the period 1971 to 1975. The data include loans 
made by European banks, particularly where these are members of consortia provid-
ing loans to Latin American countries in the Euromarket, as well as direct loans from 
European banks and governments to public and private organizations in Latin 
America with official guarantee. They therefore also exclude operations carried out 
by the private sector without official guarantee, which, in the case of Euromarket 
operations, account for a considerable percentage of the loans received by some Latin 
American countries. 
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European banks disbursed 6 128.6 million dollars on long-term loans 
to Latin America. The figure does not include loans received by Chile and 
those received by Mexico in 1976.113 Most of these loans (90 per cent) 
were absorbed by four contries: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru. Other 
Latin American countries which draw regularly upon European banking 
sources are Colombia, Guyana and Uruguay. 
Financing provided by foreign private banks to Latin American 
countries has important economic and financial implications for them. On 
the one hand, these funds have in many cases been obtained more quickly 
and with fewer requirements than those obtainable from international 
finance institutions or from bonds; this may account for the intensive use 
that Latin American countries have made of this source. On the other 
hand, the possible future consequences for Latin American countries of 
having substantial debts with foreign transnational banks are not always 
clear. These banks have in some cases consulted the IMF on the credit-
worthiness of the borrowing country when granting substantial loans or 
renegotiating a loan. However, there is no established set of rules in this 
matter, and private banks may decide to apply their own rules and 
conditions for granting or renegotiating loans. 
In the period under consideration Brazil received 2 084 million 
dollars in this way, which is 34 per cent of the total; European loans 
amounted to 28.6 per cent of the total of effective loans made by private 
banks to Brazil between 1969 and 1976. 
Mexico received 2 074.7 million dollars up to 1975, which repre-
sents 33.8 per cent of the total; between 1971 and 1975 European loans 
accounted for 27.5 per cent of the bank loans made to Mexico. 
Argentina received 957.6 million dollars, i.e., 15.6 per cent of the 
total. European loans represent an important but variable proportion of 
the total of loans received by Argentina. 
Peru received 355.8 million dollars, 5.8 per cent of the tota1.114 
On the lending side, countries which form an important part of the 
Eurodollar market played a notable role: the United Kingdom (3 302.5 
million dollars, representing 53.8 per cent of the total); France (1 115.2 
million dollars, 18.2 per cent of the total); Luxembourg (212.9 million 
dollars, 3.5 per cent). The two other major sources of bank loans for Latin 
America have been the Federal Republic of Germany (600.3 million 
dollars, 10.7 per cent of the total) and Switzerland (272.4 million dollars, 
4.4 per cent). 
113Although exact figures are not available, it is estimated that these may have 
been in the region of 1 000 million dollars. 
114The figures for loans negotiated in the United Kingdom are not available 
and in view of the substantial loans obtained by Peru in the Euromarket, in which the 
United Kingdom figure may have been important, Peru's share of the total may well 
be underestimated. 
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Official financial flowslis 
Official bilateral financial assistance for development between 1969 
and 1975, in terms of a net flow from the European member countries of 
DAC to Latin American countries, amounted to 1 223.3 million dollars, or 
5.6 per cent of the total of the net bilateral ODA allocated by these 
countries to developing countries as a whole. This proportion did not 
increase in 1975. The low priority given by European countries to Latin 
America for development aid is thus evident. 
This low priority is practically confirmed in the case of all European 
countries. In four countries (Finland, the Netherlands, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Switzerland) the proportion allocated to Latin 
America ranged between 18.4 and 10.3 per cent of the total between 
1969-1975; in all other European countries the proportion was less than 
10 per cent. Particularly worth mentioning are the cases of France and the 
United Kingdom, which allocated to Latin America a mere 0.9 and 3.9 per 
115This heading includes "official development assistance" (ODA) and "other 
official lines of credit". The ODA has been defined by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD as the total contributions provided for developing 
countries and for multilateral institutions by the official organizations of developed 
countries, including local offices and negotiating entities in each country and at every 
level of operation, subject to the following criteria: (a) They are made with the 
essential aim of favouring the economic development and the improvement of the 
standard of living of developing countries; and (b) They have a favouring character 
and include an element of liberality of at least 25%. This "element of liberality" has 
in turn been defined as "equal to the nominal value of the financial commitment less 
the actual amount of amortization and of the foreseen interests (on the basis of an 
actualization rate of 10%r. On the basis of this definition, the member countries of 
DAC often label as ODA the donations of the public sector (in the form of technical 
assistance, foodstuffs and donations of technical equipment); the so-called "soft 
loans", including renegotiation of debts originating in loans of this kind; and 
contributions made to multilateral entities either in the form of contributions to the 
United Nations or as capital subscriptions to development banks. Much has been said 
about whether some of the financial flows included in this definition are actually 
"assistance for development" or not. In this report, considering that OECD informa-
tion will be used, these financial channels will be considered as such, excepting those 
loans made- by countries to their colonies or dependent territories in Latin America. 
Because the report published by OECD allows the separations of such lines of credit 
(very important in the case of France and less so in the case of the United Kigndom 
and the Netherlands), this analysis has concentrated on the bilateral flow between 
European countries and the independent countries in Latin America. "Miscellaneous 
financial flows", although they have never been so precisely defined as ODA, include 
all the rest of the bilateral financial transactions, among them Government-to-
Government loans, public credits to exporters, their refinancing, and those contribu-
tions made to multilateral organizations under conditions similar to those existing in 
the market. See OECD, Geographical distribution of financial flows to developing 
countries, op. cit. 
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cent respectively of their net ODA, contrasting vividly with the interests 
these countries have in Latin America and with their share of other types 
of financial flows.116 
Eighty-five per cent of the net European transfers accumulated in 
these seven years corresponds to three countries: the Federal Republic of 
Germany (54.7 per cent), the Netherlands (almost 20 per cent) and the 
United Kingdom (10.3 per cent),  
Two facts are worth mentioning in connexion with Latin American 
countries. The first of these is the relatively low amount of European ODA 
received by countries which have greater need for concessionary assistance 
(El Salvador, Honduras, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, etc.). Secondly, there is 
a concentration of ODA in a limited number of Latin American countries 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru). In the case of Cuba, in 1975 most of the 
European ODA came from three Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Finland 
and Norway. 
European contributions to the capital and the trust fund of the IDB 
are a recent development which is important not only because of the 
amounts involved, but also because of the implications in the diversifica-
tion of capital in the ID B . 
Other official financial flows between 1969 and 1975 were the 
bilateral loans for terms exceeding 12 months made by European countries 
to Latin America, which amounted to 907 million dollars.117 
Although no systematic information has been compiled, the data 
available for certain countries and years indicate that European participa-
tion in the grand total received by Latin America from all sources in the 
flows under consideration here, has been limited and has only exceptional-
ly exceeded 30 per cent. 
116It is probable that Latin America as a whole receives a higher proportion of 
less soft loans than donations. As the figures mentioned are for net flow (loans minus 
amortizations), the low priority given to Latin America is more clearly shown than if 
these were expressed as gross flow. 
117It has only been possible to obtain information on official bilateral loans 
for terms longer than 12 months to Latin American countries from series published 
by the World Bank on disbursements between 1969 and 1975. These statistical series 
present some problems. In the first place, it has not been possible to obtain data on 
Mexico and Venezuela; secondly, the World Bank has not published any information 
on Cuba, which is possibly one of the countries which have received more funds of 
this kind from European sources; neither does the World Bank publish any informa-
tion in its Debt Reporting System on other Latin American and Caribbean countries 
such as the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda and Haiti, nor on the Dominican Republic, 
Guyana and Paraguay; thirdly, the available information is probably incomplete and a 
certain number of operations may not be included; finally, it 4s nuite possible that 
many of the operations appearing in these series are not actually "miscellaneous 
official financial flows" but ODA-type operations which therefore have already been 
accounted for by the OECD series. 
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The greater part of the loans to the region made by European 
countries came from the Federal Republic of Germany (54.5 per cent of 
the total), Italy (12.3 per cent) and Spain (10.6 per cent), followed by the 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, in that order. 
A concentration of loans in a few countries is evident, and with the 
exception of Argentina the beneficiaries are the same as the major benefi-
ciaries of the 0 D A. In this period Brazil received 33.1 per cent of the total 
of official credits of European origin given to the region and Argentina 20 
per cent the other main recipients, in order of importance, Chile, Colom-
bia and Peru. These five countries absorbed 80 per cent of the total being 
official bilateral credits of European origin. 
Suppliers' credits118 
Europe provides Latin America with a high proportion of goods 
which are susceptible to payment on a long-term basis: principally capital 
goods for various activities and transport equipment. It is therefore not 
surprising that credits granted by European exporters should represent an 
important part of the total credits of this type received by Latin American 
countries. 
European suppliers' credits received by Latin America in 1973 
amounted to 65.2 per cent of the total suppliers' credits received by Latin 
America; in 1976 the proportion was 49.6 per cent. 
In 1976 the Latin American countries for which information is 
available received a total of 655.3 million dollars in suppliers' credits, of 
which 352.2 million came from European exporters. In 1973 European 
credit sources had accounted for 14 per cent of Latin American imports of 
machinery and transport equipment from Europe. 
In the case of Argentina, European suppliers' credits averaged 68.9 
per cent of the total suppliers' credits it received between 1969 and 1976. 
In the case of Brazil, between 1969 and 1973 European suppliers' credits 
amounted to 1 037 million dollars: 58 per cent of its total credits of this 
type. For Colombia, the European proportion of these credits in the 
period 1969 to 1976 was 76.9 per cent. In Venezuela (1969 to 1974) 
Europe accounted for 92.9 per cent, while for Mexico, the figure was 40.1 
per cent. Jamaica (90.7 per cent), Ecuador (80.4 per cent), Costa Rica 
(58.6 per cent), Bolivia (45.7 per cent) and Peru (41.8 per cent), are the 
remaining countries for which information is available regarding the 
118The information 
tary. For this reason, the 
other sources, information 
exceeding 12 months was 
less than 12 months are 
proportion of the total. 
available on suppliers' credits is both scarce and fragmen-
relevant data should be considered with) caution. Among 
provided by the World Bank on effective credits for terms 
consulted. Consequently, suppliers' credits for periods of 
excluded, and these may well represent a significant 
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proportion of European suppliers' credits in the total amount of suppliers' 
credits received. 
Among. European countries, the major sources of suppliers' credits 
are Italy and Germany, followed by France and the United Kingdom. 
V. THE FUTURE OF THESE RELATIONS. 
NOTES FOR ANALYSIS 
A complete and systematic analysis of the future relations of Latin 
America with Europe would go far beyond the purpose of this study. The 
aim here is merely to indicate, on the basis of the conclusions which 
emerge from previous chapters, a few lines of analysis for the study of 
some of the aspects considered to be particularly vital for the future of 
these relations. The following comments, therefore, should be taken 
merely as a starting point for the discussion and as a working hypothesis 
for future research.119 
Moreover, this study only deals with the industrial sector in relation 
to the international division of labour between Europe and Latin America. 
It examines the factors which affect trade between them, the evolution of 
the Latin American productive structure —especially in manufacturing—
and direct European private investment in Latin America. It does not deal 
with other questions such as relations in other fields —commodities, 
energy, finance, etc. 
The following notes refer in particular to relations with the more 
developed economies of Europe. The references to private investment 
apply mainly to the European countries with a market economy, although 
they may be extended, at least in some important aspects, to those with 
centrally-planned economies 
What is said here might also be applied, with due modifications, to 
Latin America's relations with other developed market-economy areas. 
Two time horizons have been used: 
(a) The long term: e.g., 10 to 20 years. 
(b) The transitional period, that is, the short to medium term: e.g., 
2 to 5 years. 
A. The long term 
Some points come to mind from previous chapters which should be 
highlighted in summary form as a basis for what follows: 
it 
9This chapter incorporates, with modifications, ideas presented in a paper 
prepared at the request of the secretariat by Ben Evers, Gerard de Groot and Willy 
Wagenmans, "Perspectives of industrial adjustment: the EEC and the developing 
countries". However, the opinions expressed in the present study are not necessarily 
those of these authors. 
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products, etc. Among the improved processes reference may be made to 
electro-chemistry, combustion technology, biotechnology, catalysis, etc. 
In other words, the production of these goods will probably be shared 
between developing and developed countries, the latter co-operating with 
the former in that part of production which takes place in them. 
A very important example of this type of sector is the iron and steel 
industry.123 Others would be the petrochemical and non-ferrous metals 
industries. It should be noted that the iron and steel industry is mentioned 
only by way of example, and not because it is more important than 
various other industries which would have served equally well as examples 
here. 
During the post-war period there was a very rapid expansion of the 
iron and steel sector in Europe, which in 1974 reached a level of steel 
production comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Technology changed considerably and spread widely; production 
techniques and the 2,tructure of the sector tended to become more 
homogeneaus in European countries. Productivity rose rapidly; the labour 
force fell from 469 000 in 1963 to 426 000 in 1971, in spite of the rapid 
increase in production. 
The sector is predominantly national in character in Europe, and 
international firms are on the whole exceptional (e.g., the case of ESTEL 
between Holland and West Germany). Domestic markets are relatively 
closed and function as oligopolies: in Europe 12 companies are responsible 
for 75 per cent of the production; in Japan 6 companies account for 80 
per cent of the production, and in the United States 9 companies produce 
71 per cent. 
In Europe steel production is under the aegis of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, which promotes and rationalizes the common 
market for iron and steel and can impose sanctions against restrictive 
practices by cartels and set minimum prices, as it is doing now because of 
the present recession. 
Between 1953 and 1971 international trade in iron and steel grew 
more rapidly than production: the latter doubled while the former 
quadrupled, and the proportion of international trade over production 
rose from 7.4 per cent to 13.7 per cent. Parallel to this there was a sharp 
change in the shares of individual countries in world trade between 1950 
and 1971. During this period the market share of traditional exporters 
(United States, Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain and the Federal 
Republic of Germany) dropped from 85 per cent to 46 per cent. In 
contrast, new exporters developed during the same period: Japan (whose 
share rose from 3.4 per cent to 22.2 per cent), the Soviet Union (from 4.1 
per cent to 7.9 per cent), and numerous developing countries. The devel-
oping countries have increased their presence mainly in recent years: 
123Ben Evers, et al., op. cit., pp. 41 and 42. 
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between 1970 and 1974 their share in the total iron and steel imports of 
the OECD countries increased from 2.8 per cent to 4.1 per cent, and 
between 1965 and 1971 the number of developing countries exporting 
these products rose from about 26 to 54. It must not be forgotten that the 
proportion of pig iron is greater in the imports coming from the devel-
oping countries than in the total; even though this proportion has di-
minished, it represented in 1970 9.2 per cent of the total imports of the 
OECD countries and 58.0 per cent of their purchases from developing 
countries. In 1974 these percentages were 9.2 per cent and 45.5 per cent 
respectively.124  The chief exporters of more highly processed products 
among developing countries are: Korea (55 per cent of imports from these 
countries), Argentina (7.5 per cent), Mexico (7.5 per cent), Taiwan (6.7 
per cent) and Brazil (4.0 per cent). 
The growing importance of developing countries in the world iron 
and steel industry is boosted by the increase in the number -of those 
countries which wish to export their raw materials in processed form, and 
by the increasing importance of their markets in this sector as a con-
sequence of their own development and industrialization. The interna-
tional division of labour between developing and developed countries 
which is now evolving appears to assign to the former the initial, more 
standardized phases of the process, while the developed countries tend to 
specialize in the more advanced phases, to which they attach strategic 
importance, and which involve greater technological requirements. 
The exports of iron and steel from developing countries to markets 
of the European Economic Community encounter considerable obstacles 
of three types: tariff and non-tariff barriers, transport costs, and the 
oligopolistic structure of these markets. 
The tariffs of the EEC increase in proportion to the degree of 
processing: from zero for iron ore they rise to 6.6 per cent for the 
semi-processed product and to 8.7 per cent for the processed product. The 
non-tariff barriers include import licenses, quotas, anti-dumping regula-
tions, administrative obstacles and support to the domestic industry 
(direct payments, investment incentives and tax relief measures). These 
non-tariff barriers are the result of internal pressures and are often of an 
ad-hoc nature. 
Fluctuations in export prices, insofar as they depend on markets of 
developed countries, are also greater for the processed products than for 
iron ore, pellets and cast iron, which are usually subject to long-term 
contracts. From the policies and measures applied it is clear that the 
European Economic Community considers this sector very important and 
is not prepared to sacrifice it despite the growing international competi-
tion. A policy of restructuring the industry is therefore being followed, 
complemented by a set of trade policy measures. 
124Source: OECD, Trade by commodities - Imports, 1970 and 1974. 
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(a) Latin America now has a very large domestic market for con-
sumer durables and capital goods of great significance to European ex-
ports, and even more for European technology and private investment. 
This market, based mainly on the middle-income strata, will increase in 
relative importance as a result of the high growth rate of the Latin 
American population, the increase in these middle-income strata and the 
incorporation into the market of sectors which are not yet part of it. 
(b) Latin America has a labour force with a relatively high and still 
rising general level of education. It has broad sectors with industrial skills 
and experience. A high and increasing proportion of this labour force is 
urban and must therefore be absorbed into manufacturing industry and 
the productive services connected with it. 
(c) The cost of labour in Latin America is still lower than in 
developed countries and, although the gap may be expected to lessen, it 
will continue to be significant for some time. 
(d) The region possesses abundant and varied natural resources, 
including mineral resources. The countries are clearly interested in 
increasing the degree of processing of exports of these goods. 
(e) If the aim is to prevent an intensification of the present serious 
problems of extreme poverty, marginality and unemployment in the 
labour force and instead to begin solving them in the long term, albeit 
slowly, a high economic growth rate of not less than 8 per cent must be 
achieved. 
(f) This poses delicate problems of external bottlenecks which can 
only be tackled successfully if exports of commodities maintain constant 
growth and stable prices, and above all if exports of manufactures to 
developed countries develop at a high rate. The present asymmetry of 
Latin American external trade, with exports mainly of commodities and 
imports of manufactures, is changing and must continue to do so, with an 
increase both in the proportion of manufactures in exports and also in 
their technological input, as part of the process of change in Latin 
America's position in the international economy. 
(g) Latin American industry has now reached a highly competitive 
level of development in a variety of goods, including consumer durables 
and capital goods. If this development is to continue, as it must in order to 
maintain the rising standard of living of the broad urban strata incor-
porated in the market, there must also be an increasing proportion of 
mechanical, chemical and metallurgical goods in exports, in addition to the 
more traditional manufactures. 
(h) The region also possesses a technological capacity which is by no 
means insignificant, although still insufficient and fragmentary. The 
strengthening of this capacity will be a very important policy objective in 
Latin America. 
(i) The protection given to industry will probably continue to be 
rationalized and reduced. However, in most of the countries of the region 
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government policy will probably continue to maintain a sufficiently high 
level of protection and support for national industry in order to carry out 
their policies for developing new industries, above all those of capital and 
basic intermediate goods. 
(j) The countries of the region will probably continue to give high 
priority to encouraging modes of operation on the part of foreign private 
investors and transnational corporations such as co-production, specializa-
tion and, to a lesser degree, subcontracting proper, and they will probably 
try to substitute these modes to a large extent for the traditional proce-
dures whereby foreign enterprises produced exclusively for the domestic 
markets. They will favour whenever possible the breakdown of the private 
investment package by means of a separate negotiation of its components 
(technology, management capacity, access to international markets and 
distribution networks). They will probably also prefer association 
arrangements between foreign enterprises and national public or private 
capital, as well as arrangements which would enable them to strengthen 
their national technological capacity and degree of self-determination. 
Access to domestic or regional markets by foreign enterprises may be 
made conditional upon their exporting a part of their production to the 
rest of the world and allocating to factories situated in Latin American 
countries the production of parts of some goods or of certain models of 
others. 
(k) The supply of high-technology goods will continue to depend to 
a large degree on imports from developed countries: since the demand for 
these goods increases very rapidly, imports by Latin America from those 
countries, including the European countries, will be very dynamic. 
(1) The availability of capital in Latin America will of course con-
tinue to be low in relation to labour and natural resources, in comparison 
with developed countries. 
Four cases of specialization and co-operation 
Bearing in mind the points summarized in the previous section, it is 
possible to identify in a very tentative and preliminary form four cases of 
manufacturing sectors. The possibilities of specialization by Latin 
American countries and of setting up activities of these sector in them, and 
the modes of co-operation with developed countries like those of Europe, 
are different in each of these cases. 
The grouping of sectors made here and the characteristics assigned to 
each represent simplifications whose sole purpose is to indicate some of 
the main factors involved, as well as possible policies of Latin American 
countries and modes of co-operation in each case, although of course the 
possibilities and problems differ from one Latin American country to 
another. A more specific case-by-case analysis will be required to reach 
conclusions permitting a decision on the course of action to be followed in 
each situation. 
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(a) Mineral-processing and chemical industries 
The goods processed by thee industries serve as inputs for other 
manufacturing industries or for construction. This sector includes, for 
instance, the iron and steel industry, some industries which process non-
ferrous metals, the petrochemicals industry, the fertilizer industry, etc. 
Generally these industries are very capital-intensive, their capital is 
often immobilized to a considerable extent and they have long lead-times 
for investment. They usually involve economies of scale, and the minimum 
size for plants is quite large. Technological renovation is important —a 
change in processes, for example, may enable mineral resources to become 
economically exploitable which were not so before. In some cases, rapid 
technological renovation occurs in one part of an industry, whereas 
technology changes less rapidly in another part. Thus, the petrochemical 
agreement of the Andean Group, for example, does not in general include 
products whose manufacture is subject to an excessively high risk of 
obsolescense. Labour intensity in relation to capital and product in actual 
production, i.e., in the plant, is low. These conditions give the indus-
trialized countries advantages in these sectors, through their resource 
endowment and technological capacity. 
On the other hand, mention must be made of the following features 
which explain the growing importance of these industries in Latin 
American countries. 
(a) Some of these industries generate external economies in the 
form of forward or backward linkages. Their production stimulates the 
establishment of other industrial activities to provide them with inputs or 
capital goods, or to use the goods which they produce in the manufacture 
of other goods, and in this way they have positive effects on the industrial 
structure. The iron and steel industry, the processing of some non-ferrous 
metals and certain chemical industries, for example, lead to the creation of 
industries which use these goods as inputs. 
In a preliminary study of the rayon industry in Argentina there is an 
analysis of two types of externalities which were presumed to be gen-
erated: (a) the appearance of suppliers and manufacturers of spare parts 
and equipment; and (b) technical services for clients.12° 
The social benefit may be greater than the private, and this may help 
to explain the support that governments usually give to these sectors. 
(b) The claim by Latin American governments of sovereignty over 
some non-renewable resources and their policies to achieve more local 
processing of the goods exported are designed to obtain a greater share for 
the country of the price paid by the final user abroad. The frequently 
oligopolistic character of the foreign markets of these goods and the desire 
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1DB/CEPAL research programme on scientific and technological subjects. 
Working monograph No 13. "Productivity, technology and local efforts in research 
and development", March 1978. 
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that some of the forward linkages of the processing activities should be 
situated in the country underlie these policies. Due to increased concern 
about the availability of some of these non-renewable natural resources, 
expressed in the Club of Rome Report and intensified by the increase in 
oil prices, the industrialized countries are very keen to ensure a regular 
supply of these. This provides the developing producer countries with 
greater bargaining power to attain their aims. 
(c) The domestic markets of some Latin American countries or the 
regional market may already account for an important part of the demand 
for production. In some cases such as steel, production has been tradi-
tionally below domestic demand. But even in other cases of industries 
originally set up for export, the national or regional market is undoubtedly 
acquiring a growing relative importance with the process of industriali-
zation. This sure domestic market gives the Latin American countries an 
advantage and strengthens the trend towards setting up industries for 
export too. 
(d) These industries often produce a high degree of pollution, which 
causes some developed countries to look with approval on the displace-
ment of the growth of these industries to developing countries.121  
The balance between these two groups of factors will possibly lead 
to the increasing implantation in Latin America of mineral-processing 
industries to satisfy a greater proportion of domestic demand and to 
export these commodities with a greater manufacturing value added; the 
development of basic chemical industries with intra-sectoral specialization, 
making the export of some goods compatible with the import of others; an 
increasing degree of participation of national public and private capital in 
the ownership of these industries; and co-operation between Latin 
America and enterprises of developed countries, such as the European 
countries, for the development of these industries, in some of the forms 
dealt with in chapter III, section C. It would seem that this prospect, as 
viewed mainly from the Latin American standpoint, might in its general 
features be acceptable to European developed countries. However, there is 
perhaps little hope that even in the long term these countries would allow 
the industries in question to be entirely transferred to developing coun-
tries.i 22 For strategic, political and economic reasons, the developed 
countries will possibly also try to control a certain proportion of their 
demand and to diversify their sources of supply, in order to avoid being 
placed in a vulnerable position by a too heavy and unilateral dependence 
on certain suppliers. At the same time it must be hoped that the trend will 
continue towards the development of technologies which save mineral 
natural resources by means of recycling, the substitution of industrial 
121  This subject, like those of the size of the domestic market for consumer 
goods, cost of labour, etc., was dealt with in chapter III, section B. 
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The serious internal difficulties of the EEC are manifested in struc-
tural excess capacity (only 65 per cent of installed capacity is in use), 
which is due to the large-scale expansion carried out before the beginning 
of the recession, the unfavourable evolution of domestic consumption and 
the deterioration in the Community's external position (exports minus 
imports). The recession has resulted in the loss of many millions of 
man-hours through workers being laid off and the work force being 
reduced: the employment outlook is not encouraging. 
During 1976 the European Economic Community took measures 
temporarily to relieve the crisis, using the instruments provided for by the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The worsening of the situation led 
to the extension of these measures into a full-scale crisis programme with 
objectives up to 1985 and 1990. In the short and medium term its aims are 
as follows: 
(i) To improve the profitability of the industry without expanding 
productive capacity for which purpose the EEC has suggested the 
application of price regulations for various iron and steel products, 
has increased the possibilities of financial support aimed at stimulat-
ing the shift towards a more modern and rationalized industry, and 
has proposed measures to support research with a view to improving 
productivity; 
(ii) To control the market, to which effect the EEC has introduced an 
"early warning" system paying special attention to imports and a 
series of anti-dumping regulations for iron and steel products; 
(iii) To mitigate the consequences of the readjustment process for the 
workers by means of the Social and Regional Fund. 
Although the programme for the iron and steel industry is the EEC's 
broadest programme for manufactures, it suffers from important short-
comings, since it is not binding upon business enterprises and governments 
and therefore its success depends on their willingness to adopt it, while 
moreover, a further expansion of demand is urgently required in order to 
avoid more serious problems for the industry. In these conditions the 
future of the sector is uncertain. 
Under these circumstances the possibilities for developing countries 
to increase their participation in the Community's iron and steel market 
are limited, at least until the industry of the Community's own member 
countries is in a better condition to compete. 
(b) Light industries for the production of final and semi-final non-durable 
consumer goods. 
The second group comprises light industries for the processing of 
agricultural and chemical products and the production of final non-durable 
consumer goods based on the former. It includes food and drink indus-
tries, together with others which process agricultural raw materials 
(textiles and clothing, leather and its products including footwear, light 
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chemicals such as paints, articles made of wood, etc.) and it covers both 
the production of goods exported in final form, and others which are sold 
abroad as intermediates with some degree of processing for use as inputs in 
other industrial processes. 
With all the reservations due in the case of a simplified generalization 
of this kind, these industries may be said to have certain features which 
favour their establishment by developing countries, such as those of Latin 
America: 
(a) A broad and increasing domestic market, since many of these 
goods are widely consumed by sectors with rather low incomes. 
(b) Capital intensity is generally not very high. 
(c) They require a medium or high proportion of labour which, 
above all, need not be highly skilled. There are, however, important 
differences in this respect, and also in respect of point (b) above, even 
among industries which form part of similar manufacturing groups. For 
example, the fibre and yarn industries are generally more capital-intensive 
and less labour-intensive than the clothing industry, whereas the latter is 
well-known for the high content of low-skilled labour which it requires in 
its productive process. 
(d) Technological renovation is not very rapid. 
Nevertheless, several developed countries, including European ones, 
maintain a large share and an active interest in the development of these 
sectors of manufacturing in the following ways. 
Firstly, they have a high degree of control over the distribution and 
marketing of some of these items, as in the case of certain food industries, 
such as dairy products, oils, etc. Advertising is an important tool to 
influence public taste and thus to maintain a degree of control over 
distribution. 
Secondly, even though technological change is not important some 
developed countries do in fact exercise leadership and a degree of control 
over some of these activities, either because they have the advantage in 
design, which is important for textiles or high-quality footwear, or because 
they introduce innovations in the presentation of the product or control 
patents, as in the case of food industries such as dairy products, choco-
lates, etc. The needs of urban life often reveal the advantages of new 
presentations of foodstuffs, such as packaging, etc. 
In brief, the Latin American countries possess important advantages 
for the development of these sectors, and it may be assumed that they will 
have a growing share in satisfying the growing world demand, including 
that of developed countries. Of course one cannot expect a complete 
displacement of these industries from North to South nor a total loss of 
participation and interest in them on the part of the developed countries, 
since the latter will possibly try to avoid an excessive dependence on other 
countries for the satisfaction of their own demand and will continue to 
exert influence through advantages of design, presentation. management of 
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distribution procedures and swaying public taste by means of advertising. 
The importance which these factors may have will also depend on the 
effort made by the developing countries to achieve a leading role. It must 
also be remembered that we are referring here to the long term: in the 
short and medium terms the growing protectionist trends, which will be 
discussed below, will play an important part. 
In other words, in the long term, within a production scheme shared 
by developed and developing countries, the Latin American countries 
ought to increase their share of total production, collaborating in some 
cases with enterprises of the developed countries. 
The prospect for the future may be projected on two time horizons: 
firstly, the long term, during which the factors examined below will have 
an important though not absolute influence on the specialization and 
participation of Latin American countries in the development of each type 
of sector; and secondly, the short or medium term, during which the 
rigidities caused by the already existing capacity and the current problems 
of unemployment, the balance of payments, recession and inflation will 
play a major role and will limit or hamper an advance towards the 
long-term goals. 
(c) Metal-working industries 
The third case comprises the metal-working industries producing 
durable consumer goods and capital goods which do not need highly 
sophisticated technology and which are often mass produced. An impor-
tant aspect of these industries is that they generally involve the assembly 
of parts produced by sub-sectors which differ considerably among them-
selves in respect of labour and capital intensity, technological require-
ments, etc. In the interests of simplicity two classes of sub-sectors or 
processes within each industry may be identified. 
One group of sub-sectors or processes is characterized by medium or 
high capital intensity, relatively low labour intensity and high technolo-
gical requirements. All these features often appear together, but even when 
this is not so, there are always at least exacting technological requirements, 
stemming from the fact that the industry as a whole involves a consider-
able degree of technological renovation and therefore its competitive 
development demands that considerable resources be devoted to research. 
A second group of sub-sectors or processes, in contrast to the 
former, is relatively low in capital intensity, high in labour intensity and 
uses technology which, although perhaps modern, is within the reach of 
developing countries. 
A clear example of this type of industry is the motor-vehicle sector. 
The production of the sector is organized on the basis of assembly plants 
and a considerable number of factories producing individual parts. 
The constant introduction of new models (and consequently of 
component parts) imposed by competition calls for a high degree of 
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technological capacity and capital intensity is also high in some of the 
processes for the production of certain parts: in other words, the industry 
includes sub-sectors or processes of the first type. On the other hand, the 
production of sqme parts or processes belongs to the second sub-group in 
that it calls for little capital intensity, a lower capacity for technological 
innovation, and only medium or low skills in the labour force.125 
The economies of scale are very different from one sub-sector to 
another: some can produce competitively on a relatively small scale, while 
others have strong economies of scale and therefore require plants of 
considerable size. 
The transnational corporations are generally the owners of trade-
marks and patents and are able to carry out the necessary technological 
research. The sub-sectors and processes of the second type can take place 
in separate plants which may even belong to national companies of 
developing countries, associated or not with the transnational enterprises. 
For these reasons, co-production and sub-contracting play a very 
important part in the organization of this sector in most countries of the 
world where it exists, including those of Latin America. This leads to an 
important international trade in the sector's products, since parts are often 
interchanged between plants in different countries. It also generates in 
each country a strong domestic trade in spare parts and components which 
is of considerable volume in relation to the production of the sector. 
In addition to the motor-vehicle sector there are several other 
industries with similar characteristics, such as electronics, consumer 
durables, mass-produced capital goods (multiple-use machine tools, 
tractors, boilers, shipbuilding, etc.). These sectors are also traditionally 
organized on the basis of various plants specializing in the production of 
different parts, together with assembly plants; the tendency to subdivide 
the industry into separate plants varies from one country to another and 
has tended to increase in recent years. For example, Japan has made great 
use of specialization among several plants within a single sector and this 
has led to very close co-operation between large plants and firms and other 
medium-sized and small ones producing parts: the former generally handle 
the technological side and are responsible for components and processes 
with a high capital intensity and powerful economies of scale, while the 
medium-sized and small firms specialize in products which are more 
labour-intensive and less capital-intensive and receive from the large firms 
the technical and financial assistance needed for them to produce com-
ponents which meet the cost and quality requirements imposed by the 
competitiveness of the industry as a whole. 
125  This semi-skilled or low-skilled labour force must, however, usually have a 
general education above a certain level. For example, in an assembly line each worker 
must carry out simple but varied and numerous operations, so that his general 
education cannot be very low. General education is also usually related to the 
responsibility and work habits needed in industry. 
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The transnational corporations which generally control the produc-
tion and technology of each sector are beginning to seek to shift the more 
labour-intensive part into countries where labour costs are lower: this 
involves not only labour with low specific skills but also more highly 
trained manpower, which is nevertheless less expensive in developing 
countries. An hour's work by a skilled labourer or engineer in a country 
like those of Latin America is cheaper than that of a worker or engineer 
with similar qualifications and experience in a developed country. This 
trend towards the displacement of sub-sectors into developing countries 
has been gaining in importance and will probably be intensified in the long 
term, particularly as a result of the growing competition by Japanese and 
European firms with those of the United States, which dominated the 
markets and sectors up to a few years ago. In the short and medium term, 
however, the developed countries may put up some resistance. 
The motor-vehicle industry, as discussed in the study mentioned 
earlier,126 is a good illustration of this type of sector. 
In four member countries of the European Economic Community 
(the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy) the 
motor-vehicle industry is very important. In 1973, in relation to total 
industrial production, it generated between 5.2 and 6.9 per cent of the 
value added and employed 5.5 per cent of the labour force. Its weight in 
the external trade of these countries was even greater, as it represented 
between 8 and 14 per cent of their total exports. 
This industry has undergone a marked process of decentralization. 
Until the end of the 1950s the motor industry was concentrated in a few 
large centres, such as Dagenham, Paris-Billancourt, Wolfsburg, Turin, etc., 
but during the 1960s there was internal decentralization towards other 
regions within the same European countries, prompted on the one hand by 
increased labour conflicts and the rise in wages, and on the other by the 
policies of the governments of these countries which encouraged decentra-
lization. 
At present a process of international decentralization is taking place. 
In some cases it has followed the process carried out within the same 
countries, while in others it has run parallel to it. This transnationalization 
is reflected in the rapid increase in the number of assembly lines. In 1974 
there were 550 lines in 81 countries, of which 80 (15 per cent) had been 
established in the last two years. Of this total, 350 lines (60 per cent) were 
for European, 98 (18 per cent) for Japanese and 85 (15 per cent) for 
United States vehicles. 
There are two main factors behind this international decentraliza-
tion. The first relates to labour. The motor-vehicle industry is relatively 
labour-intensive. In substantial parts of the production process the special 
skills required are low, although a suitable level of general education is 
126Ben Evers, et al., op. cit., pp. 36-39. 
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required, and the conditions of work in various stages of the process are by 
no means attractive, because of standardization and automation. For these 
reasons, in the above-mentioned European countries the industry brought 
in migrant workers from countries or regions with a lower income level, 
while labour conflicts continued to increase. This led to the beginning of 
a process of displacement of production into countries where labour was 
abundant and cheap. 
The second factor relates to the market. In order to improve their 
access to markets the firms have had to carry out a mutual interpenetra-
tion of the markets of industrialized countries (e.g., Volkswagen in the 
United States) and to establish assembly plants in developing countries, 
above all in those which maintained a high level of protection and were 
going ahead with dynamic industrialization processes, as was true of many 
Latin American countries. In the case of the developing countries, in 
addition to the processes aimed at producing for the domestic or regional 
market there is a perceptible trend towards displacing part of the pro-
ductive processes to these countries with lower labour costs with a view to 
producing for the international markets. This trend is prompted by the 
increasing competition of Japan, in addition to the excess of installed 
capacity in the European industry and the slow growth of demand in 
Europe. The import restrictions which the European countries might apply 
would not be very effective in the medium or long term, since the 
Japanese firms could retaliate by establishing production lines inside the 
European Economic Community. 
Some producers have now decided to displace labour-intensive parts 
of the production process into countries with cheaper labour, for sub-
sequent export to other markets. By way of illustration, the FIAT plants 
in Spain (SEAT) export to other developed countries; the Ford Fiesta 
model for the European market is produced in Spain; the Volkswagen 
plants in Brazil and Mexico are also oriented towards export; and the 
co-operation of firms with member countries of CMEA (FIAT in Poland 
and the Soviet Union, Renault in Rumania) has led to exports from those 
countries, above all to other European countries. 
With regard to assembly plants, as already noted elsewhere, pro-
duction may be expected to be increasingly displaced to developing 
countries with lower wages, while new models and the smaller production 
series of expensive models in some makes with a lower price-elasticity of 
demand will continue to be produced in developed countries where wages 
are higher. In addition to the allocation to developing countries of a large 
share of the international market for certain models, which was discussed 
in chapter III in connexion with specialization, the production of parts is 
also being divided up. The original situation in which the production of 
components was carried out near to the asembly plants has gradually 
yielded to the policy by the transnational enterprises of trying to multiply 
the sources of supply in order to avoid the risks of depending on a single 
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source for the supply of vital parts, and in order to promote more 
competition among suppliers. 
These trends towards decentralization have inevitably had political 
implications, in view of the great importance of the motor-vehicle sector 
for manufacturing, the industrial structure, employment and the inter-
national trade of the European countries. A reduction of 100 000 jobs in 
the European motor-vehicle industry is expected in the forthcoming 
decade, international competition is intense, and prospects are uncertain, 
not to say unfavourable. The European Economic Community encourages 
co-operation between firms at the European level, which reduces the 
ability of national governments to influence the development of their own 
industries, and the influence of the trade unions in each country may also 
be affected. 
With regard to the Latin American attitude in this respect, in 
addition to what was said in section C of chapter III reference should 
be made to the motor-vehicle agreement recently approved by the Andean 
Group, which establishes that each country should produce part of the 
components required for the vehicle in which it is going to specialize and 
may import the rest from abroad, always provided that these imports are 
offset by an equivalent value of exports of the components it produces. 
This compensated interchange constitutes a duty imposed on the final 
assembly plants, which will undoubtedly be under the control of some of 
the great transnational motor-vehicle enterprises. Permission to import 
part of the vehicle makes ii possible to avoid an excessive increase in cost 
or drop in quality which might result from compelling the enterprises to 
produce in the member countries components which these are not in a 
position to manufacture competitively either now or within a reasonable 
time: if they were forced to produce these components they would have 
to fix protection for the final article at a higher level than the maximum 
which the country or the sub-region is prepared to allow. The obligation to 
offset these imports with exports is a further example of terms imposed on 
transnational companies and enables the countries on the one hand to 
defend the balance of payments, and on the other to ensure the beginning 
of the regular export of parts of motors or vehicles. In Latin America it 
has generally been the case that, for an initial period, a condition of entry 
of a transnational company into the production market has been to 
include an increasing proportion of national (or regional or sub-regional) 
components in the production of the article in question. Only in a second 
stage (very recently introduced) have export obligations been introduced 
into the terms of entry or continued presence in the national or sub-
regional market. In the first stage the aim is to prevent the industry from 
consisting of the mere assembly of parts manufactured abroad. The pro-
duction of components provides a major part of the favourable technolo-
gical impact that the motor-vehicle industry produces on the economy as a 
whole. Consequently it is made a condition of participation in the sub- 
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regional market that the vehicles should contain increasing proportions of 
components produced by the Group. 
An interesting case in which production runs are not generally very 
long, except for certain parts, is that of machine tools for a single 
speciality. These are tools, such as specialized or high-precision lathes or 
milling machines, which are adapted to the specific needs of a particular 
industry or process; they are quite different from those of more general 
application which are used for repairs or in industries and processes which 
do not require very specialized machinery. In these cases, the machine 
cannot be mass produced. It has to be "made to measure" after a careful 
study of the industrial process in which it is to be employed. This requires 
highly qualified and technically specialized manpower, although not 
necessarily much infrastructure in the way of basic and applied research. It 
might be said that it is rather a case of craftmanship with a high technical 
content requiring the participation of specialized engineers. Some Latin 
American countries have now had considerable experience in producing 
this type of article, and they also have the advantage of the relatively 
lower cost of their trained manpower in comparison with developed 
countries. Similar examples can also be found in other capital goods, 
particularly if one assumes a concentrated research effort which, in both 
scope and quality, lies within the reach of Latin American countries. 
In brief, most of the Latin American countries, with due regard for 
the differences between them, have the interest and facilities to play an 
active part in the development of these sectors. They already produce 
many of these goods to supply their own markets and in many cases have 
already begun to export significant amounts. They have relatively lower 
costs for unskilled and even skilled labour. They wish to diversify their 
exports by incorporating these goods with a relatively high income-
elasticity of demand and a dynamic international market in comparison 
with commodities and the non-durable consumer goods produced by 
traditional industries. 
In addition to the advantage of available labour, the Latin American 
countries have the important advantage of the bargaining power provided 
by their own broad and increasing domestic market, and in recent years 
several governments have established conditions for permitting the entry 
of transnationals to produce for their domestic market. 
(d) High technology goods 
The fourth case consists of sectors producing specialized capital 
goods involving high technology. This group includes, among others, 
producers of equipment which determines the productive technology of 
other goods. 
The research carried out by these sectors is the factor which enables 
them to make innovations which, in turn, make it possible to achieve greater 
efficiency as regards the cost and quality of the goods produced with these 
types of equipment. The research required is complex and expensive and is 
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'generally beyond the reach of developing countries. The production of 
these goods does not necessarily imply a relatively high capital content, 
but it does demand very high levels of investment and technology costs. 
The manpower required is to a large extent of a very high technological 
standard. 
The industrialized countries will probably tend to shift resources 
into these industries so that they can exploit their advantage in the 
scientific and technical field, benefit from the high income-elasticity of 
demand for these goods, attain higher margins of profit by virtue of their 
technological superiority, and be able to pay their work force increasing 
wages in proportion to the higher qualifications required. 
In the case of Latin American countries, for a certain number of 
years their technological inferiority will not allow them to undertake the 
competitive production of some of the more complex of these goods: they 
will need to import them in order to produce in their turn, with up-to-date 
technologies, the goods manufactured with this equipment. 
In qualification of the foregoing paragraph, and with reference to 
exceptions which may in some cases be important, it is to be expected that 
some Latin American countries, particularly the more advanced ones, will 
undertake some processes or parts of the production of these goods and 
concentrating on this may lead to possibilities of competitive production 
both for the national and regional market and for export. The operation of 
plants in Latin American countries over a long period of years is gradually 
generating a fund of technical experience which facilitates a deeper 
knowledge of the processes, the introduction of minor innovations in the 
plants, and the provision of useful support in the installation of new ones. 
For example, in some cases involving the installation of a furnace, a 
distillery or a petrochemical factory, some Latin American countries have 
the capacity to build the plant, but not to design certain parts of it, and 
this has to be obtained from abroad. The engineering concern which 
provides the design needs to operate with a capacity for research and with 
an operational scope which in some cases is beyond the reach of these 
countries. It is possible to envisage a form of co-operation between Latin 
American countries and enterprises of developed countries in which the 
former contribute the construction and the latter the design and certain 
technologically complex parts. 
B. Conflict between long- and short-term objectives? 
The preceding section presented a long-term view of the type of specializa-
tion which Latin America might pursue, and the co-operation with 
European countries which might be sought in different sectors. This 
section will contain a brief analysis of some problems which arise in the 
short and medium term in the advance towards these objectives. 
In the case of the developed countries there appears to be a measure 
of conflict between, on the one hand, long-term objectives and the policies 
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appropriate for pursuing them and, on the other, short- and medium-term 
objectives and policies. First, a summary will be given of the policies for 
industrial reconstruction which are being followed by some of the 
principal European countries with market economies. Next, reference will 
be made to some of the major problems at present affecting the developed 
economies, with their restrictive effect on reconstruction, and to the 
protectionist policies of those countries. Finally, a proposal will be made 
on ways of reconciling long- and short-term objectives for the revival of 
the world economy. 
1. Policies for the restructuring of industry 
in the developed countries 
Following the interpretation given in the study mentioned earlier127 
concerning current policies to restructure industry in the industrialized 
countries of Europe, it might be said that they aim to bring about 
transformations in the manufacturing sector through three types of 
mutually complementary policies. 
Firstly, there are the policies designed to place the existing industries 
in those countries in a competitive situation vis-a-vis similar ones in other 
developed and developing countries. These policies apply in particular to 
sectors such as textiles, footwear and other leather industries, paper, 
automobiles, ship-building, iron and steel. They are intended to modernize 
obsolete machinery, rationalize the productive processes, and in general 
bring these industries up to date. They cannot, of course, completely 
overcome the potential disadvantages of these countries in these sectors, 
which stem from more permanent factors such as the high cost of labour, 
environmental problems, etc. 
Secondly, insofar as these policies are unable to eliminate the 
competitive disadvantages of these countries in the sectors in question, the 
developed countries of Europe can seek association with developing coun-
tries in order to share in the activities of these industries in the latter 
countries. In this case, the European countries are in a position to 
contribute elements such as technology, access to markets and capital. The 
developing countries can contribute labour, natural resources, an industrial 
environment and their own markets, in addition to the technical capacity 
which they already possess, as mentioned in chapter I. Production under 
these conditions would be destined not only to cover the demand of the 
countries where it is actually carried out, but would also be partly for 
export to the rest of the world, including the developed European coun-
tries themselves. 
127Ben Evers et al., op. cit., pp. 47 et seq. The study refers to the member 
countries of the European Economic Community; here the theory is extended to 
other developed European countries which are members of the OECD. 
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Thirdly, there are policies for the development of industrial sectors 
using advanced technology which aim to give them greater priority than 
hitherto in the sectoral composition of the industrial structure and in the 
allocation of productive resources. These sectors include, inter alia, 
computing and data-processing equipment, aircraft construction, telecom-
munications, nuclear technology, etc. The development of these sectors 
generally requires government support and in some cases also co-operation 
between European countries, as has occurred in some sectors in recent 
years. Government support can be provided in the form of measures to 
stimulate research and development, financial help, channelling of invest-
ments, sales promotion, etc. 
The transformation of the manufacturing structure, by progressively 
diminishing the role of the more labour-intensive industries with less 
intense technological change and giving increased priority to industries 
with more rapid technological change, more capital content and a highly 
qualified work-force, is one process by which the developed countries can 
sustain their wage increases and the general development of their econo-
mies. This measure is encouraged by some transnational enterprises as a 
result of the growing competition among them and among developed 
countries to win markets, which induces them to shift parts of industrial 
production processes to countries which possess certain cheaper elements 
of production. In chapter III some facts were given on the different 
progress made by transnationals of Europe, the United States and Japan in 
winning export and investment markets. 
In general the industries being restructured cater for demands which 
have been declining in developed countries as markets have gradually 
become saturated. In contrast, the demand for their products is still 
buoyant in Latin American countries, since the needs of the social strata 
already incorporated into the market have not yet been satisfied and there 
is a further great potential demand in the marginal strata. The dynamism 
of these manufactures is gradually being displaced from North to South. If 
there were also a shift to developing countries of part of the productive 
activity of these sectors (non-durable and durable goods, and some capital 
and intermediate goods), and if closer co-operation were achieved between 
these countries and the developed countries, the latter could still have 
dynamic prospects, while the developing countries, for their part, by 
obtaining part of the market of the developed countries, would receive a 
great boost to their production and exports and would increase their 
imports, both in these sectors and in others with advanced technology 
from the developed countries. 
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2. Short- and medium-term policies of 
the developed countries 
In the short and medium term, the application of these restructuring 
policies may produce maladjustments such as those which usually 
accompany transformations in the production structure. In this case in 
particular there are certain circumstances which must also be taken into 
account. In the first place, it is not a question of securing changes in 
isolated sectors which have little influence on the great macroeconomic 
variables: several very important sectors may be affected, with a great 
impact on the economy as a whole. In the second place, these changes are 
taking place at a time when there are also serious problems to be faced in 
the world economy. 
It is common knowledge, of course, that in the developed economies 
two problems arise, or are latent, simultaneously: the problem of reces-
sion, with a fall in the economic growth rate and consequent unemploy-
ment, and the problem of inflation. The growth rates predicted for the 
medium term in the economies of the OECD countries are lower than 
those maintained over long periods in the past. Open unemployment has 
reached high proportions in many of these countries, and although it has 
been reduced it is still a major problem; in some cases a further rise in 
unemployment has been avoided by a reduction in the proportion of 
foreign labour employed. The solutions are all the more difficult in that 
the measures for combating the recession may stimulate inflation, and 
those intended to limit the rise in prices may have a negative effect on the 
growth rate and on the recovery of economic activity. 
Although the present problem undoubtedly has a short-term com-
ponent, it is not purely a short-term phenomena. The present period is one 
of transition in the world economy, in developed and developing countries 
alike. Some of the factors which gave dynamism to their economies after 
the war are wearing out. To obtain new dynamic factors, transformations 
are required which involve time and important decisions. There is an 
overlapping of short- and long-term factors, and the solutions also need to 
combine the two time horizons: the problems cannot be eliminated in a 
short period. Furthermore, in addition to these changes, there is the 
transformation taking place in the international monetary and financial 
system. 
It must also be remembered that a change is taking place in the 
relative positions of the developed countries themselves. Not only is the 
bipolar world gradually giving place to a multipolar world, as seen in the 
increase in competition mentioned earlier, but there is also an intensifica-
tion of the differences in dynamism of the various OECD economies, which 
helps to explain the differences already existing among these countries in 
respect of the priority which they currently asign to long- and short-term 
considerations. 
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The measures adopted by developed countries, both European and 
others, to combat inflation and defend their balance of payments have a 
negative effect on their policies to restructure their industry and on their 
imports from Latin American and other developing countries. In the initial 
stage following the increase in oil prices, the surplus of the OPEC countries 
had its counterpart in a balance-of-payments deficit both in the developed 
and the developing countries. Gradually, however, the former succeeded in 
levelling off their balance of payments and the deficit is now confined to 
the developing countries. It should be borne in mind that this surplus of 
some of the OPEC countries will be substantial and prolonged: a factor 
which must be added to the number of transformations in the world 
economy mentioned above. 
Hitherto, by means of their deficits, the developing countries have 
helped to activate the economies of the developed countries. Conse-
quently, their rate of development, the performance of their exports and 
consequently of their imports, the deficit in their balance of payments and 
their external debt, are not aspects which should be considered any longer 
as being of interest only to the developing countries themselves: their 
problems are created by factors of the world economy as a whole, and 
their solutions will also have important implications for the performance 
of this same world economy. 
For these reasons it is a matter for concern that in the policies of 
developed countries short-term considerations may take precedence over 
long-term ones. An indication of this possibility is the substantial increase 
which may be observed in the protectionist policies of these countries. 
Indeed, one important expression of the concern over the problems just 
described is the growing protectionism in trade, to which reference was 
made in chapter II. 
As pointed out in a recent article in The Economist9 128 pressure 
groups in the industrial countries are becoming increasingly preoccupied 
by the prospect of "other Japans" flooding their markets and ex-
tinguishing whole industries, although the threat is exaggerated and there 
are benefits to both rich and poor from increasing trade in manufactures. 
The article classifies eleven countries, including two Latin American ones 
(Brazil and Mexico) as "NICs" (newly industrializing countries) and says 
that growing protectionism in the industrialized world against them means 
that the NICs, as well as Japan, are coming into the front line of 
protectionist fire in America and Western Europe. The backlash in parti-
cularly "sensitive" areas (e.g., textiles) is worrying enough —especially 
when the barriers thrown up are unpoliced (because "voluntary") and 
impossible to hurdle (because quantitative). More ominous still are the 
hints that the rich might disallow the basic development strategy that has 
produced those troublesome exports, in part because of Japan's mercan- 
128 The Economist, 10 June 1978, pp. 84-85. 
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tilist behaviour in piling up a seemingly permanent trade surplus. The 
article goes on to say that the products in which the NICs have so far 
scored their biggest gains are precisely those which the older industrial 
economies ought gradually to be abandoning in favour of more sophis-
ticated products needing the skill, research and development and capital 
that are scarce in industrializing developing countries. 
Three main groups may be distinguished as influencing the govern-
ments of industrialized countries to step up trade protectionism. They are: 
(a) the industrialists who see a possible threat to their own firms, (b) the 
labour unions, which are concerned about the threat to employment, and 
(c) minority groups and regions whose interests may be at stake in the case 
of particular industries. 
It has been observed that there is growing opposition from the 
Euippean trade unions to the way in which the new international division 
of labour is taking shape. This inference is based on certain declarations of 
the ICFTU —an organization which is rather representative because of the 
dominance of European unions (AFL-CIO left the organization in 
1969).129 
Neo-protectionism is aimed particularly at the semi-industrialized 
countries, including several Latin American ones, and the industries most 
affected by this resurgence are precisely those that are of great importance 
to Latin America. Here there is a clear example, moreover, of attempts to 
solve short- and medium-term employment and balance-of-payments 
problems which interfere with efforts to achieve longer-term objectives of 
economic restructuring. 
3. Reconciliation of long- and short- 
term objectives 
It therefore seems undeniable that some conflict exists between the long-
and short-term aims of the developed countries. On the one hand, they 
must transform their economies by shifting their attention and economic 
resources from traditional sectors into other more dynamic ones, in order 
to create the conditions for a new stage of vigorous development. On the 
other hand, these same transformations may aggravate short-term unem-
ployment and balance-of-payments problems. If these short-term con-
siderations prevail, the advance towards the necessary transformation will 
be hampered and the period of uncertainty, difficulty and low growth 
rates will inevitably be prolonged. 
In practice it can be assumed that the policy of the developed 
European countries will combine both elements in the next few years. This 
will probably mean that the rate of restructuring industry will be slowed 
down and its form modified. 
129Ben Evers, et al., op. cit., pp. 72-82. 
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In the abovementioned studyl " a summarized account is given of 
the industrial restructuring policies of various developed European coun-
tries: the conclusion which emerges from this account is that these 
individual policies give different priorities to considerations of long-term 
restructuring compared with the short term. Moreover, just as the strength 
and characteristics of the economies of these countries differ, so there is a 
difference in the importance given by their governments to social and 
political considerations closely linked to the problems of the present 
situation. 
How to combine both time horizons and achieve a gradual advance 
which would not create unmanageable disturbances in the short term, but 
which would at the same time ensure steady progress in the right direction, 
is a problem of economic policy which interests both groups of countries. 
For the developed countries the growth of the developing economies, 
especially those which have achieved semi-industrialization like many 
Latin American countries, promises to be the "engine of growth" which is 
so much needed. For the developing countries the subject is even more 
vital: on the achievement of adequate international co-operation to 
complement their domestic effort depends their possibility of tackling 
with some hope of success t he grave problems of mass unemployment and 
poverty and their economic, social and political consequences. 
Finally, from the Latin American standpoint, it is essential that the 
international co-operation policies in different fields (trade, private invest-
ment, finance and technology) should be viewed not only separately but as 
a whole. Partial considerations and separate negotiations in different 
specialized fields may be necessary from the practical point of view, but if 
the relation between these different fields is not at the same time taken 
into account, there can be no accurate interpretation of the nature of the 
problems nor an adequate approach to their solution. Let us take two 
examples. 
In the first place, greater access to the markets of developed coun-
tries for the manufactures of the region, and in consequence a more rapid 
growth rate for their total exports, relieves the need for external financing 
and reduces the effect of debt servicing on the balance of payments and on 
the capacity to import. 
In the second place, m discussions on the restrictions which some 
developed European countries place on imports of Latin American goods, 
sufficient importance is not attached to the fact that Latin America 
constitutes at the present time, and will do so even more in the future, one 
of the most important areas for private European investment in the world. 
The investment possibilities in this region strengthen the international 
corporations and their capacity to sustain on an adequate scale the heavy 
costs of research and development involved in achieving technological 
130 Ben Evers, et al., op. cit., pp. 72-82. 
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innovations, which in their turn generate the competitive capacity of the 
European countries throughout the world. Reference has already been 
made to the great bargaining power which Latin America possesses in 
virtue of its extensive domestic market. This bargaining power is important 
in relation both to private investment and to trade, finance and techno-
logy. To link this interest in the Latin American market on the part of 
European investment with the treatment of Latin American exports in 





LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE INDEX 
Year 
Oil- 	 Non-oil- 
exporting exporting 
countriesa 	 countries 
Latin 
Americab 
1950-1954 179.9 124.0 134.7 
1955-1959 182.6 104.6 121.5 
1960-1969 122.6 95.9 101.5 
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971 112.9 92.8 96.9 
1972 111.5 97.5 100.3 
1973 131.6 108.6 113.1 
1974 273.0 100.2 127.8 
1975 235.5 89.0 110.1 
1976 225.2 94.6 113.3 
Source: CEPAL, official data. 
aComprising Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. 
bExcluding Cuba, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Table II 
STRUCTURE OF WORLD TRADE' 
Current values 
1950 1960 1973 1974 1977 
Food and raw materials 25.7 36.7 113.0 141.8 176M 
Fuels 5.5 10.6 55.4 156.4 192.9 
Manufactures 24.2 57.7 313.7 416.8 578.5 
Total 55.4 107.8 488.3 724.0 961.3 
Constant values 
(billions of dollars at 1974 prices)b 
Food and raw materials 55.0 77.3 144.9 141.8 162.2 
Fuels 27.2 52.7 156.9 156.4 152.4 
Manufactures 8.0 111.5 380.4 416.8 481.7 
Total 140.2 243.5 681.6 724.0 818.7 
Percentage breakdowns 
Food and raw materials 46.4 34.9 23.4 19.8 18.6 
Fuels 9.9 10.1 11.5 21.9 20.4 
Manufactures 43.7 55.0 65.1 58.3 61.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 







Food and raw materials 6.8 7.4 4.1 
Fuels 35.1 14.1 6.6 
Manufactures 23.9 12.5 16.4 
Total 17.4 11.1 6.7 
Sources: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1978, vol. I and 
E/CEPAL/1024/Rev.1, table 2, page 172. 
aExcluding trade of countries w ith centrally planned economies. 
bCurrent values deflated by the unit value of each SITC section. 
sin terms of current values. 
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SHARE OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN EXPORTS 






France 1.7 1.7 7.8 
Italy 2.4 3.2 9.4 
Federal Republic of Germany 5.1 5.3 8.2 
Rest of EEC (6) 5.4 5.7 7.8 
United Kingdom 9.1 4.3 4.0 
Rest of EFTA 3.6 2.6 6.4 
Rest of Western Europe 3.5 7.5 12.1 
Source: CEPAL, official data. 
aExcluding Cuba. 
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IMPORTANCE OF SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS 
MARKETS FOR EUROPEAN EXPORTS? SHARE OF EACH 
COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES IN TOTAL 
SALES TO LATIN AMERICA 
Rest Total 
Argen- 
Brazil 	 CALM Mexico 
Andean 	Carib- ofin Latin Lat . tins 	 Group bean 	Ameri- Amert- caa 
ca 
CEE (6) Percentages 
1955 21.6 21.8 	6.0 	32.0 4.7 1.8 12.1 100.0 
1975 11.6 36.5 11.0 28.2 4.4 2.0 6.3 100.0 
EFTAb 
1955 16.0 18.9 	5.5 	29.4 2.6 16.8 10.7 100.0 
1975 9.3 33.8 11.3 20.9 4.6 12.9 7.2 100.0 
CMEA (European) 
1955 69.6 24.1 	0.6 	1.9 0.6 1.3 1.9 100.0 
1975 20.5 48.7 4.7 14.6 3.3 1.0 7.2 100.0 
Rest of Europe 
1955 21.0 60.9 	3.0 	6.0 0.8 - 8.3 100.0 
1975 12.8 23.0 10.7 38.7 4.9 1.9 8.0 100.0 
CIF value of Latin 
American imports 
at current prices 
from: Billions of dollars 
EEC (6) 
1955 265 267 	74 	392 57 22 148 1 225 
1975 938 2 955 891 2 283 360 162 510 8 099 
EFTA 
1955b 140 166 	48 	258 23 148 94 877 
1975b 324 1 176 392 726 159 451 251 3 479 
European socialist 
countries 
1955 110 38 	1 	3 1 2 3 158 
1975 100 237 23 71 16 5 35 487 
Rest of Europe 
1955 28 81 	4 	8 1 11 133 
1975 94 169 79 285 36 14 59 736 
Source: CEPAL, official data. 
aExcluding Cuba. 
bOriginal EFTA countries. 
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Table IX 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, 
BY DESTINATIONS, 1977 
(Millions of dollars and percentages) 

















Chemical products 724 20.7 642 28.9 549 28.7 316 21.7 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 	1 248 35.7 487 21.9 268 14.0 241 16.5 
Other manufactures 1 527 43.6 1 092 49.2 1 094 57.2 902 61.8 
Total 
manufactures 	3 499 100.0 2 221 100.0 1 911 100.0 1 459 100.0 
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 1979. 
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Table X 
VALUE OF IMPORTS BY EEC (9) FROM LATIN AMERICA 
(Millions of dollars) 
1960a 1965a 1970b 1974b 1977b 
011 	 Meat 196.6 245.2 296.5 315.2 330.0 
041 Wheat 50.0 121.0 41.4 84.5 62.1 
044 	 Maize 163.0 221.0 252.4 363.5 283.7 
051.3 Bananas 166.7 171.3 271.9 384.2 
061 	 Sugar 109.3 102.2 135.7 494.4 305.4 
071 Coffee 345.4 466.7 674.0 946.7 2 676.7 
072 	 Cocoa 44.1 18.6 31.2 126.7 259.9 
081.4 Fish meal 102.7 138.6 73.5 77.1 
263 	 Cotton 156.1 234.6 169.6 262.1 179.0 
262 Wool 131.6 168.8 92.4 106.7 247.7 
281 	 Iron ore 138.5 160.6 260.3 602.5 599.2 
622 Copper 583.3 
283.1, 682 	Copper 273.4 515.7 736.0 
283.4 	Lead 11.2 12.4 36.3 29.8 363.5' 
283.5 Zinc 7.9 6.0 14.6 94.6 
42 	 Vegetable oils 50.4 62.6 89.3 230.1 173.7 
12 Tobacco 21.2 42.5 46.2 91.0 210.2 
21 	 Leather 46.6 45.4 61.2 35.2 49.9 
24 Wood 21.2 45.1 42.0 71.2 91.5 
Total above products 	 1 493.1 	2 495.5 	3 068.7 	4 935.6 6 877.1 
Total imports from Latin America 	2 768.8 5 187.6 4 613.3 8 735.7 12 191.7 
Above products as a percentage of 
total imports 53.9 48.1 66.5 56.5 56.4 
Total imports of basic 
commodities 	 2 330.7 	3 177.6 	4 020.2 	6 961.5 9 665.2 
Above products as a percentage 
of total imports of basic 
commodities 64.1 78.5 76.3 70.9 71.2 
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series C, several years. 
alncludes 20 Latin American republics. 
bincludes the 20 republics plus 4 Caribbean countries. 
clncludes all ores and concentrates of non-ferrous metals. 
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Table XI 
EEC IMPORTS OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES FROM LATIN AMERICA 
(Millions of dollars) 















































Source: OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics Series C, several years. 
aBetween 1965 and 1977. 
bBetween 1970 and 1977. 
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MEXICO: ORIGIN OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(Percentages) 
Country 1970 1975 
United States 79.4 72.2 
Federal Republic of Germany 3.4 5.8 
United Kingdom 3.3 4. 7 
Switzerland 2.7 4.2 
Canada 1.6 2.0 
Japan 0.9 1.9 
Netherlands 1.8 1.9 
France 1.6 1.5 
Italy 2.0 1.5 
Others 3.3 4.3 
Sources: 1970: Bernardo Sepulveda and Antonio Chumacero, La inversion extranjera 
en Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, Mexico City, 1973; 
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